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Abstract 
 
Vulnerability, an abstract concept in health research, has concrete effects both on those 
who are labelled vulnerable and those who are not. It has been used increasingly as an 
exclusion criterion in research but has been the least examined from an ethical perspective 
despite being linked in most research ethics guidelines and codes, both international and 
local, to questions of justice and informed consent. Neither has there been an agreed upon 
standard for identifying and responding to vulnerability. The guidelines, despite categorizing 
vulnerable research participants into groups and subpopulations, do not offer a robust and 
comprehensive definition of vulnerability.  
The study aimed to analyse the notion of vulnerability in health research with a view to 
constructing an operational definition of the concept which would assist researchers and 
RECs to identify and understand vulnerabilities and strategize on maximizing protections for 
the participants without obstructing essential research. 
Using normative, metaethical and historical methods of bioethical inquiry, this research has 
shown that the categorization of people into vulnerable groups is not justified as it could 
result in obstructing research, and paternalistically excluding participants from necessary 
research, or inadequately protecting participants enrolled in research. The study has 
resulted in an appropriate operational definition of vulnerability and a Vulnerability 
Assessment Scale being developed to assist Research Ethics Committees and researchers 
identify participants with vulnerabilities and develop focused safeguards for their 
protections. The concept of vulnerability in health research is no longer nebulous and vague 
and its definition is therefore no longer an unanswered question. 
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Chapter 1: A STUDY OF VULNERABILITY IN HEALTH RESEARCH: BACKGROUND 
1.1: INTRODUCTION  
Vulnerability is used and referred to increasingly as a criterion in health research. It is, 
however, a concept that is perhaps the least examined from an ethical perspective in the 
context of research ethics. It is linked in most research ethics guidelines and codes, both 
international and local, to questions of justice in selection of participants, limitations of 
capacity to provide informed consent and unequal relationships between disadvantaged 
groups and researchers and sponsors. Because so many groups are now considered to be 
vulnerable in the context of clinical research, some commentators have expressed a concern 
that the concept has become too broad and hence lost its gravity and weighting1. In this 
chapter I briefly introduce the concept of vulnerability in health research and argue for the 
need to do this study. I conclude this chapter with an outline of the remainder of the thesis.  
1.2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
This section provides a brief overview of the issues associated with the notion of 
vulnerability in health research. These will be expanded upon in the chapters that follow.  
1.2(A) Defining Vulnerability 
It is generally accepted that one of the principal tasks of ethics in research is that of 
protecting participants from exploitation and other forms of harm2. According to the South 
African Concise Oxford Dictionary3 the term “vulnerable” originated from the Latin term 
“vulnerare”, which means “to wound”. The meaning of vulnerable as offered in the 
dictionary is “exposed to being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally”. If one 
is to extrapolate from the dictionary definition of vulnerable, it would follow that ethics in 
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research is about protecting vulnerable people against harm and that all those who 
participate in research, if we take the definition above, are vulnerable.  
Because research is a systematic set of activities to obtain certain answers to questions, the 
uncertainty principle is integral to research. Health research will involve uncertainty about 
the effects of interventions and outcomes on research participants.  Hence, at all times 
there is the risk that participants involved in health research could be harmed. While the 
concept of vulnerability has developed broadly, vulnerability per se may narrow the focus of 
ethics in research, by diverting attention from important features of research like the 
institutional, social or economic environments where contexts in themselves can result in 
harms to participants1.  
1.2(B) Historical Perspective 
Although the concept of vulnerability has not been adequately researched, it is not new. 
Vulnerability was referred to in 1978 in the Belmont Report4, in the Declaration of Helsinki 
(DoH) in 20005 and the 2002 version of the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects of the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS)6. The 2008 version of the DoH makes specific reference to vulnerability in 
two sections, articles 9 and 177, and the 20138 version in articles 19 and 20b. 
Exploitation of vulnerable groups and populations has transpired in health research for over 
a century9.  For example, in 1897, Giuseppe Saranelli, an Italian researcher, injected several 
vulnerable subjects with the organism that he thought caused yellow fever with resultant 
morbidity and mortality, which is a scientific way of saying sickness and death. As news of 
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this spread around the world, scientists and researchers were harshly criticised for treating 
human beings as guinea pigs10.  
In the 1960s the works of Beecher from the United States (US) exposed much of the world 
to exploitation in research that was taking place in the scientific community.  Beecher 
published an article highlighting 22 studies that were published in respectable journals and 
had been conducted unethically.  Beecher’s article showed that there were many ethical 
violations taking place in research, even among prominent researchers11. This was followed 
by widespread discussion in the US of wrongful research conducted there. These studies 
included the Willowbrook State School hepatitis study in children12, the Brooklyn Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital cancer research in elderly debilitated and indigent patients13, and 
the Tuskegee Syphilis study in poor African-American men14. The Nazi war atrocities 
involving harmful and dangerous research on prisoners are a further example15. Africa has 
not been spared either. Africa as a continent has large populations living in extremely poor 
conditions, which in itself is a form of vulnerability. Literacy is low or non-existent. Health 
care in these contexts is, in the main, minimal with the majority of Africans accepting 
authority without question16. It is therefore not surprising that as the demands for more 
stringency in research increased over the past 20-30 years as Western country researchers 
spread into the developing world to sites with medically naive populations, several incidents 
of unethical research involving vulnerable populations have been reported17-26. Hence, the 
need for reflection and examination of vulnerabilities in health research has been present 
for many decades.                     
 
 
4  
 
1.2(C) Human Vulnerability 
Being human, by implication, denotes vulnerability, with all humans beings exposed at some 
stage or other to the risk of suffering harm against their personal integrity, be it physical, 
emotional, psychological and / or spiritual27.  Hence, human vulnerability is intrinsically 
connected to the essential notion of personal integrity and could be perceived as an 
inescapable dimension of human life and an integral component in the shaping of human 
relationships. Human vulnerability acknowledges that at some point, all human beings may 
lack the ability to protect themselves from harms which at times may even be inflicted by 
other human beings. While humankind as such is vulnerable, there are individuals, groups 
and situations for whom greater attention needs to be paid27.       
1.2(D) Approaches to Describing Vulnerability in Health Research 
A number of different approaches to describing vulnerability in health research have been 
proposed. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
draft document on the subject27 highlights two fundamental categories in respect to 
“special vulnerabilities” in the context of health research as being special disabilities, 
disease and limitations imposed by the stages of human life and social, political and 
environmental determinants. The document further states that vulnerability should be 
viewed with regard to its nature, cause and context, and possible remedies are suggested. 
Ballantyne and Rogers provide a conceptual definition that generates a theoretical 
framework for considering different sources of vulnerability28.  They further elucidate that 
while vulnerability exists as a broad spectrum rather than a simple present / absent 
dichotomy, it is still possible to identify individuals / groups that are particularly vulnerable 
in research. They draw a distinction between two sources of vulnerability at a conceptual 
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level: extrinsic, as a result of external circumstances, e.g., social, and intrinsic, which is due 
to internal qualities of individuals themselves, e.g., medical illnesses, mental disabilities and 
extremes of age. Both these types raise complex ethical issues in the context of health 
research and while often appearing independently, may coexist and are sometimes 
interrelated28. Kipnis proposes a bioethical taxonomy when considering vulnerability in 
clinical research in which six types of vulnerability are distinguished by a positive response 
to a unique question.29. They are cognitive, juridic, deferential, medical, allocational and 
infrastructural. Other commentators include a seventh type, that of social vulnerability27.  
Robert Levine classifies vulnerability on the basis of risk of harms and the reasons why these 
participants are vulnerable30. While the National Health Act (NHA)31 in South Africa (SA) 
refers to vulnerability when discussing research priorities for the country and local guideline 
documents32,33 make mention of vulnerabilities in research, there is no guiding framework 
to assist the researcher and Research Ethics Committees (RECs)  in recognising vulnerability, 
its nature, type and context with a view to offering recommendations on strategies for 
protection against exploitation. Moreover, the South African Department of Health 
Guidelines, “Ethics in Health Research, Principles, Structures and Processes”32 (SA Ethics 
Guidelines) replaces “vulnerable” with “subpopulations requiring added protections in 
health research”. However, several shortcomings of the subpopulation focus have been 
highlighted29 and while there may seem to be something common to these disparate 
groups, it is not really apparent what that characteristic or set of characteristics is.              
1.2(E) Vulnerability, Exploitation, Risk and Harm 
That vulnerability is associated with a strong potential for exploitation must be highlighted. 
The fact that research participants require protection from exploitation underscores a highly 
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disturbing issue in this context: that the researcher, sponsor and others may see an 
opportunity to capitalize and take unfair advantage of the situation to the individual’s or 
group’s detriment34; hence the concept of exploitation. It is stated that this concept is also 
complex and at times ambiguous34. Resnik has proposed three basic elements, at least one 
of which is requisite for exploitation to be present: harm, disrespect and injustice35. In 
practice, however, these elements often overlap and interact. At an operational level, 
exploitation can result when, despite the risk of harm being recognised, the risky action is 
embarked upon with resultant harms. Weijer describes four categories of risk in research36. 
These are exacerbated where participants are vulnerable. The risk categories are physical, 
psychological, social and economic. While Weijer does not consider harm categories, 
because harms follow risks, harm categories should be in line with risk categories.  
1.2(F) Protectionism  
Protectionism is a well-entrenched principle in the ethics of research. Controversy does not 
lie in the existence of this principle but in its application, especially in light of several 
nuanced interpretations of the principle. In addition, alternative perspectives on 
protectionism have been offered9. Moreno distinguishes three versions of protectionism, 
weak, moderate and strong, framed in terms of how much discretion an investigator should 
be allowed when it comes to managing human participants in research. The critical issues in 
his analysis are the relationship among protections, the demands of science and the manner 
in which the conduct of researchers should be monitored and controlled.    
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1.2(G) Vulnerability, Personal Integrity, Human Dignity and Ethical Principles 
The notion of vulnerability is closely linked with the notion of personal integrity. Where 
participants are vulnerable, there is potential for their autonomy to be infringed. This could 
impact negatively on their rights – not only to bodily and psychological integrity37, but also 
to that of human dignity38. Human beings are moral agents and hence have rights to their 
own values and preferences. When vulnerable, one or more of the elements of informed 
consent39 could be eroded, resulting in individuals participating in research as a 
consequence of coercion and / or lack of understanding. Kipnis29 states that  
“... in the minds of many investigators the paradigmatic research subject remains 
more or less a mature, respectable, moderately well-educated, clear thinking, 
literate, self-supporting US citizen in good standing – that is, a man who could 
understand a 12-page consent form and act intelligently on the basis of its contents.”  
This description is a far cry from the typical research participant in Africa where levels of 
literacy are low and poverty rife. Yet, in collaborative international research, the consent 
forms presented to the Research Ethics Committees for review and approval are often those 
designed for the literate US citizen.     
Beauchamp and Childress have proposed four clusters of principles which derive in the 
common morality as being central to biomedical ethics40. The four clusters comprise:  
(1) respect for autonomy (a norm where the decision-making capacity of 
autonomous persons are respected);  
(2) nonmaleficence (a norm requiring avoiding the causation of harm);  
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(3) beneficence (a norm that provides for benefits and for balancing benefits against 
risks and costs); and  
(4) justice (a norm for distributing benefits, risks and costs fairly).  
This cluster of principles is utilized extensively in the context of health research ethics 
discourse and is intricately interwoven in the notion of vulnerability in health research, 
similar to ethical theories like Deontology and Virtue Ethics as will be shown in the following 
chapter.  
1.3 DEFINING HEALTH RESEARCH 
There are two acceptable definitions of research in the context of health in SA, i.e., from the 
Department of Health’s NHA31 and from Academy of Sciences of South Africa41 (ASSAf).  
The NHA31 in its definitions section states that: 
 “... health research includes any research which contributes to the knowledge of – 
(a) the biological, clinical, psychological or social processes in human beings; 
(b) improved methods for the provision of health services; 
(c) human pathology; 
(d) the causes of disease; 
(e) the effects of the environment on the human body; 
(f) the development or new application of pharmaceuticals, medicines or related 
substances; and 
(g) the development of new applications of health technology.” 
Section 72(7) of the NHA describes clinical trials as:  
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“... a systematic study, involving human subjects that aims to answer specific 
questions about the safety or efficacy of a medicine or method of treatment.”  
From the above broad characterization of health research and clinical trials, it is clear that in 
the South African context this definition is not restricted to projects in the health sciences 
disciplines only and would cover a range of studies from other disciplines, e.g., the 
Humanities where social science studies involving individuals with vulnerabilities are a 
conducted and would also require review by a Research Ethics Committee (REC). 
In November 2009, the ASSAf in its consensus report on “Revitalising clinical research in 
South Africa. A study on clinical research and related training in South Africa”41 defined 
clinical research as  
“... research primarily conducted with human participants (and on materials derived 
from them, such as tissues, specimens and cognitive phenomena) during which 
investigators examine the mechanisms, causation, detection, progression and 
reversal of human disease.”  
While the ASSAf definition also encompasses a wide variety of research from a range of 
disciplines, it is not as extensive as that in the NHA and it could be interpreted as excluding 
studies involving the social processes in humans. It is inevitable that the subject matter of 
this research is inclusive of social aspects as pertaining to health and hence the more 
appropriate definition to use in this study is that of the NHA. Hence, despite there being two 
recognised and acceptable definitions of health research in the country, all reference to 
health research in SA in this thesis will be specifically in the context of the definition in the 
NHA.   
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1.4 AIM OF STUDY 
Although several documents exist that provide a baseline for research participant 
protections, vulnerable participants require ethical consideration that goes beyond the 
baseline. There is no agreed upon standard for identifying and responding to vulnerability, 
especially in the African context29. Moreover, the guidelines, despite categorizing vulnerable 
research participants into sets of subpopulations, do not offer a robust and comprehensive 
definition of vulnerability. In addition, as will be seen in some of the chapters that follow, 
various approaches to the issue of vulnerability including its definition are offered in the 
literature. However, again, none is robust or comprehensive. The aim of my study therefore, 
is to analyse the notion of vulnerability in health research with a view to constructing an 
operational definition of the concept which will assist researchers and RECs to identify and 
understand vulnerabilities and strategize on maximizing protections for the participants 
without stopping essential research. 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THESIS  
Prior to embarking on the analysis of the notion of vulnerability, an appreciation of the 
approach to ethics in the context of health research is essential and hence Chapter II 
focusses on the approaches to ethical enquiry. A discussion of moral status and its link to 
human dignity and vulnerability in the research context is also necessary for the analysis. 
The objective of chapter III therefore is to explore the concepts of moral status and human 
dignity and their relationship to vulnerability and how all three concepts are intricately 
linked in health research. This thesis also gains from historical inquiry as health research has 
been responsible for creating historically unprecedented ethical problems and has also 
added new dimensions and complexities to old problems42. In chapter IV abuses and 
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exploitation in research with resultant violations of human dignity and disrespect for moral 
status leading to protectionism will be described and discussed. Chapter V examines and 
analyses international guidelines and codes in terms of how they have handled specific 
vulnerabilities. Because of the rapid progress in systematic health research in the 20th 
century, and because of the offensive way in which it was misused by researcher-physicians 
from many countries43, a historical approach will be utilised again in order to explore the 
treatment of specific vulnerabilities in these protective instruments through time. Using the 
same historical approach, Chapter VI deals with the national protective instruments 
approach to vulnerability in SA and because of the large number of health research projects 
undertaken in SA but funded by the US, US national protective instruments are also studied. 
Chapter VII reviews, analyses and critiques the literature on the subpopulation approach 
utilized by the guidelines and constructs a robust, comprehensive and practical definition of 
vulnerability, the application of which would assist REC members with identifying possible 
vulnerabilities and guiding researchers on appropriate safeguards for protection of 
participants within the research context. To this end, a Vulnerability Assessment Scale has 
also been developed in this chapter. Chapter VIII tests the definition and the Vulnerability 
Assessment Scale with the use of two South African Court Judgements where aggrieved 
vulnerable participants resorted to the Courts in anticipation of findings that would address 
the wrongs that they suffered. Chapter IX concludes this thesis by highlighting the merits of 
the definition and the Vulnerability Assessment Scale as developed in this thesis. They are of 
value not only during the review process, but they can also be utilized during the course of 
the research and even after the research is over to assist RECs guide researchers on 
optimizing protections for participants in research. Moreover, they can also be used as an 
adjudication tool should a dispute arise. 
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1.6 RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE REVIEW 
The research did not involve the participation of human research participants or the use of 
animals and a waiver of ethics review was applied for and approved. (See Annexure I for the 
waiver certificate.) 
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Chapter 2: UNDERSTANDING ETHICS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO HEALTH RESEARCH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to embarking on an ethical analysis of the notion of vulnerability it is imperative that a 
brief explication of ethics be undertaken. Generally, ethics is considered to be the 
systematic study of norms and values in human conduct.  Beauchamp and Childress1 
describe ethics as a generic term which covers a number of different approaches to 
understanding and examining the moral life. This chapter commences with a brief 
explanation of these approaches to ethical enquiry and then proceeds with a critical review 
of Beauchamp and Childress’ account of ethics and its relationship to health research. 
Beauchamp and Childress are well known as leaders in the field of medical ethics since the 
seventies, and the principles they espouse are commonly drawn upon in the field of 
research ethics. A description of the three major ethical theories in the health research 
context (virtue ethics, consequentialism and deontology), their relationship to each other 
and their application in the research environment then follows.   
2.2 APPROACHES TO ETHICAL INQUIRY 
There are three basic types of inquiry in the field of ethics: normative ethics, metaethics and 
descriptive ethics2. In normative ethics, questions regarding which general moral norms for 
the guidance and evaluation of conduct should be used and the reason for their use are 
addressed. These norms are often referred to as principles in ethical theories and are 
usually starting points for developing norms of conduct appropriate for specific contexts1, 
including health research involving vulnerable participants and populations. Some questions 
that normative ethical enquiry sets out to answer are: “What ought to be done?”; “What 
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ought not to be done?”; “What kinds of persons ought we strive to become?”3. In normative 
ethics, these questions are answered systematically and critically and the answers are 
justified3. In research ethics, normative ethics is concerned with arguments about such 
topics as the morality of enrolling children or mentally ill patients who are unable to consent 
into risky studies or whether research participants in international research ought to be 
enrolled in studies when there is uncertainty as to whether post study interventions will be 
affordable by the host country.        
 Metaethics sets out to investigate the meaning of moral terms, the logic and language of 
moral reasoning and elementary and essential questions of moral ontology, epistemology 
and justification3.It has been stated that while metaethics is the most abstract type of 
ethical enquiry, it is vital to normative questions. In metaethics, the language, concepts and 
methods of reasoning in normative ethics are analysed. Prominent questions in metaethics 
focus on whether morality is objective or subjective, relative or nonrelative and rational or 
non-rational. In metaethics the meanings of terms like justification, responsibility, 
obligations and virtue are addressed1. Metaethics enquiry in health research would include 
questions like: “ Ought the categorization of people into vulnerable groups be justified?”, 
“Ought there be a moral obligation to compensate participants who have been injured as a 
result of their participation in the study?” and “Ought Research Ethics Committees have 
moral responsibilities to ensure special protections for research participants who are 
vulnerable?” Descriptive ethics involves the factual investigation of moral beliefs and 
conduct where scientific techniques are used to study how people reason and act1. There is 
no direct engagement with questions of what one ought to do or the proper use of ethical 
terms in descriptive ethics3. Empirical research using quantitative, qualitative or quali-quanti 
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methods of investigation, where the study of a question in ethics is undertaken, is an 
example of descriptive ethics. Research questions in this sphere include, “How do people 
think they ought to act in this particular situation of normative concern?”;  “What facts are 
relevant to this normative ethical enquiry? ” and “How do people actually behave in this 
particular circumstance of ethical concern?”3. Descriptive ethics enquiries in research ethics 
include questions such as: “How do researchers think they ought to act when participants 
are harmed in clinical trials?”; “Do people in poor contexts participate in research as a 
means to access healthcare?” “What do RECs understand by the term ‘vulnerable’?”  In 
summary, descriptive ethics is concerned with what factually or conceptually is the case and 
not with whether the case is ethically valuable or what the outcome of the case ethically 
ought to be. The subject matter of this thesis involves the use of both normative and 
metaethical inquiry. Descriptive methods are beyond the scope of this research and hence 
have not be undertaken. However, this thesis also gains from historical inquiry as health 
research has been responsible for creating historically unprecedented ethical problems and 
has also added new dimensions and complexities to old problems4. While historical 
approaches are not fundamental to ethics inquiry, when facts are not just simply presented 
but also used to provide an interpretation of what ought to or ought not to have been done 
in the past, historical inquiry  augments ethics research5.        
2.3 MORALITY 
As the principles in ethical theory stem from common morality, it is also essential that the 
notion of common morality be explored. Where norms of right and wrong in human 
conduct are agreed upon so extensively that they grow into a stable social compact, the 
resulting collective shared understanding is considered common morality1. Common 
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morality as a concept can therefore be viewed as a social institution with core tenets shared 
by all; i.e., common morality is not merely a morality in contrast to other moralities. 
Common morality is normative for everyone. All persons are rightfully judged by its 
standards6. Beauchamp and Childress refer to these core tenets as universal norms1. It is 
these universal norms that comprise the substantive matter of common morality and they 
can be applied to all persons everywhere. It may be understood in terms of broad ethical 
principles or as comprising basic rules of obligation6 and includes standards for conduct and 
moral character traits like integrity and compassion. The common morality also supports 
human rights. All human conduct is judged by these norms or standards1, 7.   
Even if morality has core tenets that are shared by all, there are ideologies and beliefs 
related to morality that are not core and hence not universally shared. These non-core 
ideologies are referred to as particular moralities because they contain moral norms that 
are not shared by all cultures, groups and individuals. However, these norms should not 
violate the norms in the common morality1. Professional morality with standards of conduct 
that are accepted and supported by those in the profession, e.g., standards for the ethical 
conduct of health research, is an example of particular morality. 
2.4 PRINCIPLES 
Beauchamp and Childress have proposed four principles which stem from the common 
morality as being central to biomedical ethics8. The four principles are:  
(1) respect for autonomy (a norm where the decision-making capacity of 
autonomous persons are respected);  
(2) nonmaleficence (a norm requiring avoiding the causation of harm);  
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(3) beneficence ( a norm that provides for benefits and for balancing benefits against 
risks and costs); and  
(4) justice (a norm for distributing benefits, risks and costs fairly).  
These four principles are utilized extensively in the context of health research ethics 
discourse and are also intricately interwoven in the notion of vulnerability in health 
research. All principles have equal moral worth and no one principle can claim moral priority 
over other principles7.    
2.4(A) Autonomy 
The origins of autonomy derive from Greek, with autos and nomos denoting “self” and 
“rule” respectively. While originally referring to self-rule or self-governance of independent 
Greek city states, autonomy has, through time, been extended to individuals9. Two 
conditions are fundamentally indispensable for autonomy9: 
(a) Liberty – independence from controlling influences; and 
(b) Agency - capacity for intentional action.  
The principle of respect for autonomy acknowledges the right of autonomous agents to hold 
views, make choices and take actions based on their values and beliefs. Respect includes 
that, where necessary, the individual will be assisted in developing the ability to 
competently make autonomous choices. Both negative and positive obligations are included 
in this principle. The negative obligation is broad and entails that for actions to be truly 
autonomous, they should not be constrained by controlling influences of others9. A negative 
obligation in health research would be to avoid coercion during recruitment of research 
participants in order to ensure that voluntariness to participate is not interfered with. The 
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positive obligation entails that autonomous decision making is facilitated by treating the 
individual with respect when disclosing information and assisting the individual with actions 
that promote autonomous decision making. The positive obligation gives recognition to the 
fact that there may be a need for the involvement of others in order to bring to fruition the 
principle of respect for autonomy9. In the context of health research, it is this positive 
obligation that makes it necessary not only to disclose all essential information but in 
addition to ensure understanding of the information and the implications for the participant 
once enrolled. Furthermore, voluntariness of decision making must be probed for and 
ensured. Community involvement coupled with innovative methods of information sharing 
prior to and during enrolment of participants in health research are examples of positive 
obligations.   Assisting participants in achieving their ends and building up their capacities as 
agents go a long way in avoiding treating research participants exclusively as a means to 
researchers’ ends.   
Persons who lack decision making capacity are vulnerable and may lack competence. 
Needless to say, decisions on competence require standards for its determination9. There 
are several competing standards of competence and incompetence in the literature. 
Beauchamp and Childress favour the use of standards for incompetence over standards for 
competence because of the general presumption that in the absence of a determination of 
incompetence and incapacity, an adult should be considered competent and should be 
treated as such. There are a number of “inabilities” currently required under competing 
standards in the literature which are presented in the following schema by Beauchamp and 
Childress as9: 
“1. Inability to express or communicate a choice. 
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  2. Inability to understand one’s situation and its consequences. 
  3. Inability to understand relevant information. 
  4. Inability to give a reason. 
  5. Inability to give a rational reason (although some supporting reasons may be 
given). 
  6. Inability to give risk/benefit-related reasons (although some rational supporting 
reasons    may be given). 
  7. Inability to reach a reasonable decision (as judged, for example, by a reasonable 
person standard).” 
Three types of abilities arise out of these standards9: 
(a) The basic ability to formulate a preference (standard 1) 
(b) The ability to understand information and appreciate a situation (standards 2 and 3) 
(c)  The ability to reason through a life decision that would be of consequence to the 
individual (standards 4, 5, 6, 7). 
Diminished autonomy will arise where there are controlling influences by others, e.g., 
lecturers doing research on their students, or where individuals are incapable of 
deliberating, e.g., those with mental illnesses, or acting in accordance with their own 
wishes, ideas or plans, e.g. the dependent elderly participant.  
As liberty is a necessary precondition for autonomy and because autonomy is accorded 
significant moral value, moral justification is required should there be any infringement 
upon, limitation or usurpation of liberty. Mappes and DeGrazia advance six general reasons 
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which are most frequently considered when limitations of liberty are at issue. These are 
sometimes called “liberty-limiting” principles 6.  
Justifiable reasons for restricting liberty are6: 
1. To prevent that person from harming others (harm principle). 
2. To prevent that person from offending others (offense principle). 
3. To prevent that person from harming him or herself (paternalism). 
4. To benefit that person (paternalism). 
5. To prevent that person from acting immorally (legal moralism). 
6. To benefit others (social welfare principle).  
In the context of health research, researchers have used reason 3 to justify excluding people 
who are vulnerable from health research. Reason 4 has been used to justify including people 
in research who, because of language barriers or difficulties with understanding, do not 
comprehend adequately what their participation will entail but the researcher is of the 
opinion that it would be in the best interests of the individuals to participate. These reasons 
for exclusion or inclusion into research cannot be justified if researchers have not assisted 
participants with acquiring agency.  
It is important that researchers and RECs understand the meaning of paternalism so this 
type of unjustifiable conduct can be safeguarded against in research. There are several 
definitions of or explanations for paternalism in the literature.  Mappes and DeGrazia state 
that perhaps the most widely cited definition of paternalism is that by Gerald Dworkin10 
who defines it as “… the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the 
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person being coerced.”10. However, coercion seems to be necessary for paternalistic acts but 
patients and research participants are often subjected to paternalistic acts that do not 
necessarily involve coercion in the practitioner-patient or researcher-participant 
relationship. This definition is, hence, rightfully criticised by Mappes and DeGrazia who offer 
the following more workable definition: “Paternalism is the interference with, limitation of, 
or usurpation of individual autonomy justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare 
or needs of the person whose autonomy is being interfered with, limited or usurped.” 
Autonomy is considered by degree in this definition6. Beneficence is also discussed here, 
and nonmaleficence, while not mentioned explicitly, is implicitly inferred.     
Beauchamp and Childress advance a simpler definition which includes the principles of 
autonomy, beneficence and nonmaleficence. They explain paternalism to be:  
“… the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or actions by 
another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the goal of 
benefiting or avoiding harm to the person whose will is overridden.”11 
In the context of health research,  Research Ethics Committees make paternalistic decisions 
as to the inclusion or exclusion of groups of potential research participants on the basis of 
vulnerability without taking into consideration their preferences. In my opinion, the 
definition by Mappes and DeGrazia, while not explicitly including nonmaleficence, would be 
the more appropriate one to use in the health research context. 
While cognisant of the negative obligations of the principle of autonomy, it must be 
remembered that competing moral considerations could override respect for autonomy. 
Hence this principle, similar to the other three principles, has only prima facie standing8,9.    
27  
 
2.4(B) Nonmaleficence 
An obligation not to intentionally inflict harm is asserted by the principle of nonmaleficence. 
It is closely associated with the maxim, Primum non nocere, which translates to “Above all 
[or first] do no harm.” While this maxim is frequently referred to by healthcare 
practitioners, its origins are unclear.12  
The principle of nonmaleficence very concisely captures the universal consideration that 
there is an overriding duty of anyone who undertakes to care for a patient or enrol a 
participant in research not to harm the patient or participant. It must be stated that this 
duty is not an ultimatum to achieve the impossible. However, practitioners and researchers 
need to live up to reasonable standards of performance in their professional and/or 
scientific conduct and are expected to be cautious, competent and compassionate13. 
Nonmaleficence is often explained using the terms harm and injury. Injury refers to harm on 
the one hand and injustice, violation or wrong on the other12. However, when put simply, 
the principle of nonmaleficence requires that needless risk of harm is avoided and when risk 
is an inevitable aspect of the professional or scientific activity, e.g., in health research, risk 
should be minimized as far as is reasonably possible. Failing to act with due care violates the 
principle of nonmalefecence, even if no harm results, while acting with due care does not 
violate this principle, even in the face of resultant harm13.       
Although several authors combine nonmaleficence and beneficence, nonmaleficence 
obligations are generally more rigorous than beneficence obligations. In certain instances 
nonmaleficence obligations could take priority and override beneficence obligations despite 
the latter resulting in highest net utility as regards outcomes12.  A harmful action could 
impede, defeat or ruin a party’s interests. Beauchamp and Childress in their writings, while 
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affirming their recognition of mental harms and other setbacks to interests, focus, in the 
main, on significant bodily harms. However they do go on to state that in the context of 
medical research, the economically disadvantaged, very sick and vulnerable bear a 
disproportionate burden of the risks of harms due to their ready availability, and they 
express deep moral concern on the unjustified overutilization of these groups. They also 
acknowledge that harms could extend beyond individuals to affect whole groups12. While 
there is general agreement that internal controls to protect participants through a system of 
research ethics are necessary, they caution against overprotection as this too results in 
harms to society because of delays in the progress of much needed research.  
2.4(C) Beneficence 
Stemming from the common morality, this principle places an obligation on us to contribute 
to the positive welfare of persons. A practitioner-patient or researcher-participant 
relationship imposes on the practitioner or researcher the duty of promoting the patient’s 
or participant’s welfare. The duty of beneficence is inherent in the role of the professional.    
In this context, simply avoiding harmful acts is insufficient. Positive steps are called for in 
order to assist others. The principle refers to “... a statement of moral obligations to act for 
the benefit of others”11. Beneficence, in terms of the common morality, does not place 
obligations of extreme sacrifice and altruism11 and while in principle beneficence has no 
limits, in practice it must.      
In the milieu of research ethics, the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence are 
usually considered together and translate to the risk/benefit ratio in the study where risk 
refers to a possible occurrence of harm in the course of the research process. It is expected 
that the overall probable benefits of the research (to participants, but more so to society) 
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will outweigh the possible risks to individual participants. Hence, the risk/benefit 
asymmetry: probable risks of harms to participants during research and possible benefits to 
others in the future.  
2.4(D) Justice 
The two primary notions of justice are that equals should be treated equally and that the 
distribution of burdens and benefits should be fair14’15.  The former is expressed in the 
formal principle of justice which is interpreted as “Treat like cases alike (and different cases 
differently)”16. This formal principle of justice is sometimes referred to as the principle of 
formal equality14.  It is “formal” because no specific respects in which equals ought to be 
treated equally are recognised. In addition, no criteria are made available for determining 
whether individuals are actually equal and all it does is state that persons equal in 
whichever respects considered appropriate need to be treated equally14. While this formal 
principle is undisputed, and the fact that equals ought to be treated equally is not 
debatable, it lacks content and substance and is frequently difficult to apply in specific 
contexts14,17. Applying this formal principle in the context of international health research is 
an example of difficulties that its use entails: it is widely accepted (and emanates from the 
formal principle of justice) that if it is not ethical to conduct a particular health research 
study in countries in the developed world, it would be equally unethical to conduct the 
study in countries in the developing world. However, upon interpretation of this statement, 
and when the differences in contexts including the differences in benefits and risks are 
considered, it is unlikely that this statement could strictly apply17. The confusion, doubts and 
problems created by the formal principle of justice, albeit important, are addressed by the 
use of material principles of justice14.   
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One of the material principles of justice is distributive justice, which is defined as “fair, 
equitable, and appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens determined by norms that 
structure the terms of social cooperation.”14 Distributive justice as fair access to 
participation in research and access to proven beneficial interventions resulting from the 
research has since the nineties gained prominence as a result of the needs of patients with 
HIV/AIDS to gain expanded access to experimental therapies both within and outside the 
clinical trial and to continue accessing therapies once the trial had been completed14. 
Imposing undue burdens and denying expected benefits are violations of the standard 
notion of distributive justice. In health research, distributive justice requires a fair 
distribution of burdens and benefits of the research itself17 . Because criteria for fairness 
may differ in different contexts, arriving at a precise general definition of what constitutes 
fair distribution is not easy. For this reason, equity, a core concept in fair distribution, is 
drawn upon.  It is in terms of equity that no one group should receive disproportionate 
benefits or bear disproportionate burdens17.     
Exploiting the vulnerabilities of participants is one of the ways in which justice as fairness is 
violated in research because those with greater power or resources take unfair advantage of 
those with less power or fewer resources17. Macklin positions this into a subcategory of 
distributive justice because the nature of the wrong in this situation is that of inequitable 
treatment. She further states that it is less likely that populations in developed countries will 
be exploited as compared to those living in developing countries. This then results in an 
inequitable selection of research participants across international boundaries. Ruth Macklin 
correctly stresses that while justice always relates to fairness in some way, it is not limited 
to fair distribution17 in the context of health research, and as a response to several forces 
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and influences which are dealt with in subsequent chapters, fair inclusion or exclusion of 
participants has also started being emphasised as a significant aspect of justice15. In 
addition, competing values of justice in this context have also emerged, and include the 
social need for research, benefit to participants and protecting them from harm and 
exploitation16. 
Other notions of justice that are pertinent to the health research context are procedural and 
compensatory justice17. Procedural justice is an important expression of fairness. The 
process in which decisions are made and the manner in which actions are carried out must 
also be fair. The Research Ethics Committee, a duly constituted body whose task is that of 
protecting the rights and welfare of human participants in research, involves itself in a 
process of procedural justice when it prospectively reviews research protocols17.    
When research participants are injured as a result of their participation in a study they need 
to be compensated and treated for any injuries incurred. Participants must also be 
compensated for their time, inconvenience or any other costs they may incur as a result of 
their involvement in the research. It is not fair to expect participants to bear the costs 
incurred as a result of study participation. In addition, they deserve recompense for any 
harm they have suffered. This conception of justice is known as compensatory justice17.    
Justice, therefore, broadly speaking, can be interpreted as fair, equitable and appropriate 
treatment in terms of what is due or owed to persons14. Moreover, the other principles, 
autonomy, beneficence and nonmaleficence also contribute to safeguarding just and fair 
treatment.  In the context of health research justice includes18: 
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“ 1. equitably distributing the burdens and benefits of research across the general 
population; 
2. treating like situations in the same way;  
3. offering equal opportunity for all qualified persons to participate in research; 
4. treating all research volunteers with the respect due them as collaborators in the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge; 
5. providing appropriate oversight of studies involving human subjects, including 
follow-up care and compensation for research-related injuries; 
6. protecting the general population from misinformation or from exposure to 
unnecessary risks; 
7. not invading the bodily integrity or privacy of research subjects without obtaining 
their informed consent; and  
8. preventing, ameliorating, or curing disease without transgressing the dignity of 
individuals.”    
 It is clear that a unified principle of justice that captures the various conceptions and uses 
of justice in the health research context is not easily arrived at. In addition, it is also clear 
that depending on context and situation, justice as fairness must include the other three 
principles as presented by Beauchamp and Childress to be effective in its application.   
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2.4(E) Wrapping up the Principles 
As seen from the brief discussion of principles all four principles can be drawn upon to assist 
in a comprehensive ethical analysis in health research and, in particular, research involving 
vulnerable participants or populations. These principles are not without their limitations, 
and while no one principle is superior to the others and there is no hierarchy of principles, 
one or other principle can be overridden in order to give way to the most compelling 
principle in certain situations.    
In addition to principlism, there are several moral theories that can be drawn upon for 
reflective study in bioethics. An understanding of the major theories is also necessary for 
the ethical exploration of the notion of vulnerability. A brief examination of these theories 
follows in the ensuing section of this chapter.  
2.5 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 The role of theory is somewhat complex, but it can be perceived as providing a unifying 
perspective that creates or connects multiple phenomena and in this way generates 
knowledge19. Theories also assist with direction and recommendations on the case in point 
and in the particular milieu. Concepts are provided for distinguishing differing 
characteristics of some phenomena and for responding to queries about relationships 
between different types of phenomena. Points of view are created to facilitate recognising 
perspectives that may otherwise be ignored, neglected or even undervalued. Simply stated, 
in the context of ethics, theories synthesise moral rules, thereby generalising diverse moral 
experiences. Reason-giving guidance, commonly known as justification for actions to be 
undertaken, is provided19.  This reason-giving guidance is often relied upon when trying to 
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ensure that particular conduct is moral, e.g., ethical guidelines for the inclusion of 
vulnerable participants in health research. An appreciation of ethical theories translates to 
an appreciation of the many diverse endeavours towards comprehending the complexities 
and hence the richness of the world of human life19.   
Time has witnessed the emergence of many competing ethical theories. None of these 
qualifies as the most satisfactory and comprehensive for facilitating ethical reasoning for all 
situations, including those involving vulnerability in the context of health research. Each 
theory is enriched with particular strengths and prejudiced by particular weaknesses. 
Moreover, while debatable, it has been stated that no theory has been established to be 
superior or inferior to other theories. And neither has it been found that theories derive 
from each other19-21. While several ethical theories exist, it is sufficient for the purpose of 
this thesis to examine the three theories that are currently most influential in advancing 
reasoning in the context of science and scientific research, i.e., Virtue Theory, 
Consequentialism and Deontology19. There is no particular ranking or preference of these 
theories and the order of discussion is based on the historical order of their emergence.         
 2.5(A) Virtue Ethics  
In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, written about 325 B.C ., attention is drawn to the 
development and nurturing of virtuous traits of character as a primary function of 
morality19. Aristotle made a distinction between two types of virtues, intellectual and moral. 
Intellectual virtue refers to excellence in thinking with reasoning constituting the activity 
itself. Moral virtue equates to excellence in activities carrying out the instruction of 
reason19. Aristotle responds to the question “What is the good of man?” with “... an activity 
of the soul in conformity with virtue.”22 Accordingly, an understanding of ethics requires an 
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understanding of what makes someone a virtuous person. Aristotle gave much weighting in 
his discussions of ethics to particular virtues including courage, self-control, generosity and 
truthfulness. In addition, reason was viewed as the source of practical wisdom by the 
Greeks, and hence, for them the virtuous life could not be detached from the life of reason. 
Prior to Aristotle, ancient thinkers like Socrates and Plato also focussed on virtues when 
discussing ethics and approached ethical analysis by examining the character traits that 
would create a good person. The aim of life was to fare well and flourish and this could only 
be accomplished if humans developed virtuous character traits, capacities, skills or 
excellences in their conduct or behaviour22. 
Virtue ethics has been widely criticised. Some claim that it does not take into consideration 
that different cultures could be at variance in opinions on what constitutes virtue and, 
correspondingly, vice19. Some virtues may foster the performance of unethical actions20; 
e.g., loyalty and solidarity amongst researchers in the research enterprise could discourage 
reporting of breaches in scientific integrity. While virtue ethics is more likely to work where 
an environment of virtue and trust exists, it is unlikely that it can be applied in situations 
where such an environment has not been established20. Moreover, it emphasises character 
but provides no insight on correct courses of action as it is silent on action guidance19. In 
addition, because its focus is on individual agents, it is not appropriately placed to evaluate 
morality at a collective level – i.e., institutions, policy making and the like19.       
Although virtue ethics theory has been widely criticised, it does have several advantages of 
note. Without doubt, it provides a natural and appealing account of moral motivation20-22. 
Furthermore, impartiality features as the dominant theme in modern moral philosophy as 
will be seen in the discussions that follow. However, the importance of impartiality in the 
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moral life is thrown into doubt especially in the context of relationships with family and 
loved ones. Hence, some virtues like love and friendship are partial while others, like 
beneficence towards people in general may be impartial22. In the context of health research 
and vulnerability, virtue theory is well suited in assisting researchers navigate care giving 
and information sharing. A caring, compassionate researcher in this milieu is unquestionably 
critical to the researcher-participant liaison. In addition, normative appeals to human nature 
and virtues of researchers are often drawn upon as compelling reasons when questioning 
the prudence of pursuing certain types of research20. Hence, although virtue ethics theory is 
unable to provide a complete set of resources for normative evaluation of health research 
involving vulnerable populations, it nevertheless does provide some very useful ones. 
2.5(B) Consequentialism 
While the focus of virtue ethics is on character traits, i.e., agents as a whole, the trajectory 
of consequentialist ethics is on the situation and conditions that result as a consequence of 
an agent’s actions. Moral value as expressed by the rightness or wrongness of an action is 
judged by its outcomes. The decisive factor in determining whether an act is right is if and 
only if the act is reasonably expected to produce the greatest good or the least harm when 
compared to alternative choices of action19,20,23. Hence, what counts as good is also a 
criterion used when applying consequentialism. 
Consequentialism stems back to 1781 when Jeremy Bentham formulated the principle of 
utility which holds that when values are balanced, positive values must always override any 
other values.  Simply formulated, the utility principle requires the greatest good for the 
greatest number. It also requires that this determination be made from an impartial 
perspective where equal consideration is given to the legitimate interests of each affected 
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party19,20,23. According to Bentham, an action is approved and supported or not endorsed 
according to the tendency which it appears to have to enhance or diminish the happiness of 
the group whose interest is in question; hence the introduction of the concept of 
hedonism19,20,23. In 1861, John Stuart Mill reinforced hedonism in consequentialist utilitarian 
thinking by making happiness the ultimate goal when judging the rightness or wrongness of 
an action. Mill maintains that actions are right when they tend to promote happiness and 
wrong when they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Happiness is described as 
pleasure or the absence of pain23. Although the principle of utility was formulated by 
Bentham in the 1700s, it was only in the nineteenth century that classical utilitarianism (also 
known as the strong version of consequentialism) was systemised by Bentham and Mill in an 
endeavour to construct a decision-making rule whose objective would be to guide social 
policies in a changing world that was being transformed by the advent of science, 
technology and the Industrial Revolution19.  Classical utilitarianism is summed up in the 
following schema of three propositions19,20,23: 
a. It is solely by virtue of their consequences that actions are to be judged as right or 
wrong; 
b. The only thing that matters when assessing consequences is the amount of 
happiness or unhappiness that is created; and 
c. Each person’s happiness counts the same. 
The importance of utilitarianism from the historical perspective is that it contributed to 
democratic development and reform. It has also become exceedingly influential because it 
is compatible with democratic decision-making in the public sphere. It forms the foundation 
of almost all contemporary economics and most public policy formulations. Benefits and 
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harms that could accrue from alternate regulatory proposals are commonly weighed by 
policy makers prior to adopting those judged to produce the greatest overall action19.  
While sharing basic agreements, Bentham and Mill demonstrate two significant differences 
in their viewpoints which gave rise to act and rule utilitarianism19,20,23. In Bentham’s act 
utilitarianism, it is required that each individual action be evaluated such that all outcomes 
are subjected to a common metric. On the other hand, Mill, in his rule utilitarianism, 
instructs that rules for action and not actions per se be evaluated and these should be 
assessed by the qualitative difference in their outcomes. Qualitative differences are judged 
on the basis of experience and anyone who has experienced two different outcomes will be 
able to judge which one is better and express a preference.    
Utilitarianism, while an attractive theory in ethics, has had its fair share of criticism as it too 
is not completely adequate for all areas of the moral life. Concerns have been raised on 
conceptual issues related to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. “Greatest” is 
not necessarily the same for happiness or number and it has been proposed that it should 
be interpreted as the greatest average happiness19. In the context of education in research, 
this could mean greatest average education and training for the maximum number of 
students. Not only would this impact negatively against exceptionally good students, but 
average training could result in gaps in scientific knowledge with possibly damaging results 
for the research enterprise and unacceptable and preventable harms to participants.     
Where utilitarians are concerned with the maximization of individual preference, i.e., rule 
utilitarianism, problems would arise when in considered judgement, these preferences and 
subsequent actions could be morally unacceptable19. In the context of health research, this 
could be a problem when a researcher’s satisfaction and hence the research objectives can 
39  
 
only be achieved by exploiting the vulnerability of participants. In terms of act utilitarianism, 
immoral actions like lying to participants or withholding materially significant information 
from them may not only be permissible but may be morally obligatory when lying or 
withholding information would result in an overall maximization of utility. When a conflict 
between scientific rigor and participant welfare arises, utilitarianism will justify superseding 
obligations to a small group of participants because of a greater obligation to produce 
reliable data which could potentially provide future benefits to members of society at large, 
or even to the participant’s particular social group24. Hence, a value structure could be 
encouraged whereby higher moral priority is given to the potential benefits of science and 
society over and above concrete and measurable risks to research participants. Risk and 
benefit are conceptualised as tangible entities with universal value subject to rational 
analysis by those other than participants. Hence, the type of ethical orientation promoted 
by utilitarianism is more of an abstract risk/benefit calculus guiding moral action. This is 
detached from the particular preferences and values a participant might consider significant 
in the context of specific risks and benefits. Moreover, this has the potential to minimize the 
researcher’s moral obligations to individual research participants24.     
In addition, utilitarianism has been criticised for not being adequately resourced to guard 
against unjust social distributions where the interests of the majority could override the 
rights of the minorities because value is distributed according to net aggregate 
satisfaction20.         
Despite the many criticisms of utilitarianism, its great strength is that it does play a 
significant role in formulating public and institutional policies. The latter includes policies 
regulating the ethical conduct of research. Requiring objective assessments of everyone’s 
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interests and making impartial choices in order to maximise good outcomes for all affected 
parties are acceptable and valuable norms of public policy. Moreover, if the legitimate goal 
of utilitarianism as elucidated above is primarily to promote welfare, the theory could also 
be perceived to be beneficence based20.  
Peter Singer in the late twentieth century revived classical utilitarianism and promulgated 
the commitment to impartiality as recognising the need to go beyond one’s own likes and 
dislikes and to adopt the stance of an impartial spectator or ideal observer25. This would 
mean that one’s own needs, wants and desires cannot, simply because they are one’s 
preferences, count more than the wants, needs and desires of anyone else. Such an 
approach in moral reasoning would clearly result in the best consequences, on balance, for 
all that are affected. This slant in moral reasoning makes utilitarianism a highly attractive 
ethical theory.   
2.5(C) Deontology 
At the time that utilitarianism was being formulated as a theory in the 1700’s, Immanuel 
Kant’s deontological approach was being propagated as an alternative approach to ethics. 
Deontology derives from Greek, with “deon” meaning duty and “logos” meaning reason. 
The concept of deontology is therefore one of reasoned duty19. This corresponds to a 
common understanding of ethics being that of critical reflection on inclinations or desires. 
Hence, action not only makes character traits evident and results in consequences, but 
action emerges from willed intentions. Because human beings have many needs and 
desires, reason must be utilised to determine which to pursue. This then becomes the will 
and is expressed in a command or imperative19,20. Moral principles manifest in moral duties 
which define right action. The goal of moral action is to uphold the action itself and not to 
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perfect the character traits of an agent or produce a good state of affairs. According to Kant, 
the moral worth of an individual’s action depends exclusively on the moral acceptability of 
the general rule of conduct or “maxim” on which the person is acting, i.e., the rule provides 
a moral ground that justifies the action. Maxims must be consistent. They must be capable 
of being conceived and willed without contradiction19,20,26.  
Ethical knowledge, which informs the will, takes the form of commands or imperatives. Kant 
argues for a categorical imperative and for this the ethical assessment of intentions is based 
in reason alone. Because categorical imperatives are canons of the acceptability of moral 
rules, and since they derive from a principle that everyone must accept, they are binding on 
the rational will and are absolute19,20,26. Kant’s two most important formulations of the 
categorical imperative are: 
1. One must act only in accordance with that maxim which one can at the same time 
will to become a universal law; i.e., one must be able to endorse the universal 
acceptability of a plan or action19,20,26. This formulation can be used in the context of 
health research, where it would draw on truth-telling and other related imperatives. 
2. One must act in such a way that every person is treated as an end and never as a 
means only. Treating others as mere means results in a maxim that cannot be 
universalised. The importance of dignity, rights and personal autonomy are 
underscored in this formulation19,20,26. In health research, participants must be 
treated with the moral dignity and respect to which everyone is entitled. When 
participants are involved in a process whereby they agree to be used in the search 
for the answer to a research question, they will not be used as a means to an end 
they do not endorse. Even where research promises cutting edge breakthroughs and 
42  
 
huge benefits for society, participants would be treated unethically if fundamental 
ethical constraints like obtaining their voluntary informed consent are violated20. 
Respecting autonomy in turn respects human dignity. 
Similar to virtue ethics and utilitarianism, deontology is not without its weaknesses and does 
not provide a comprehensive theory of the moral life. Because Kant’s moral requirements 
are construed as categorical imperatives, his theory is not adequately resourced to handle 
problems when there are conflicting obligations. In addition, his emphasis on rules is 
perceived as overemphasising law26 with little regard being given to relationships. Kant does 
not accord moral worth to actions conceived as a result of sympathy, caring and 
compassion. Only actions performed from the motive of duty are morally worthy. Clearly, 
caring, compassion and sympathy as motives for actions deserve moral recognition. 
2.5(D) Wrapping up the theories 
Despite the brief and simplified overviews of virtue ethics, consequentialism and 
deontology, the common denominator to all three has surfaced quite clearly: all have 
distinctive strengths and distinctive weaknesses. Each theory is instructive. Each theory 
contributes to our thinking about the moral life. Different aspects of the moral experience 
are highlighted in the different theories. Despite the risk of these theories clashing at times 
with considered moral convictions, these three theories all display insights into our common 
moral heritage20. For moral experience to be comprehensive it will require the involvement 
of agents (virtue ethics), actions (deontology) and results (consequentialism) – hence, 
contributions from all three theories19,20. It should also be noted that through the past 
century, many theories have emerged, either as complementary to these three or as 
standalone theories. These include Feminism, the Ethics of Care, Communitarianism and 
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Casuistry. While each has made worthy contributions to the field of moral reasoning and 
ethical analysis, the combination of agents, actions and results coupled with the application 
of the four principles is, in my opinion, the most appropriate method of moral assessment in 
health research.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Emerging from the brief description of the principles and theories above it is clear that all 
theories and principles will prove to be valuable tools when confronted with ethical 
dilemmas in the context of health research, and in particular from the perspective of the 
notion of vulnerability. The chapters that follow draw  from these principles and theories as 
applicable and appropriate. The next chapter looks at the relationship between moral 
status, human dignity and vulnerability and the importance of the former two in 
safeguarding against exploiting the vulnerable in research.   
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Chapter 3: MORAL STATUS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND VULNERABILITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research ethics mandates special protections for participants considered to be vulnerable 
because of the danger of exploitation by some researchers and the need to respect the 
intrinsic value and dignity of those who do not have the means and / or ability to protect 
themselves. These concerns over vulnerabilities have been intricately linked with issues of 
moral status and human dignity. 
In the different notions of moral status, the common denominator conferring moral status is 
human dignity. Because human dignity is so frequently referred to when promulgating 
protections for the vulnerable, vulnerability and human dignity have developed into 
inseparable concepts. It is therefore prudent to examine these three concepts and their 
application in health research. 
In this chapter, I start off with a discussion of moral status and link this to human dignity and 
vulnerability in the research context. I then proceed to discuss human dignity and how this 
concept has been incorporated into international and national instruments to protect 
people with vulnerabilities against being harmed, wronged and exploited, in particular in 
health research. My discussions on moral status and human dignity form the basis for the 
conceptual analysis of vulnerability which follows thereafter. 
3.2 MORAL STATUS 
Beauchamp and Childress1 opine that moral status as a term has been brought into 
bioethics discourse from law and the notion of legal standing. They categorise moral status 
into weak and strong types. In its weak sense, it refers to a grade or rank of moral 
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importance, but in its strong sense, it means to have rights, or the functional equivalent of 
rights. Put simply, this entails that while moral status exists independently of the moral 
obligation of others, it is in fact the basis of these moral obligations. 
Having moral status merits the obligation of protections required by the moral norms 
referred to in the previous chapter. This is because having moral status signifies the 
potential for being morally wronged. There are several approaches to moral status1. They 
will not be discussed in detail in this thesis as they are not core to the subject matter under 
study.  
Just as the notions of human dignity and vulnerability are ill-defined, there are several 
different notions of what constitutes moral status. The problems here also hinge on 
questions as to which individuals and groups are or should be protected by moral norms and 
whether members of these groups deserve moral protections and have moral rights1. In this 
context too, some authors challenge the need for this notion and recommend that this 
concept be dropped from the literature completely2,3. However, based on lessons learnt 
from history, this could be dangerous and in my opinion not advisable. In the past some 
human beings, and even large groups of humans, were treated as incapable of morality and 
having either no moral status or low-level moral status1. This is exactly how people who did 
not belong to the White race group were treated prior to 1994 by the Apartheid 
government of South Africa. Even within the non-White groups moral status differed, with 
groups from Indian origin, while having very few and limited rights, being given a higher 
moral status with more rights as compared to native Africans who were given hardly any 
rights as they were seen to have very little, or weak moral status, if any. Whether an 
individual or group has a full or partial set of moral rights depends on whether they are seen 
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to have full or partial moral status in morally tarnished societies1 like those that existed in 
South Africa during Apartheid and that currently still exist in the world today. In several 
societies and cultures today women and the mentally disabled are still treated as though 
they lack full moral status. 
While issues of moral status have also been raised in situations where individuals are 
incompetent and their decision-making roles are taken over by surrogates, all moral 
protections and forms of respect are not lost in this context. In fact, most obligations 
towards them continue and some may even increase. It is only certain rights that are lost by 
recognising the surrogate as the decision-maker and hence, a lowering of moral status in 
this respect, as perceived by some, for the individual unable to make a decison1. In other 
words, incompetent individuals do not have the same moral authority in respect of decision-
making that they had prior to the determination of incompetency1. Mental incompetence is 
one among many other criteria used when assessing moral status and in determining rights 
and obligations. Children do not have the same moral authority as adults and are at times 
treated as if they have diminished moral status. In both these groups, their diminished 
moral authority will result in them being vulnerable necessitating increased protections1.  
Whichever way moral status is viewed, to have moral status is to deserve some protections 
as required by moral norms and these protections are afforded to those that can be morally 
wronged1. In the main, this has been the approach for moral principles and categories to 
apply to human beings. There are several approaches in the context of moral status and 
some approaches categorically state that the only property conferring moral status is 
human dignity1. Other approaches state that properties such as sentience, rationality or 
moral agency are necessary for the acquisition of moral status1. The individual approaches 
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do not resolve the main issues in respect to moral status1. Beauchamp and Childress 
describe these approaches and group them into five theories which, when combined, all 
contribute to the understanding of moral status1. The approaches are based on human 
properties, cognitive properties, moral agency, sentience and relationships respectively. 
While all of them are able to demonstrate sufficient conditions for moral status, none of 
them identify necessary conditions for moral status. The theories described by Beauchamp 
and Childress are discussed below.   
3.2(A) Theory Based on Human Properties1 
Often called the traditional account of moral status, this theory holds that characteristic and 
distinguishing human properties, those of Homo sapiens, bestow moral status. In this 
theory, all humans, and only humans have full moral status. Moral value is discerned by 
particular human properties. The latter also defines which beings comprise the moral 
community. An essential and adequate condition of moral respect is that of being a living 
member of the species Homo sapiens. Accordingly, biological criteria and species 
membership are necessary components in this theory.  
This theory appeals to many, especially those who believe the properties of humanity form 
a basis of moral status, because it unambiguously covers all human beings. No one is 
excluded based on certain properties, e.g., mental incompetence, being in a persistent 
vegetative state or belonging to a particular race group or gender. It is cemented into 
morality and is fundamental to the claim that all humans have human rights. However, this 
theory is also criticised because any set of human properties are sufficient for moral status. 
Hence, embryos and fetuses would unequivocally have moral status - a much contested 
domain in bioethics which will not be discussed in this thesis as this subject has been 
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debated for centuries and there are no new arguments forthcoming. Nevertheless, this 
theory does supply a sufficient condition for moral status although it fails to identify a 
necessary condition for moral status. 
3.2(B) Theory Based on Cognitive Properties1 
In this theory, a specific set of cognitive properties that refer to processes of awareness, 
e.g., perception, memory, understanding and thinking, are necessary for moral status. 
According to this theory, individuals have moral status as they are able to contemplate and 
reflect on their lives using their cognitive capacities. In addition, their beliefs influence their 
determinations. Incompetent humans are unable to use their cognitive capacities and 
beliefs in these ways. The autonomous human being in respect of the competent human 
adult is conceived in this theory. Cognitive properties necessary for moral status in this 
theory include: 
1. Self-consciousness as existing over time; 
2. Freedom to act; 
3. Capacity to engage in purposeful actions; 
4. Ability to provide reasons for actions; 
5. Ability to appreciate reasons for actions; 
6. Capacity for beliefs, desires and thoughts; 
7. Capacity to communicate using language with other people; 
8. Rationality and higher order volition. 
It is clear from the set of conditions above that the ability to exercise self-determination 
leading to informed consent or informed refusal decisions would mean possessing moral 
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status and therefore being deserving of moral respect and respect for dignity. Those without 
this ability would not be deserving of moral respect and respect for their dignity as they 
would lack moral status.       
The problem with this theory is that many humans will be excluded if all the above criteria 
have to be satisfied for moral status. Infants, people with mental disabilities, elderly who 
are senile and others would be excluded from having moral status. Weak, vulnerable and 
incapacitated individuals would not have moral status and hence would not be deserving of 
moral respect and protections. All these individuals could be treated as though they lacked 
human dignity and would not qualify for protections of their vulnerabilities. As will be seen 
in subsequent chapters, many examples of abuses and exploitation took place in health 
research where individuals and communities were treated by researchers as though they 
lacked moral status. So, while this theory supplies a sufficient condition for moral status, it 
does not identify a necessary one either.  
3.2(C) Theory Based on Moral Agency1   
In this theory, an individual will have moral status if the individual has the capacity to act as 
a moral agent. Two conditions of moral capacity criteria have to be satisfied for an individual 
to be a moral agent: the ability to make moral judgements about the rightness or wrongness 
of actions and possessing motives that can be judged morally. 
This theory dates back to Kant who advanced one of the most influential theories of moral 
agency. Beauchamp and Childress state that while Kant focussed on moral worth, autonomy 
and dignity, some of his formulations suggest that he is proposing conditions of moral 
status. Kant links autonomy and dignity intricately in that one has dignity only if one is an 
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autonomous agent.  The capacity for moral agency confers moral respect and dignity and 
this is not possessed by individuals that lack the capability to be moral agents. Beauchamp 
and Childress interpret this account as one of moral status and state that they find this 
theory appealing because being a moral agent is without dispute a sufficient condition for 
moral status. This is so because moral agents are typically carriers of moral status in that 
they know they can be condemned for motives and actions, blamed for being irresponsible 
and punished when their behaviour is immoral. The concern they express with this theory is 
that those who lack autonomy and agency like people with advanced dementia would lack 
moral status, hence moral respect and value and therefore their interests would not be 
protected. Accordingly, people with certain vulnerabilities, like research participants who 
lack capacity would not merit protections because they lack moral status. Again, this theory 
generates a sufficient condition but not a necessary one for moral status. 
3.2(D) Theory Based on Sentience1 
Here moral status is determined by properties that include a range of emotional and 
affective responses that are neither cognitive nor moral in nature. The single most 
important property here is sentience, which is consciousness in the form of feeling, 
especially the capacity to feel pain and pleasure and to suffer. Causing pain harms and 
therefore wrongs individuals. Actions that result in harm are morally forbidden unless there 
are sufficient moral reasons to justify them. It is these properties of experiencing pain and 
suffering that give some measure of moral status because two of the foremost objectives of 
morality are to minimise pain and suffering and to prevent or limit a lack of concern and 
aggression toward those who are experiencing pain and suffering. All those that experience 
pain and suffering have moral status and are therefore morally wronged when others cause 
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them pain and suffering. People with vulnerabilities are therefore protected by this theory. 
The problem with this theory is that it takes us to the centuries old debate on fetuses and 
moral status because fetuses develop sentience after several weeks of development. In 
addition, individuals with severe brain injury and an inability to feel pain would not have 
moral status and would therefore not be deserving of protection and could be exploited in 
health research. Therefore this theory can also be interpreted as providing a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for moral status. 
3.2(E) Theory Based on Relationships1                   
In this theory, relationships between parties, in particular those that establish roles and 
obligations, justify moral status1. A researcher-participant relationship is established in the 
context of health research. This is a relationship based on scientific need (researcher) and 
provision of research data (participant). Once this relationship commences, the participant 
gains a right to a particular respect that others cannot have a claim to, i.e., those who are 
not research participants. The participant does not have this status independent of the 
established relationship and the researcher does not have the same obligations to those 
outside such a relationship. Important to this relationship are trust, caring and empathy, 
and these are all the more necessary when participants are vulnerable. This theory provides 
for the conditions under which particular relationships, especially those requiring social 
interactions and reciprocity, are more robust and influential as compared to relationships 
with those outside this context1.       
Beauchamp and Childress go on to explain in this theory that moral status will not 
necessarily be acquired through a decisive incident that can, independent of communal 
relationships, be determined at a particular time. Moral status is conferred to classes of 
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people, like research participants, because historically, the human moral community has 
weighed up the importance of the researcher-participant relationship, together with the 
worthiness of reciprocal moral protections, to participants in this class. The basic 
requirement is that of protecting and caring for those in the established relationship. 
Moreover, should they become vulnerable because of the relationship, the obligations of 
protections and care will need to increase1. While this theory is appealing in the context of 
health research, it too provides sufficient but not necessary conditions for moral status.  
As can be seen by the above discussion on the theories of moral status, a unified and 
comprehensive account of moral status is lacking. In addition, various morally relevant 
features of situations that lay out moral reasons for acting or not acting in particular ways 
with regard to others are required in the form of moral judgements that none of the 
theories of moral status is able to address1. A compromise position is to draw the best 
elements from each theory and combine them to formulate an account of moral status that 
accommodates multiple criteria,1 thereby taking into consideration the diversity of views on 
moral status.             
Vulnerable persons and populations and their moral status evoke another moral resource, 
i.e., the human response of sympathy4. Moral sympathy is a trait identical with compassion. 
It usually involves empathy and in the context of health research would be included in the 
attributes of a virtuous researcher. While the capacity for sympathy does not necessarily 
imply generosity or favourable responses, it enables the researcher, albeit imperfectly, to 
enter the thoughts and feelings of the vulnerable participant1. People differ in their human 
responses and their capacity to evoke sympathy, with a greater degree of sympathy shown 
towards those close to them and less sympathy towards those remote from them.  
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Dissimilarity and distance from others may limit sympathy1,4. This situation of limited 
sympathy could arise in the context of health research where researchers and research 
ethics committee members are socially removed from the participant populations. Severely 
limited sympathy could help explain such phenomena as exploitation of vulnerable research 
participants. 
While there are limits to the notion of moral status, Beauchamp and Childress affirm, and 
rightly so, that despite its limitations, the notion of moral status is of paramount moral 
importance as practices like slavery and abuses of human subjects in research succeeded 
historically in part because of defective criteria of moral status and inattention to basic 
rights and dignities, leading to exploitation of those with vulnerabilities. The recognition of 
moral status is important because it can generate interest in and support essential moral 
protections. It is therefore crucial to respect the moral status of participants with 
vulnerabilities in health research as this respect would serve to highlight that safeguarding 
them against exploitation would be a morally justifiable action. In addition, respecting their 
moral status would also give regard to protecting their dignity as human beings. Moral 
status, dignity and vulnerability are without doubt, intricately linked and as will be shown in 
subsequent chapters are necessary considerations in the context of health research. 
3.3 HUMAN DIGNITY AS A CONCEPT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MORAL STATUS AND 
VULNERABILITY 
It has been claimed that human dignity, similar to vulnerability, is a ubiquitous concept 
found in the literature of many disciplines5. Its worth as a notion has been questioned and it 
has been criticised as at best a nebulous replacement for other, more precise notions and at 
worst, a “mere slogan” that acts as a smokescreen to cover up arguments and biases that 
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lack credibility6-10. Macklin claims that dignity is a “useless” concept in the panorama of 
bioethics and dignity means “no more than respect for persons or their autonomy”7, i.e., the 
need to obtain voluntary informed consent, to protect confidentiality and to avoid 
discrimination and abusive practices. She states that it is not deserving of a space in 
bioethics. She argues that elimination of dignity from bioethics discourse would not make 
any difference to the content of bioethics7. 
Immanuel Kant attempted to place universal human dignity on a foundation based on 
rational thinking. One of his most important formulations of the categorical imperative was 
that one must act in such a way that every person is treated as an end and never as a means 
only. Treating others as mere means results in a maxim that cannot be universalised. The 
importance of dignity, rights and personal autonomy are underscored in this formulation11-
15. 
For Kant, dignity meant the intrinsic worth that is inherent in being human6. All people 
possess dignity because of their rational autonomy and it is this human dignity that 
mandates equal respect for all persons and forbids the use of another merely as a means to 
one’s own ends. Kant’s clear celebration of autonomy and his embargo on the use of 
individuals as pieces of equipment have had a lasting impact in research ethics and more 
specifically in the context of protecting participants who are vulnerable. Research 
participants are not to be treated as a means to answer a hypothesis posed or as mere 
things, and every wrong done to them infringes their human dignity.    
While this significant formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative has the impact of evoking 
unembellished awe, at times of grandiose proportions, it is not without its drawbacks when 
viewed through the lens of rational, critical thinking. In situating human dignity within the 
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confines of rational autonomy, all other aspects of humanity and being human were 
dispensed with. Those without rational autonomy like children and the mentally ill, i.e., 
significant vulnerable groups in research ethics, did not qualify for the ownership of human 
dignity and hence equal respect. Therefore, because of his focus on rational autonomy, 
Kant’s account of the moral life is very narrow and does not offer clear moral guidance on 
basic questions of human dignity. Moreover, dignity should not be downgraded to just 
Kantian autonomy as it is an intrinsic human value that is important as a matter of 
constructive morality in human relationships16.   
Forster contends that what makes humans tick and what makes them tick well, i.e., what 
makes them thrive, are all connected to human dignity17. Human dignity, to him, is the 
precondition for human thriving and flourishing. He further states that dignity is not 
necessarily connected to bodily integrity in that one can be physically compromised and still 
have dignity. Forster transports human dignity even further back to the time of Aristotle, 
Socrates and Plato and links the concept to virtue ethics. These philosophers conceived the 
aim of life as being to fare well and flourish and this could only be accomplished if humans 
developed virtuous character traits, capacities, skills or excellences in their conduct or 
behaviour18. A problem with this classical notion of dignity is that it lends itself to 
unwelcome distinctions between people and its focus is on individual agents and gives little 
consideration to the fact that thriving and flourishing are best achieved at a collective level. 
People, as social beings, do not do well by themselves. If dignity is a precondition for 
thriving and flourishing, then dignity is held in a joint account in a nexus of relationships17. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword sum up the situation quite aptly when they state15: 
59  
 
“In sum, human dignity appears in various guises, sometimes as the source of human 
rights, at other times as itself a species of human right (particularly concerned with 
the conditions of self-respect); sometimes defining the subjects of human rights, at 
other times defining the objects to be protected; and, sometimes reinforcing, at 
other times limiting, rights of individual autonomy and self-determination.” 
Notwithstanding opponents of human dignity in bioethics dialogue, this phrase is an 
articulation of a fundamental value that is widely accepted. Reference to and reliance on 
human dignity is found in most of the leading international documents, including the 
following: 
I. The Charter of the United Nations19, Preamble: 
“We the people of the United Nations, ...  reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small .” 
II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights20 Article 1: 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”    
III. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights21 Article 10: 
“ ... all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect of the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
IV. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights22 Article 13: 
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“ ... education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and the sense of its dignity.” 
V. The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights23 Article 3.1 
“Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.” 
VI. The Declaration of Helsinki24 Paragraph 9: 
“It is the duty of physicians who are involved in medical research to protect the life, 
health, dignity, integrity, right to self-determination, privacy, and confidentiality of 
personal information of research subjects.” 
VII. Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences25 Commentary on Guideline 
2: 
“A national or local ethical review committee responsible for reviewing and 
approving proposals for externally sponsored research should have among its 
members or consultants persons who are thoroughly familiar with the customs and 
traditions of the population or community concerned and sensitive to issues of 
human dignity.” 
VIII. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights25. UNESCO (1997). 
Reliance on human dignity in this Declaration is not only implicit, but it is also pervasive15. 
Respect for human dignity is stressed in the preamble several times and the first four 
Articles which comprise Part A of the Declaration are grouped under the heading of “Human 
Dignity and the Human Genome”. Article 2 is most focussed on respecting human dignity 
and reads as follows: 
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“(a) Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of 
their genetic characteristics. 
(b) That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic 
characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity”   
Following Part A, seven Articles explicitly refer to human dignity, three of which are specific 
to research: 
Article 10:  
“No research or research applications concerning the human genome, in particular in 
the fields of biology, genetics and medicine, should prevail over respect for the 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity of individuals or, where 
applicable, of groups of people.”      
Article 15:  
“States should take appropriate steps to provide the framework for the free exercise 
of research on the human genome with due regard for the principles set out in this 
Declaration, in order to safeguard respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and human dignity and to protect public health.” 
Article 21:  
“States should take appropriate measures to encourage other forms of research, 
training and information dissemination conducive to raising the awareness of society 
and all of its members of their responsibilities regarding the fundamental issues 
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relating to the defence of human dignity which may be raised by research in biology, 
in genetics and in medicine, and its applications.” 
Moreover, several national laws, policy documents and guidelines also refer to human 
dignity. In SA, some pertinent legal instruments and guideline documents are:  
I. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa27 Section 7 (1): 
“ ... affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
II. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa27 Section 10: 
“ Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected.” 
III. The Founding Provisions of the Constitution of South Africa28 Section 1 starts off with: 
“ The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms.” 
IV. Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes,29 the National 
Department of Health’s Guidelines (SA Ethics Guidelines) for health research, besides 
pointing to issues involving dignity in its Preamble and Introduction, gives it full guiding 
principle status in Section 2.1, the Principle of Respect and Dignity: 
“Respect for the dignity, safety and well-being of participants should be the primary 
concern in health research involving human participants.”    
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V. The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), the statutory regulator for the 
majority of health professionals in the country, in its General Ethical Guidelines for Health 
Researchers30 refers to dignity in sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1: 
“6.1 In order to always act in the best interests of research participants, health 
researchers should always: 
6.1.1 Place the life, well-being, health, privacy and dignity of their research 
participants before all other interests.” 
“6.2 In order to demonstrate respect for their research participants, health 
researchers should always:  
6.2.1 Respect the privacy and dignity of research participants.”   
Table 1: PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL AND SOUTH AFRICAN INSTRUMENTS AFFIRMING  
               DIGNITY 
International 
 
South Africa 
 
 Charter of the United Nations, 
Preamble 
  
 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Art 1   
 
 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art 10 
 
 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Art 13 
 
 Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights, Art 3.1 
 
 Declaration of Helsinki, Para 9 
 
 Council for International 
 Constitution of South Africa, 
Founding Provisions, Sec 1  
 
 Constitution of South Africa, Bill of 
Rights, Sec 7 
 
 Constitution of South Africa, Bill of 
Rights, Sec 10 
 
 Ethics in Health Research: Principles, 
Structures and Processes, Sec 2.1 
 
 General Ethical Guidelines for Health 
Researchers (HPCSA), Sec 6.1.1, 6.2.1           
     
   
 
64  
 
Organisations of Medical Sciences, 
Guideline 2 
 
 Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, 
Preamble and several Arts. 
 
 
None of the documents mentioned above defines or explains human dignity. This state of 
affairs is similar to most research ethics policy and guideline documents (both international 
and country level) where vulnerability is mentioned and protections are pronounced; 
vulnerability is either, ill-defined, not defined or not explained. However, it is clear that the 
dignity of the human person as a basic ideal is universally acknowledged and that this 
acknowledgement is carried through within and between national boundaries. Moreover, 
jurists, philosophers and political leaders increasingly maintain that because human dignity 
is generally recognised as a basic ideal, independent support for this notion is 
unnecessary31. Schachter states that dignity has become so significant that it is widely 
invoked as a legal and moral ground for dissent against degrading and abusive treatment 
and that no other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a universal good31.   Most certainly, 
invoking human dignity in these instruments establishes a universal baseline beneath which 
no treatment of human beings should ever drop. This baseline could well be of value in 
establishing boundaries for the protection of vulnerable participants in health research as 
will be seen in the Vulnerability Scale that has been developed in Chapter 7.  
3.3(A) The Meaning of Human Dignity 
Human dignity is not specifically defined in the international instruments and its meaning, 
content and foundations are not explicitly described. Hence its inherent meaning has been 
left to perception, instinct and intuition, all of which are essentially influenced by cultural 
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factors. When dignity is drawn into the equation in particular concrete situations, it is 
assumed that violating human dignity can be recognised even though the term is abstract 
and not defined11, and to quote Schachter31 “I know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you 
what it is.” 
However, operational difficulties do inevitably arise because of the lack of definition of 
human dignity in general terms in international and national policy and guideline 
instruments. These include problems with drawing specific implications for relevant 
conduct. The etymology of the word “dignity” draws from the Latin term “dignitas” which 
means worth31. One of the meanings of dignity in the South African Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 32 is “intrinsic worth” – a meaning that could well be used to define “dignity” in 
the instruments referred to above.  
It follows, therefore, that respect for human dignity would translate to respect for the 
intrinsic worth of the individual, independent of the individual’s capacity of rational 
autonomy. This in turn translates to how one (moral agent) would treat the other (individual 
with reciprocal moral status). In the arena of research ethics; the moral agent would equate 
to the researcher and the individual with reciprocal moral status, the participant.     
Coercive acts in health research are incompatible with due respect for the dignity of 
participants. Being demeaned or humiliated as a result of participation in research clearly 
violates the dignity of participants. This now draws into the equation the psychological 
dimensions of human dignity. Notably, this type of lack of respect could destroy or reduce 
the self-respect that is so necessary to the intrinsic worth of being human. Respect for 
intrinsic worth recognises that a person is entitled to his or her own beliefs, attitudes, ideas 
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and feelings. Physical or psychological coercion is as striking an affront to human dignity as 
physical abuse or mental torture both within and outside the research context.31 
The notion of human dignity involves a complex concept of the individual. While 
appreciating a distinct personal identity interwoven into individual autonomy and 
responsibility, it also gives recognition to the individual self as part of a larger collectivity 
that must also be considered in the meaning of the inherent dignity of the person.31 Even as 
part of a larger collectivity, no one individual will have more human dignity than any other14. 
Metz rightfully affirms that having human dignity in a sense could mean possessing a 
superlative non-instrumental value that deserves respectful treatment. Human dignity is 
“good for its own sake and to a greater degree than anything else in the physical world and 
that grounds human rights14.” Specific reactions are demanded by the value of human 
dignity because having human dignity means being owed respect of the type associated 
with human rights33. Basically, to recognise one’s human rights is to uphold an important 
natural duty to treat someone in a certain positive way; e.g., dignity is the value that 
supports the judgement that there are strong moral grounds not to discriminate against or 
exploit research participants, especially those with vulnerabilities. Dignity refers to the 
inviolability of human life and in this way expresses the outstanding position of human 
beings in the universe. It also expresses the moral responsibility of individuals to each other 
and in this context Rendtorff offers an explanation for human dignity that links in well with 
moral status and can also be applied as a basis for protecting individuals with vulnerabilities.  
Rendtorff’s explanation is as follows16: 
1. It is an expression of the intrinsic value of the human being in a community or 
society; 
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2. It includes respect for the moral agency of the individual; 
3. It signifies that every individual must be considered as being without a price and 
unable to be commercialised; 
4. It also refers to the indeterminate position of human beings in the universe  because 
they are able to create their own destiny; 
5. Self-esteem, pride, shame, feelings of inferiority and degradation are essentially 
matters of human dignity expressed in relationships between individuals; 
6. Dignity can establish restrictions on individuals in certain situations because of the 
necessity of human civilized behaviour.  
7. Dignity relates to metaphysical experiences of individuals in existential limit by 
degrading treatment; and 
8. In the context of human rights, human dignity indicates the intrinsic worth and 
fundamental equality of all human beings.              
The above analysis makes a compelling argument that human beings are morally important 
because they have dignity. It is because we are human that we have dignity; i.e., dignity is 
characteristic of being human and it is the essential and inviolable core of being human and 
also of what gives one moral status. The analysis also makes a compelling argument that 
respect for human dignity and moral status are indispensable components of ethical 
standards for the treatment of participants in health research and that every human being, 
regardless of the degree to which he or she is autonomous, or vulnerable, has invincible 
worth. Human dignity and moral status are natural properties of research participants which 
must be recognised by researchers and research ethics committee members. Respecting 
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human dignity and moral status is core to protecting vulnerable research participants 
against exploitation and other forms of harms and wrongs.  
Understanding vulnerability in the health research context is examined in the section that 
follows.      
3.4 UNDERSTANDING THE NOTION OF VULNERABILITY 
Over the past few decades, research ethics has witnessed a proliferation of discussion and 
debate on the steady manifestation of vulnerability in almost all aspects of its discourse, 
with concern for vulnerability occupying the centre-stage of bioethical enquiry. Despite it 
being linked in most research ethics guidelines and codes, both international and national, 
to questions of justice in selection of participants, limitations of capacity to provide 
informed consent and unequal relationships between disadvantaged groups and 
researchers and sponsors, it has been a very poorly examined concept from an ethical 
perspective in the context of research ethics. Similar to human dignity and moral status, 
these documents are either silent on the meaning of vulnerability or where attempts have 
been made to explain the concept, these have been very sketchy.  Because so many are now 
considered vulnerable in the context of health research, concerns have been expressed that 
the concept has become too broad and hence lost its gravity34-37. 
Generally, bioethical literature links vulnerability to risk of harm, exploitation and limited 
capacity for autonomy. Exploitation is linked to violation of human dignity and disrespect of 
moral status. The problem with all this theorizing on vulnerability is that vulnerability as an 
ontological condition of humanity38,39 has not been adequately examined as separate to 
context-specific and context-sensitive kinds and sources of vulnerability. The question that 
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therefore comes to the fore is how human vulnerability should be understood. At one end 
of the spectrum, we find that all human life is conditioned by vulnerability because of our 
“embodied, finite and socially contingent existence”40 whereas at the other end of the 
spectrum, the term denotes more than the ordinary universal vulnerability of humanity. 
People vary in their exposure to risk and in their abilities and resources to counter such 
risks. It is to these people with greater exposure to risk and decreased resources to counter 
risks that greater duties of justice and specific moral obligations are required. Hence, many 
vulnerabilities move beyond the universal and are context dependent and warrant ethical 
responses because of their significance within particular settings16.   
Ordinary vulnerabilities as a result of our humanity are unavoidable and the more than 
ordinary vulnerabilities should be safeguarded against in the health research context. It is 
necessary to identify the different sources of vulnerability and the different ways in which 
they are manifest in order to correctly inform appropriate moral responses to these 
vulnerabilities. Meticulously enunciating the concept of vulnerability will, in addition, assist 
in responses not being too narrow or too broad. In the former case, the source of the 
vulnerability that merits a response may not have been recognised and in the latter, a 
person or a group may have been misidentified as being more than ordinarily vulnerable 
with resultant paternalistic protections40.  
Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds state that the theorists who understand vulnerability as an 
ontological condition of our humanity associate the concept with its derivation from Latin, 
vulnus which means “wound”, and with the capacity to suffer, innate to human 
embodiment40. Illness, propensity to disease, aging associated with impairment and 
disability, and death and dying are inescapable to our corporeal existence40. Ordinary 
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human vulnerability is also linked to the inherent sociality of human life in that embodied 
social beings are both dependant on the care and support of others and also vulnerable to 
their actions. Hence, the universal dimensions of vulnerability are emphasised and the 
concept is grounded in human embodiment, sociality and dependency40. It is therefore 
unambiguously clear that the human condition in itself implies vulnerability. All humans are 
permanently exposed to the risk of being wounded both physically and mentally. 
Vulnerability is an inescapable dimension of both the life of individuals and the shaping of 
human relationships. Human vulnerability entails that everyone, at some point or the other, 
lacks the ability or the means to protect themselves41. 
Michael Kottow42, similar to the theorists above, states that vulnerability is a human 
condition from which we all suffer, and because of its universality, we all agree that equal 
protection is due to every member of society. However, when it comes to research on 
human beings, he states that participants are not vulnerable, but they are susceptible to 
harm, especially if the research is done in less developed countries. He alleges that research 
ethics has been slow to observe this notion of susceptibility and by mislabelling participants 
as vulnerable rather than susceptible, researchers and sponsors avoid seeing the 
deprivation these people suffer and hence neglect their ethical obligations to offer them 
remedial help. He defines susceptibility as:  
“... a determined state of destitution and therefore can only be reduced or 
neutralised by measures that are a) specifically designed against the destitution in 
question, and b) actively applied. The susceptible, like the sick, require targeted 
treatment to palliate their misery.”   
71  
 
He goes on to illustrate that the distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility also 
symbolises the difference between being intact but fragile (vulnerable) and being injured 
and being predisposed to compound additional harm (susceptible). An awareness of this 
distinction, he states, should assist in giving additional pressure to the rejection of double 
standards in research. He advocates removing the term vulnerable as it is currently used 
from the research ethics literature completely. This revolutionary approach to vulnerability 
has not met with much support.  It is my opinion that Kottow’s recommendation has not 
been supported largely because he arrived at a conclusion without adequate and careful 
analysis of the notion of vulnerability. Moreover, his focus was on the disparities between 
developed and less developed countries and issues of distributive justice. He was silent on 
the other types of vulnerabilities commonly seen in health research. This is a very narrow 
and dangerous approach to the debate on vulnerabilities in health research. In addition, he 
gave very little regard to the reasons behind the escalation in emphasis of the term in 
research ethics, i.e., the scandals and tragedies that have bedevilled health research 
through time resulting in principled responses by moral agents with respect to the need to 
protect participants in research, the subject matter of the following chapter. Although 
Kottow’s standpoint does very little in assisting with a way forward as regards the nebulous 
dimensions that vulnerability has assumed in research ethics, his view on the issue is 
mentioned here for the sake of completeness.    
While vulnerability makes one susceptible to harm, vulnerability should not be replaced 
with susceptibility. In addition, vulnerability should be understood as essentially relational 
with one being vulnerable to certain types of threats to one’s interests under the control of 
particular agents. In protecting the vulnerable, it is important to take into consideration that 
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because vulnerability is essentially relational, a person’s vulnerability will give rise to special 
responsibilities on the part of those to whom she or he is vulnerable. Goodin in his book, 
“Protecting the Vulnerable”, proposes the “principle of protecting the vulnerable.” This 
translates to an obligation on the agent to act in such a manner as to prevent harms and 
protect the interests of those who are particularly vulnerable to the actions and choices of 
the agent43. Goodin’s principle is grounded in the claim that vulnerability is the source of 
moral claim. In his view, most fundamental duties and responsibilities arise from 
relationships of dependency and interdependency that are not chosen and many 
relationships are less voluntary than often assumed. It is not the voluntariness or otherwise 
of the relationships that generate obligations but the individual’s dependency, making her / 
him vulnerable to the agent’s actions and choices. In his principle, vulnerabilities are firmly 
linked to correlative responsibilities, i.e., the more vulnerable the person, the greater the 
agent’s responsibility to protect the individual’s interests.  
Goodin underscores the conceptual connections between vulnerability, harm and 
exploitation. This then allows for ease of identification of the potential for harm and 
exploitation in relationships entailing asymmetrical dependency, power, ability, resources, 
education or need.  In his view, exploitation would mean taking unfair advantage of others. 
In relationships where the dynamics are such that inequalities of vulnerabilities or 
dependencies exist, opportunities arise for more powerful people to take advantage of 
more vulnerable people. Goodin’s principle imposes an obligation on the more powerful 
party to be particularly vigilant against the misuse of their position of power, authority or 
privilege to take unfair advantage of the weaker ones and in addition, to protect those who 
are vulnerable to them. Furthermore, Goodin sees vulnerability as a matter of degree 
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dependent on the number of needs arising in the relationship and the amount of assistance 
that would be required to meet those needs.   
Goodin’s principle resonates harmoniously with the protections espoused in most research 
ethics guidelines and policy documents. However, it is lacking in that he gives minimal 
consideration to the obligations of fostering agency and autonomy and unwittingly opens 
the door to unwelcome paternalism.  
Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds 40 support relational theories44-46 of autonomy in the context 
of vulnerability. Here, the case is made that autonomy is a socially constituted capacity. 
Extensive social scaffolding is required for its development, support and meaningful 
exercise. Its development can be impaired and its exercise impeded where relationships are 
exploitative or oppressive.  Our inescapable dependency resulting in vulnerability to others 
provides the basis of this approach to autonomy. In the relational approach, agency and 
some degree of autonomy are important for a flourishing human life.  
Goodin’s principle of protections against harms, combined with relational approaches of 
providing the support necessary to promote autonomy of those that are more than 
ordinarily vulnerable, emerge as some of the substantial threads for the analysis of the 
tapestry of vulnerability in health research. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the above that moral status, human dignity and vulnerability are closely 
linked. Vulnerability in the context of research ethics must be differentiated from the 
ordinary universal vulnerability of being human. Relationships are a necessary party to 
vulnerability. Careful analysis of the notion of vulnerability assists in avoiding viewing the 
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concept too narrowly or too broadly. Respecting the moral status and human dignity of 
research participants are important safeguards against exploitation of their vulnerabilities in 
the research context. Moreover, this ensures that because of their inherent worth they are 
protected from being treated as a means to an ends they may not endorse. In the following 
chapter, the results of violating the human dignity and not respecting the moral status of 
research participants will be illustrated as the reasons for such a robust focus on 
vulnerability in research ethics and its ensuing protectionist response. 
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Chapter 4:  DISASTER, DISGRACE AND DISHONOUR:  THE ORIGIN OF PROTECTIONISM FOR 
THE VULNERABLE IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Carol Levine has stated that research ethics was “born in scandal and reared in 
protectionism”1. Concerns about the conduct of researchers in healthcare date back to at 
least the end of the nineteenth century2. Because individuals and groups were being 
exploited and harmed, the concept of vulnerability emerged and steadily gained 
prominence3,-5. It is hence not surprising that, in parallel, concerns over the participation of 
vulnerable individuals and groups grew in prominence in national and international policy 
and guideline documents5. With this surfaced the all too familiar deontological and 
utilitarian tensions between scientific progress and societal interests on the one hand and 
individual rights and interests on the other, with the dilemma being identified as the goal of 
health research which is to improve human well-being. There is no question that health 
research sets out to acquire not only theoretical knowledge but also gains and benefits for 
many people and often society as a whole, and is therefore justified. The quandary, though, 
is how such an important shared purpose can be pursued with full protections of the rights 
and dignity of individuals2, in particular those with vulnerabilities. Using a historic approach 
to inquiry, in this chapter I start off with a discussion on protectionism in health research 
and explore the scandals and tragedies in health research that led to the need for 
protectionism and the safeguarding of research participants especially those with 
vulnerabilities. This is followed with an examination of the Nuremberg Code and its 
significance and an introduction to protectionism in health research in SA. Unless specified, 
the term vulnerable in the remainder of this thesis is used to denote more than ordinary 
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universal vulnerability, i.e.; specific vulnerabilities that are determined by context and 
circumstances, including physical traits.   
4.2 PROTECTIONISM IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
According to Moreno6, protectionism as a tenet in research ethics is the doctrine that 
human beings should be protected from the risks of participating in research. While 
protectionism per se should not be contentious, unless it is believed that scientific progress 
overrides the interests of human participants, controversy arises because of the lack of 
agreement on the interpretation and application of the doctrine in health research. Reliance 
on the moral virtues of the researcher could be perceived as an alternative to 
protectionism6. The problem with relying on this alternative is that it leaves the researcher 
with a high degree of control over participant management, a situation that existed as the 
norm before the middle of the last century and resulted in the many abuses and tragedies in 
health research. Even researchers with the very best intentions and abundant goodwill 
towards humanity can, through the zealous pursuit of their good goals be blinded into 
cutting corners. The classic 19th century novels Frankenstein7 by Mary Shelley  and Dr Jekyll 
and Mr Hyde8 by Robert Louise Stvenson, illustrate this brilliantly.    
Moreno goes on to demonstrate the historical emergence of three versions of 
protectionism, weak, moderate and strong. The type of protectionism is framed according 
to the amount of discretion researchers have over participants enrolled into studies6. Weak 
protectionism allows for reliance on researcher discretion with minimal constraints in the 
form of guidelines. Moderate protectionism establishes a framework of rules and policies 
within which the researcher practices discretion. Strong protectionism entails highly 
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constrained researcher discretion in the milieu of direct interventions by third parties, 
including active monitoring of research6.    
For a good understanding of the current system of protectionism, and its application to 
vulnerable individuals and groups, an understanding of the historical origins of 
protectionism is essential.  
4.2(A) The Historical Origins Of Protectionism 
4.2(A)I Tragedies in Health Research 
The importance of health research must be acknowledged and moreover celebrated right at 
the outset. It is without doubt that studies in the healthcare context have improved well-
being for almost all people globally. Even very early experiments with humans had positive 
outcomes. In the 1700’s James Lind, a British surgeon, studied scurvy in sailors over a six 
year period aboard the HMS Salisbury. He used an interventional study design in which 
some sailors were provided a diet that included fresh fruits and vegetables and others, none 
(the control arm as in contemporary research methodologies), and in so doing was able to 
demonstrate that sailors in the control arm were more likely to develop scurvy as compared 
to those that received fresh fruits and vegetable2,9. Two and a half decades later, Edward 
Jenner tested the cowpox vaccine on his children and other children in the area where he 
resided. These children did not get smallpox, hence the origin of the smallpox vaccine2,10. 
Ironically, both these studies would today be regarded as morally highly problematic at best, 
and at worst, unethical. 
While these successes of research were being celebrated, abuses and exploitation with 
resultant violations of human dignity and disrespect for moral status were starting to 
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surface in the field and by the 1890’s, anti-vivisectionists were already calling for laws to 
protect children because of the increasing numbers of institutionalised children being 
subjected to vaccine experiments in Europe and the United States, and just after the turn of 
the century, the first attempt to test a polio vaccine was thwarted after the American Public 
Health Association condemned the program6. In 1897, Guiseppe Sanarelli, an Italian 
bacteriologist, injected five people with an organism that he had isolated to prove his 
postulation that it caused yellow fever. His action, which resulted in severe harm being 
suffered by the five, was widely criticised and remembered for some time thereafter2. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, research rules were imposed by the Prussian State11,12, 
and the United States Congress contemplated the prohibition of medical experiments for 
particular groups, such as pregnant women, in the District of Columbia6,13. The Prussian 
Ministry of the Interior issued a regulation in 1891 that would not allow the treatment of 
tuberculosis with tuberculin against the patient’s will, and although this was specific to the 
treatment and not research, it was amongst the first initiatives at clearly defining medical 
ethics regulations12. It also preceded research ethics regulation in Prussia, where in 1900, 
the Prussian Ministry of Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs issued a legal directive 
that “absolutely prohibited” non-therapeutic interventions on humans if the subject did not 
consent  to this unequivocally. In addition, proper explanation of the adverse consequences 
of the intervention was necessary before the subject consented. This legal directive, a form 
of moderate protectionism, affirmed that voluntary informed consent as a requirement was 
fundamental to ethically sound experimentation12.  
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4.2(A)II The Yellow Fever Board  
In the wake of the Sanarelli scandal, Walter Reed was commissioned by the US surgeon 
general to identify the cause of yellow fever, a raging epidemic in Cuba at that time. 
Because of an atmosphere of huge disquiet as regards human experimentation, Reed 
adopted what could be described as Moreno’s strong protectionist approach. He developed 
ethical guidelines to act as safeguards for the research which was to be overseen by the US 
Army’s Yellow Fever Board. This Board could be described as the forerunner to what is 
today known as the Research Ethics Committee (REC) or Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
The guidelines included: self-experimentation by members on the Board; written contracts 
that clearly explained the risks involved in the experimentation for locals who were not 
members of the Board (the precursor to written informed consent forms); payment in gold 
for locals who volunteered; $100 compensation for those who became ill with yellow fever; 
enrolment to be restricted to adults more than 24 years of age; children to be excluded and 
all journal publications on the research to use the phrase “with his full consent”2,14.  
4.2(A)III Self-Research: The Impact of the Illusion of Medical “Martyrdom” 
The safeguards utilized by the Yellow Fever Board, the contract process for obtaining explicit 
consent and the heroism of the Board members who participated as research subjects 
helped legitimise health research in the aftermath of emerging scandals2. It also led to 
medical researchers being “largely inoculated against regulation by the legendary status of 
self-experimentation by the Yellow Fever Board members”6. Dr Jesse Lezear, also as part of 
a self-research process, died after subjecting himself to mosquito bites. This helped to 
confirm the hypothesis of disease spread2,6.  Reed’s untimely death a few years later, as a 
result of an error by a colleague, was mistakenly believed to be because of his involvement 
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as a volunteer subject while on the Board. This added to the illusion that medical 
researchers were of such exceptionally moral character that they should be elevated to the 
status of “martyrs”6.  Other exemplary cases of self-experimentation in the twentieth 
century include Werner Forssmann who, in 1930, practiced cardiac catheterisation on 
himself and won a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 195615 for his work; and JBS 
Haldane who subjected himself to various gases in decompression chamber experiments in 
an attempt to find out how best the welfare of sailors in submarines could be protected15. 
However, it was the Reed Yellow Fever Board example that served as the primary reference 
point and a justification for self-regulation in medical research for many decades to follow. 
Despite the research tragedies of World War II and the Nuremberg Code of 194716, when 
medical researchers were being subjected to new levels of scrutiny in the 1960’s, 
distinguished physician-scientist Walsh McDermott referred to the Reed example in order to 
stress the social worth and accompanying high moral standing of medical research17.   
4.3 THE EMERGENCE OF EXPLOITATION OF THE VULNERABLE 
Notwithstanding the examples of Lind, Jenner and self-experimentation as cited above, 
examples of experimental research where people with vulnerabilities have been harmed 
have surfaced since medieval times. While not typical of experiments of that era, Frederick 
II is said to have experimented with neonates so he could obtain knowledge on the 
development of language in humans12. Avicenna, an Arabian physician and philosopher, 
tested interventions directly on people because he felt that testing these on animals would 
not have any relevance for its use on humans12.  
Briggle and Mitcham assert that, in the main, the first studies of experimentations on 
humans took place on slaves and the poor15 and that this coincided with the development 
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of the new science of anthropology which Europeans used to study non-European 
peoples15. They state that, generally speaking, human experimentation was initially 
undertaken on those who were considered to be uncivilized and often less than human with 
diminished or no moral status. Even colonial and imperial rule was often justified by 
anthropological research which described the native peoples of Africa, the Americas and 
Asia as being of inferior intelligence and ability and hence in need of paternalistic rule by 
European powers or immigrants. Their anthropological findings were based on the category 
of race15.  
Amongst the greatest tragedies in human research experimentation, the heinous studies 
conducted during World War II by Nazi doctors on “racially inferior” Jews and other 
“deficient” groups2,3,5,6,15 and by Japanese doctors on people, in the main Chinese, that they 
determined to be less than human15,18,19 take centre stage as the most notorious. 
4.3(A) Japan’s Biological Warfare Program 
An offensive and defensive biological warfare program was carried out by the Imperial 
Japanese Military between 1932 and 1945. The program, under the leadership of General 
Shiro Ishii, evolved in three stages and was responsible for some of the most notorious war 
crimes during World War II18,19. It started off as a laboratory at the Army Medical University 
in Tokyo in 1932, developed into a first research station in Beyinhe, China from 1932 to 
1936 and subsequently advanced to a system of research centres in different Chinese cities 
from 1936 to 1945. The research centres included Unit 731 in Harbin, Unit 1644 in Nanjing, 
Unit 1855 in Beijing, Unit 100 in Mengjiatung and Unit 8604 in Guanzhou. The headquarters 
of the research centres and the biological warfare program was Unit 731 which functioned 
both as a university research department and a concentration camp19. 
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Experiments were conducted using a variety of potential biological warfare agents so as to 
develop biological weapons. The agents included Vibrio cholera, Shigella dysenteriae, 
Salmonella typhi, Salmonella paratyphi, Brucella melitensis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella 
tularensis, Corynebacterium diphtheria, Bacillus anthracis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and 
Rickettsia prowazeki. Controlled laboratory studies that investigated the lethality of the 
viruses or bacteria in biological warfare were conducted. The efficacy of weapons developed 
in this way was then tested through field studies in the different Chinese cities. Japanese 
scientists also conducted experiments whereby reactions of humans to cold, heat, 
electroshocks, x-rays, bloodletting, hunger and thirst were investigated. Victims were 
routinely killed for autopsy results of the research. The bodies were then incinerated in the 
crematory of Unit 73119. More than 3000 people worked at Unit 731 at the height of the 
research activity. Tens of thousands of men, women and children, 70% of whom were 
Chinese, died as a result of being subjected to experimentation conducted in these Units. 
Close to 30% of the subjects were Russian. Others included people from South East Asia and 
the Pacific Islands18.  
At the end of the war, as a result of the Khabarovsk War Criminal Trials, a small number of 
mainly low-ranking members from the Units received prison sentences, while at the Tokyo 
War Criminal Trials, these human experiments were only mentioned once by the prosecutor 
and the presiding judge decided not to pursue the charges because of a lack of evidence. Of 
note, both the prosecutor and judge were American19. Many scientists from Unit 731 went 
on to acquire prominent careers after the war in politics, academia, business and medicine. 
One of the reasons these scientists were not tried for war crimes similar to the trial of the 
Nazi scientists is probably because the information and experience gained from those 
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studies of biological warfare was of great value for the United States biological weapons 
development program and it is alleged that a deal to this effect was concluded between the 
United States and Japan in 194818. The prosecution of the Japanese scientists could have 
interrupted the process of additional information of this nature being obtained and would 
have made public the information already obtained by the US, thereby destroying its 
military strategic value to the latter19.   
4.3(B) The Nazi War Atrocities 
In the aftermath of World War II, the horrors of experimentations on concentration camp 
inmates were publicised during the Nuremberg Trials in Germany which lasted from 
December 1946 to August 1947.3,5,6,15,20. The trial specific to the medical atrocities is the 
case of the United States of America v Karl Brandt et al - also referred to as the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial21. Nazi doctors and bureaucrats were tried by the Allies for subjecting 
thousands of concentration camp prisoners to egregious experiments. 1,750 victims were 
identified in the indictment. This was an extremely small proportion of those killed or 
injured. There were 23 defendants, 20 doctors and 3 bureaucrats, and all of them were 
indicted with war crimes and crimes against humanity20. They were just a token assortment 
selected from the 350 candidates2,6. Telford Taylor, a United States brigadier general and 
chief counsel for the trial, described the studies that were performed in his opening 
statement before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal2,22.  Emanuel, Crouch, Arras, Moreno, 
and Grady have summarised the experiments from the opening statement as follows2: 
 “High-altitude (low-pressure) experiments:  Prisoners were put into low pressure 
tanks to see how long they could survive with little oxygen. Many of those who did 
not die immediately were put under water until they died; autopsies followed.   
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 Freezing experiments: Prisoners were forced to remain outdoors without clothing in 
freezing weather for 9 to 14 hours, or were forced to remain in a bath of freezing 
water for three hours at a time. Rewarming of the bodies was then attempted, often 
without success.  
 Malaria experiments: Prisoners were infected with malaria and then given a variety 
of supposedly anti-malarial drugs. Many died from these drugs. 
 Mustard gas experiments: Prisoners were deliberately wounded and the wounds 
then infected with mustard gas, or they were forced to inhale mustard gas. 
Experimentation with various treatments followed.  
 Sulphanilamide experiments: Wounds were inflicted on prisoners, and bacterial 
culture, gangrene-producing culture, wood shavings or glass shards were forced into 
the wounds, followed by treatment with sulphanilamide for wound infection. A 
control group consisted of prisoners who were subjected to the wounds and 
infections, but not given the sulphanilamide.  
 Typhus experiments: Prisoners were injected with an antityphus vaccine and then 
infected with typhus. Prisoners in a control group were infected with typhus and 
received no treatment; others were infected with typhus simply to ensure that the 
typhus virus remained active within the prison camps.  
 Poison experiments: Various poisons were fed to prisoners through their food. Most 
died immediately, and those who did not die were killed for purposes of autopsy. 
 Incendiary bomb experiments: Prisoners were burnt with phosphorus material taken 
from English incendiary bombs so that doctors could examine the wounds.  
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 Sterilization experiments: Because sterilization by surgical means was considered too 
costly and time consuming, prisoners were subjected to chemical sterilization and x-
ray sterilization experiments.”     
In addition to the above, anthropological studies in which hundreds of prisoners were killed 
so as to assemble a collection of skeletons were also conducted. They were killed because 
they were considered by the Nazi’s to be prototypes of what they called the “repulsive but 
characteristic subhuman”2. The “Jewish Skeleton Collection” was one of the activities of the 
SS-Ahnenerbe (Ancestral Heritage) Society headed by Wolfgang Sievers. It was a collection 
of heads and bodies of murdered Jews compiled by August Hirt, anatomist at the Reich 
University of Strasbourg20.   
The aim of detailing the atrocities cited above is to underscore the robust and relentless 
exploitation and wrongs prevalent in medical studies at that time. The vulnerable were 
considered to be subhuman, of decreased intelligence, of no moral status and lacking 
human dignity. The Nuremberg Trial raised insightful issues on how and why doctors who 
were trained in the Hippocratic tradition were able to commit such egregious and heinous 
medical crimes. As medicine was supposed to be one of the “… world’s most advanced 
scientific cultures …”20 questions on whether these doctors actually understood that they 
were committing a crime were raised. The defendants’ lawyers during the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial, using a utilitarian approach highlighted that the Allies had also engaged in 
medical experiments in servicing the war effort and hence there should be no grounds for 
the indictment6, 20. They also argued that the type of medical experimentation performed in 
the concentration camps (which included Auschwitz, Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler 
Ravensbrük and Buchenwald)20 during the war was commonplace even before the war. They 
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pointed out that there were no legal restrictions on such experiments15. As the 
prosecution’s attempts at demonstrating that there were clear international rules governing 
medical experimentation wavered, the judges attempted to create their own set of rules, 
and two medical advisors to the judges, Drs Andrew Ivy and Leo Alexander, were tasked to 
do this2,6,15. They drafted a ten point memorandum entitled “Permissible Medical 
Experimentation”15, which then became known as the Nuremberg Code16, the aim of which 
was to obtain a way forward on one of human experimentation’s most fundamental 
conflicts: that of balancing the need for advancing medical science for the benefit of society 
with the rights of individuals to “personal inviolability, autonomy and self-determination”20. 
While the judges at the trial were all American nationals, the trial was based on 
international law as outlined in the “London Agreement on the Punishment of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis” (London Charter) in 194520. Although international law 
had previously not codified specific war crimes, the crimes specified in the London Charter 
included those contained in the Hague Regulation of Warfare (1907)23, which Germany had 
signed20. Germany had also signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 192824 which condemned 
aggressive wars, and the Geneva Convention25 in 1929 which specified in its rules on how 
prisoners of war should be protected20. Therefore both the judgement and the Code were 
de jure international in character. The Nuremberg Code (see Annexure II) is hence 
undoubtedly the first international medical ethics code20.    
It is interesting to note that besides Germany being signatory to international instruments 
for protection of prisoners of war, by the end of the 19th century it started developing some 
of the most stringent and clearly defined medical ethics regulations12 and in March 1931, 
the Reich Health Council (Reichsgesundheitstrat) issued the Regulations Concerning New 
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Therapy and Human Experimentation26 (Annexure III). The far-reaching directives in these 
regulations were “… among the most comprehensive research rules by any standard at the 
time …”12. Some aspects which involved contentious issues like voluntary informed consent, 
therapeutic research, non-therapeutic research and benefits were much more structured 
and detailed as compared to the principles in the Nuremberg Code. It was stressed that the 
rights and dignity of subjects had to be protected at all times and on the issue of non-
therapeutic research it underscored the prohibition of experimentation in all cases where 
consent had not been given. Unfortunately, despite the strong protectionism in the 
Guidelines, respect for moral status, upholding dignity and according special protections for 
subjects enrolled in research – fundamental values highlighted in the Reich Health Council’s 
regulations - were ignored.            
4.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUREMBERG CODE 
Although this Code, consisting of ten characteristics for acceptable research involving 
humans, is one of the most widely known documents of ethics in research,2 and is often 
cited as the most important document in the history of research ethics27-30, it was not cited 
in any of the findings against the defendants and never became a formal part of law in 
Europe or North America. While it is clear that the courts believed protections were needed, 
it is unclear how much weighting they wished to give the Code in the operations of medical 
research6. Although they were urged by Drs. Ivy and Alexander to identify persons with 
mental disorders as in need of special protections, they declined to do so. In fact, the 
requirement that there must always be voluntary informed consent for all participants in 
any form of research undermined the relevance of their Code to research designed for 
vulnerable people with diminished or absent competence6.  
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Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Code established fundamental human rights in medicine and 
research and placed the welfare of patients in the foreground of medical and research 
practice20. In addition, it would seem that the key contribution of the Code was to merge 
Hippocratic ethics and human rights into one code27. While moderately protectionist, its 
principles are strongly reflective of values emanating from deontology and virtue ethics. 
Principle 1, in linking the experiment with the voluntary consent of the experimental 
subject, has been of importance for the history of research ethics in that it reaches far 
beyond Nuremberg20. The status of voluntary consent had become a central element of 
health research since the late 19th century, albeit not respected as such. Because of the 
Code, and as part of the Nuremberg judgement, the principle of autonomy was for the first 
time assigned into international law20. International law is a combination of treaties and 
customs that regulate the conduct of states among themselves and draws from three main 
sources: customary international law, treaties and conventions and soft law (guidelines and 
non-binding judgements)31.  
Principles 2-8 and 10 of the Code require that physician-researchers protect the best 
interests of their subjects. Principle 8 specifically refers to their wellbeing, and principle 10 
places an obligation on the researcher to terminate the experiment at any stage should 
there be reason to believe that continuing the experiment would in all probability result in 
injury, disability or death of the experimental subject. Principles 1 and 9 specifically refer to 
the protection and rights of the experimental subject and also proclaim that subjects can 
protect themselves as well. Principle 9 gives the subject as much authority as the physician-
researcher to end participation before its conclusion27. As this principle was formulated as a 
right, it constituted another legal precedent20.  
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The Nuremberg Code established  in a distinctive and exceptional way a combination of  
Hippocratic medical ethics and human rights, the latter being part of international law. 
While Hippocratic medical ethics was an important pre-condition to protect the welfare and 
lives of patient-subjects, it was clearly insufficient in protecting human lives in the context of 
exploitation and abuses described above. Research subjects required specific rights that 
were part of international law if they were to be sufficiently protected from harm. Hence it 
can be stated that the Nuremberg Code is both a medical ethics code and a legal code20. 
Moreover, the influence of the Code on international documents (discussed in the previous 
chapter) is substantially significant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights32 which 
was adopted a year later in1948 makes claims closely associated with the Code15. The 
Preamble of the Declaration talks to the “disregard and contempt of human rights that have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.” Article 5 states 
that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” and Article 27 states that “Everyone has the right freely ... to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.” When read together, the Nuremberg Code and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be interpreted as establishing a basis for 
underpinning the principles of free and informed consent15 and avoiding harms and 
exploitation in scientific experiments with human participants.    
4.4(A) General Use of the Nuremberg Code 
Despite the  Nuremberg Code being given the status of an International Code for the ethical 
conduct of research at the end of the Nuremberg Trial, and despite it having substantial 
influence on international documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for 
many years after the introduction of these documents, researchers continued to function as 
95  
 
“business as usual” and did not seem to recognise that there were good reasons for 
concerns as regards protecting human participants in research2,6,33. The Nazi transgressions 
were attributed to the abnormalities associated with a totalitarian regime with 
unquestionable brutality. The notion was that researchers working in democratic states 
would not succumb to atrocities and exploitation of vulnerable participants enrolled in 
research. The Nuremberg Code was therefore viewed as not applicable to those in civilized 
democracies. It was a document necessary to restrain barbarians2,33. However, evidence 
emerged in the fifties that vulnerable individuals and populations were being exploited and 
harmed in research in democracies like the US, despite the safeguards in the Nuremberg 
Code34. Faden, Lederer and Moreno report that some researchers were starting to be 
genuinely and deeply concerned with problems surrounding experimentation with 
humans33. They also state that the organisers of the First International Congress of 
Neuropathology were so concerned that they invited Pope Pius XII to address them at their 
conference which was held in Rome in 1952. He was asked to speak on “The Moral Limits of 
Medical Methods of Research and Treatment” to a group of 427 medical researchers from 
all parts of the world. He highlighted to them the relatively recent lessons from the 
Nuremberg Trial and firmly endorsed the requirement that it was necessary to obtain 
informed consent from participants before enrolling them into trials. According to the Pope, 
the Nuremberg trials taught that “... man should not exist for the use of society; on the 
contrary, the community exists for the good of man.”33 These concerns about the power of 
medical researchers could have been the reason for the gradual disappearance from 
professional discussions of the term ‘human experiment’ and its replacement with the more 
reassuring term, ‘research’6. Moreno reports that on the whole, the world of health 
research from the late forties to the mid-sixties was one in which a weak form of 
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protectionism existed, where responsibility for the participant was left to the discretion of 
the researcher steered by guidelines. Written informed consent, while well established in 
the clinical disciplines, e.g., surgery and radiology, was not common practice in health 
research6.                 
Although some researchers were genuinely concerned, not all researchers were entirely 
comfortable with the constraints imposed on them by the Nuremberg Code. This is because 
the latter researchers placed, in the main, a utilitarian emphasis on the importance of 
scientific progress. In 1959, the Committee on the Re-evaluation of the Nuremberg 
Experimental Principles in the United States reported that while there was general 
agreement with the spirit of the principles, there was discomfort with a number of the 
“particulars”33. There were three broad categories of discomfort. Firstly, some felt that 
there were discrepancies between the practice of research involving patient-subjects and 
the “lofty, idealised” language of the Code. The other category was that of simple 
disagreements with some of the elements of the Code. The third category was an 
abhorrence of the very idea of a single, concrete set of standards to guide behaviour in the 
complex context of human experimentation33.  It is therefore not surprising that in the 
United States a series of problems in research started emerging and in the sixties scandals 
seemed to break out everywhere2,6,14. 
Despite the discomfort in the US, the international medical community had no option but to 
reflect about its conduct in the aftermath of World War II and the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial. 
There were now great uncertainties regarding the role the medical profession had to play in 
a post-war society. This was of huge concern to national medical associations as well34. The 
reputation of the medical profession had been undermined, professionalism questioned and 
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the doctor-patient relationship damaged as a result of the Nazi medical experiments. 
Doctors all over the world were anxious that the profession as a whole could be affected 
negatively by the sweeping condemnation of the Nazi physicians. At potential risk also was 
funding for experimental research and the establishment of research institutes34. This 
apprehension resulted in increasing lobbying for the autonomy of physicians with a 
denouncing as totalitarian of any government scheme that advocated a greater degree of 
central or state planning of medical research by organisations like the Society for Freedom 
in Science34. Fears were expressed in the British Medical Journal that the individual 
conscience of the researcher could capitulate to the mass thinking of a totalitarian state35 
and the National Health Service in Britain was criticised as being too great an interference 
from the state in the arena of science and this in itself could lead to a Nazi or Soviet system 
of government34. The medical lobbyists were doing what the defendants at the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial had done – trying to shift the responsibility of the medical war crimes away 
from individual scientists onto an authoritarian state34.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the revelations at the Trial were also a major factor leading to the foundation of the World 
Medical Association21.  
At the first meeting to discuss an international association of doctors and national medical 
societies held in London in 1946, there were 32 national medical organisations present. The 
objective of such an international association would be to promote international medical 
relations and the advancement of medicine and its social and cultural aspects. While 
Germany and Japan did not participate in the meeting, it is to be noted that American 
physicians declined to participate. The American Medical Association (AMA), however, 
requested two British doctors to act as observers on its behalf. The first meeting of the 
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newly formed WMA in 1947, which was held one month after judgements had been 
rendered in the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial, did have representatives from the AMA. The 
Declaration of Geneva36 a statement on the physician’s dedication to the medical profession 
was amongst the first acts of the WMA and was endorsed at the 1948 General Assembly. 
The importance of this Declaration is that when adopted, considerations of nationality, race, 
party politics, and social class would not interfere with the physician’s responsibility for the 
patient’s welfare. This applied to both situations of clinical care and research. Already in its 
very first Declaration, the WMA started the process of protectionism for those patients 
involved in research. 
The Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) of 1964 was the first international set of guidelines for 
human experimentation and it “… reflected the longstanding interest of the World Medical 
Association (WMA) in issues of medical ethics and the enduring shadow of the Nazi medical 
war crimes.”21 The journey of the first DoH was long and turbulent. It involved more than a 
decade of active discussion and debate among the WMA members before the final 
document could be presented to the WMA’s General Assembly for adoption in Helsinki in 
196421. Lederer states that the Declaration reflected philosophical differences, practical 
concerns, organizational politics and the financial structure of the WMA and despite it being 
a product of an international organisation, it “… bore a sturdy American stamp.”21  
Discussion on guidance from the WMA specific to human experimentation started in 1953 
and right at the outset, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the WMA, Dr Paul Cibrie, a 
French physician-delegate to the WMA, advocated that the WMA’s considerations of human 
experimentation be dissociated from the scientific crimes of Nazi medicine21. An additional 
problem was that there were differences over the practice of human experimentation in 
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different national settings and there was huge protest from the US that the requirement 
that healthy human subjects be fully informed about an experiment would seriously 
undermine research in that country. The Nuremberg Code was deliberated extensively by 
the WMA’s Ethics Committee during this time. Some of the principles of the Code were 
rejected by some members as being too restrictive; e.g., there were utilitarian concerns that 
the requirement that all human experimentation be preceded by prior experimentation on 
animals would prevent important research. As modern medical science had evolved and 
essentially become very complex, the wisdom of laying down stringent rules to constrain 
investigators was questioned, in the main by the AMA.  
The final version of the DoH which was also strongly influenced by the principles of 
deontology and virtue ethics, shared some features with the Nuremberg Code; i.e., animal 
and laboratory studies needed to precede human studies, investigators had to be 
scientifically qualified, subjects had a right to withdraw from research, the investigator had 
the responsibility to discontinue the trial where it was foreseen that the research subject 
could be injured and the subject had to consent to participate in the research or 
experimentation. 
Differences between the Code and the DoH were that the DoH distinguished clinical 
research combined with patient care from non-therapeutic human experimentation and 
different consent requirements were introduced for these different types of research. The 
DoH specified written consent from a healthy subject but where the physician combined 
clinical research with professional care, there was no specification that consent had to be 
obtained in writing. The DoH also permitted experimentation on individuals who were 
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unable to exercise informed consent and children whose parents or legal guardians agreed 
to allow participation could now be included in research.  
While the DoH was unanimously endorsed, not all WMA member associations were pleased 
with the outcome and there was open criticism about the American influence in the final 
document21 . In addition, while the Americans had initially declined participation in the 1946 
meeting, American financial support played a crucial role in the WMA’s early years and this 
was critical to the survival of the fledgling organisation. Of note, the AMA required that the 
WMA maintain its headquarters at the New York Academy of Medicine in New York City. 
This ensured that the AMA played an important role in the daily life of the WMA and this 
lasted until 197421. 
Despite the criticisms, and the difficult journey of the DoH, it has been hailed as one of the 
most successful efforts in rescuing medical research from the darkness of the tragedies 
resulting from the heinous atrocities in the name of medical research in Nazi Germany21. In 
addition, the 1964 version was explicitly protectionist:  
“In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on a human being, 
it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life and health of that 
person on whom clinical research is being carried out.”  
However, this protectionism was of “weak” category, as there was no requirement for a 
neutral third party like a REC to ensure safeguards. The latter was included in the version 
that followed in 1975.   
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4.4(B) Post Nuremberg – The Scandals Continue 
 Henry Knowles Beecher, a professor in research in anaesthesia, published a landmark 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1966, entitled “Ethics and Clinical 
Research”37. Beecher detailed 22 cases of research conducted by leading researchers at 
leading research centres which he claimed violated the basic standards of ethical research. 
These studies had been published in highly acclaimed and reputable reviewed journals. He 
had submitted 50 cases in his original list but the number had to be reduced due to the 
space constraints of the journal14.        
The infamous 1963 Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital research is one of the studies 
he discusses. Here, three doctors, with the approval from the director of medicine at the 
hospital, injected “live cancer cells” into twenty-two chronically ill and debilitated patients. 
The patients were unaware that they were the subjects of research38. In another study, 
investigators withheld penicillin from soldiers with streptococcal throat infection, even 
though they were aware of the risk of death as a result of rheumatic fever37. In the 
Willowbrook study, also discussed by Beecher, children and adolescents with disabilities 
were deliberately exposed to hepatitis at a New York state facility with the aim of finding a 
preventative measure which was epidemic at that institution. Because of overcrowding, the 
hospital’s wards were closed to admissions and parents whose children were on the waiting 
list were informed that their children could be admitted to the research ward immediately 
and then transferred to the facility37. 
While Beecher’s aim was to draw attention to the abuses and not to vilify the researchers, 
he was not convinced that strict adherence to a code would be the solution. He concluded 
his paper by stating that the two most important components of an ethical approach in 
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research were informed consent and the “more reliable safeguard provided by the presence 
of an intelligent, informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator.”37 
Hence, Beecher, similar to many others, favoured weak protectionism, i.e., reliance 
primarily upon the virtue and discretion of the researcher. In an earlier paper in 195939 he 
expressed discomfort with the Nuremberg Code, and while supporting the importance of 
informed consent, he criticised the first clause of the Code as being too extreme and 
removed from the realities of the practicalities of research. He was also sceptical about the 
ability of any code in general to provide moral guidance to researchers. It is interesting to 
note that in 1961 when the US Army attached a new set of rules based on the Nuremberg 
Code to its standard research contract, Beecher, together with other members of the 
Harvard Medical School’s Administrative Board, protested and managed to have the rules 
amended so that they read as guidelines6,33. His protest was not surprising considering he 
received funding from the army for his studies33. Several other distinguished scientist 
researchers, including McDermott17, also openly expressed their lack of support for codes, 
rules and peer review processes. Louis Lasagna, also an eminent researcher, rhetorically and 
using a utilitarian argument, asked, “How many of medicine’s greatest advances might have 
been delayed or prevented by the rigid application of some currently proposed principles to 
research at large?”2 When a moratorium on prison research was proposed by the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research 
in 1977, Lasagna wrote in an editorial that the recommendations illustrated beautifully how 
good intentions to protect prisoners, because of tunnel vision, could lead otherwise 
intelligent people to destroy well conducted research that was meticulous about including 
informed consent40. Moreno6 states that it is worth noting that both Beecher and Lasagna 
had good reason to reflect on the ethics of research in light of some of the work they did 
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together. Lasagne had been a research assistant in an Army-sponsored study that Beecher 
directed between 1952 and 1954 in which hallucinogens were administered to healthy 
subjects without obtaining informed consent. Schmidt and Frewer correctly sum up the 
situation when they state that while some in today’s bioethics community would like to 
portray people like Henry Beecher as courageous whistle-blowers when constructing greatly 
biased historical narratives, they were actually largely opportunistic and their whistle-
blowing were measured responses to a significant change in the political, social and cultural 
climate that challenged the power of medical science34.   
4.5 THE TRANSITION FROM WEAK TO MODERATE PROTECTIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES.  
Just one year after Lasagna’s defence of researchers, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study scandal 
erupted. The study was initiated in 1932 in Alabama in order to ascertain the natural course 
of syphilis, a condition that had reached epidemic proportions in African American males in 
the area2,41. The natural history of syphilis had already been demonstrated at the turn of the 
century by a study in Oslo and therefore there was no scientific rationale for the study. Over 
400 mostly illiterate men were enrolled without informed consent or their partners being 
informed of the risk. When penicillin became available in the late 1940s, not only were the 
men not informed of this, but efforts were made to ensure they did not receive treatment 
or hear of it. By 1972, more than 100 had died because of advanced syphilitic lesions.  The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study was a manifestation of institutionalised racism in health care very 
similar to the situation in housing, employment and education at that time2.  
The impact of the turbulence in research ethics as evidenced by the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
was the 1974 National Research Act which became law in the United States and led to the 
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establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research and the enactment of federal regulations governing 
research with humans2. The National Commission was responsible for the 1979 Belmont 
Report, ethical guidelines for the conduct of research. All this resulted in the transition from 
weak to moderate protectionism in research. The Tuskegee study also served to refute 
McDermott’s and Lasagna’s utilitarian justification of research. 
Previously, another US funded set of studies had been conducted in Guatemala between 
1946 and 1948 where in some projects people were deliberately infected with sexually 
transmitted diseases (STD) without their consent. Subjects included prisoners, soldiers from 
several parts of the army, patients in a state-run psychiatric hospital and commercial sex 
workers. They were exposed to syphilis, gonorrhoea, and chancroid. Serology experiments 
that did not involve intentional exposure to infection continued through to 1953 in these 
groups, children from state-run schools, an orphanage and several rural towns42. 
There were stark similarities between the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Gautemala STD 
research. They arose from the same laboratory of the Public Health Service, the Venereal 
Disease Research Laboratory (VDRL). Some of the same researchers were involved. The 
focus in part, was on the same disease. In both situations there were deliberate efforts to 
deceive experimental subjects and the wider community who may have objected. Some 
citizens in the US would have objected as is evident by an article in the New York Times in 
1947 where the science editor described how small doses of penicillin if administered within 
a few days of intentional exposure of rabbits with syphilis prevented the disease from 
developing. The article stated that for definitive results on humans, people would have to 
be injected with syphilis first and this would be “ethically impossible” to do42. This article 
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must have been of particular interest to the researchers working on the rabbits as they were 
about to begin what was described as “ethically impossible”, with prisoners and psychiatric 
patients in Guatemala.  The subjects in Guatemala however, were citizens of a different 
country and so the researchers went ahead with the studies somewhat secretly and 
deceitfully too42. It was only recently that these atrocities came to light and in November 
2010, President Obama of the US requested the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues to oversee a thorough fact-finding investigation into the specifics of the 
study42. These and other examples of research atrocities involving researchers from the US 
are probably why there were so many objections to the Nuremberg Code and difficulties 
during the WMA’s journey to the DoH from American scientists and physicians.            
The above section has described the history of disasters of ethics in research and 
protectionism from an international perspective up to the point of the Nuremberg Code. It 
continued in this vein post Nuremberg, but the focus changed to the failures in the United 
States and the development of its protections up to the Belmont Report and the Federal 
Regulations following the 1974 National Research Act. The reason for detailing the situation 
in the United States is that the principles43 espoused in the Belmont Report have had great 
influence on several international ethics instruments that followed the Nuremberg Code , 
and the US is an influential sponsor for much international research, both Federal funded 
and pharmaceutical industry studies. Moreover, in the context of international research 
conducted in South Africa, a substantial source of funding for these studies is from the 
United States44. However, despite the fact that the protectionism movement in the United 
States was in response to scandals and tragedies in research, and there were lessons to be 
learnt for researchers there and elsewhere, reports of abuses and exploitation of vulnerable 
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populations in poorly resourced regions in the context of clinical research sponsored by the 
US continue to emerge4,42,45,46.    
4.6 PROTECTIONISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The history of protectionism from a regulatory perspective in South Africa is quite scant and 
only emerged over the past two decades. This is understandable as prior to 1994 citizens in 
the country were oppressed and subjected to the repressive apartheid regime in which 
people who were not white were considered to be subhuman, lacking human dignity and of 
decreased or no moral status, similar to the European anthropological viewpoint described 
earlier in this chapter. However, the apartheid regime and philosophy was not successful in 
removing moral agency from the virtuous physician-researcher in the country and in the late 
sixties, after Beecher’s seminal paper was published37, steps were set in motion at the level 
of individual institutions where research was conducted to introduce protections for all, and 
in particular the vulnerable, that were involved in research. Peter Cleaton-Jones47 states that 
the Beecher paper was considered such a milestone in research ethics that four months 
after its publication, at the suggestion of Professor John Hansen of the Department of 
Paediatrics at the then Baragwanath Hospital which was situated in a racially demarcated 
township, Soweto, the University of the Witwatersrand formed the Committee for Research 
on Human Subjects (Medical). Hence, this could be described as the birth of protectionism 
for the research participants in South Africa. The Committee was the first REC in the country 
and was probably one of the first in the world. The Committee underwent a name change in 
2003 to the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical)47, is still functional today, and, in 
my opinion is one of the leading RECs in the country. From the mid seventies, other 
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institutions followed suit and currently there are over thirty RECs registered with the 
National Health Research Ethics Council in the country48.    
In the beginning, guidelines for the protection of participants in research were lacking in the 
country. However, in 1978, Professor de V Lochner, then vice president of the South African 
Medical Research Council (SAMRC), visited the World Health Organisation in Geneva and 
upon his return, set to work on producing a set of guidelines for the SAMRC. In 1979, the 
first set of guidelines, entitled “Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research”, was produced by 
the SAMRC. These guidelines have undergone several revisions since47. 
The National Department of Health in 2000 produced Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 
in Research47. This was updated in 200649. Up to 2004, while some institutions had 
established REC oversight, in the main, protections in South Africa fell into Moreno’s weak 
category. However, after the promulgation of the National Health Act50 (No 61 of 2003), in 
2004, protectionism transitioned to the strong category. Chapter 9 of the National Health 
Act focuses on health research and health research ethics, similar to the US National 
Research Act of 1974. As a result of the stipulations of Chapter 9, “Ethics in Health Research: 
Principles, Structures and Processes”51 was launched in 2004. It is a response to the National 
Health Act and, while written as guidelines, has the authority of rules. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The Nuremberg Code was the first international document in research ethics. It was 
established as a response to the disasters and disgrace in medical research generated by the 
Nazi doctors. After many other abuses of vulnerable subjects in research in the United 
States, the Belmont Report was introduced and Federal Rules were established for 
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protecting those enrolled in studies. South Africa followed suit in establishing protections 
for participants of research from the late sixties. In South Africa, the protectionist approach 
was not as a response to scandals and tragedies inflicted on vulnerable participants by 
South African researchers but because of a sense of moral agency, moral responsibility and 
moral accountability of researchers in this country towards people they enrolled in research. 
South African researchers drew from Aristotelian and Hippocratic influences in their 
professional practice and embarked on the protectionist approach in an endeavour to guard 
against atrocities and human dignity violations similar to the ones that Beecher described, 
especially because sponsors and researchers from well-resourced countries, and in 
particular the US, had started finding less resourced areas highly attractive for the conduct 
of clinical research. 
The following chapter will discuss and analyse the evolution of international guidelines and 
instruments from the perspective of protections of vulnerability in health research.           
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Chapter 5: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE – AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CODES AND 
GUIDELINES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter described abuses, tragedies and scandals in the context of medical 
research and the exploitation of individuals and groups with specific vulnerabilities, 
highlighting the chequered history of health research. The birth of protectionism was also 
discussed. In this chapter, international guidelines and codes will be examined and analysed 
for their treatment of specific vulnerabilities. Because systematic medical research 
progressed in leaps and bounds in the 20th century, and because of the offensive way in 
which it was misused by researcher-physicians from many countries1, a historical approach 
will be utilised again in order to explore the treatment of specific vulnerabilities in 
protective instruments through time. The international guidelines utilised for examination 
are the World Medical Association’s (WMA) Declarations of Helsinki (DoH), the International 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects of the Council for 
International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the World 
Health Organization, and the ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline, Guideline for Good 
Clinical Practice E6(R1) (ICH-GCP). The WMA guidelines were chosen because they are the 
most widely used and highly acclaimed set of protections and have been incorporated in 
many national and international laws. In addition, they have had the greatest influence on 
South African guidelines and policies on ethics in research2-5.  
The Nuremberg Code (discussed in detail in the previous chapter), the DoH, and the 
Belmont Report6 (to be discussed in the next chapter) are the key texts that have directed 
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the development of “Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes”2, the 
South African Department of Health Guidelines (SA Ethics Guidelines) for the ethical conduct 
of health research. It is for this reason that other international documents like the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics7 and Human Rights and the European Union Clinical Trials 
Directives8, while extremely good, have not been selected for discussion, despite the latter 
together with the ICH-GCP9 having had the most influence on medical research practices 
globally1 . The European Council Directives have not had a major impact on South African 
instruments as most health research in South Africa is funded from sponsors in the US10-12 
who use the ICH-GCP as the guideline of choice for these research projects13. Moreover, the 
ICH-GCP and European Union Clinical Trials Directives claim to be based on a set of ethical 
principles for health research which have their origins in the DoH, possibly the very first 
version1-14. The CIOMS guidelines were written particularly to facilitate the application of 
the DoH in the developing world; they have been somewhat influential on the SA Ethics 
Guidelines and hence are pertinent for examination here. The ICH-GCP, which serves as an 
international ethical and scientific quality standard, has had a major influence on the 
Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials with Human Participants in 
South Africa3 (SA GCP). It will only be briefly discussed because, while it does make 
recommendations on vulnerable groups, it is highly technical in nature.          
The Nuremberg Code remains a cogent articulation of the salient points of research ethics 
but because it was a response to a specific calamity in medical research, it exerted less 
influence than it should have in practice15,16. As seen in the previous chapter, it was drafted 
pursuant to a trial that stemmed from astonishingly bizarre circumstances and was viewed 
by opponents of external interference as a “reaction to extreme evil rather than as a guide 
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for clinical research with humans.”15. It was not regarded as a requirement for decent and 
respectable doctors who did research. Moreover, the Code, which was the third section of 
the judges’ decision at the Nuremberg trials, did not actually form the basis for the 
judgement delivered against the Nazi doctors at the end of the trial15,16. 
The opening of the Code, with its emphasis on the need for voluntary consent as absolutely 
essential, left little avenue for research involving those individuals who could not give 
consent for themselves. This meant that children, the mentally ill, those in emergency 
situations and others with compromised autonomy would not be able to be involved in 
research and classes of individuals could end up as therapeutic orphans. This is possibly one 
of the reasons for the World Medical Association initiating deliberations in 1953 towards 
establishing its own research ethics guidelines15 and in 1954, adopting its “Resolution on 
Human Experimentation: Principles for those in Research and Experimentation”17,18.  This 
document was revised over the next ten years and eventually adopted as the Declaration of 
Helsinki (DoH) in 196415,18. Although the 1954 WMA Principles  for those in Research and 
Experimentation and the 1964 DoH draw substantially from the Code14,19, it is interesting to 
note that neither mentions the principles of the Code1.   
5.2 EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTIONS WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON SPECIFIC 
VULNERABILITIES    
5.2(A) Protecting the Vulnerable in Research - the Helsinki Evolution  
The WMA was established in London in 1946 and held its first General Assembly in Paris in 
1947. During this time deliberations and resolutions focussed on crimes committed in the 
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doctor-patient relationship since 1933 by certain members of the medical profession in 
Germany during World War II18. The Declaration of Geneva20, an updated version of the 
Hippocratic Oath, and the International Code of Medical Ethics21, adopted by the WMA in 
1948 and 1949, respectively, were guidance documents for physicians specifically in the 
context of clinical care. These documents, however, have had a resounding influence on the 
DoH as evidenced by their use in the introduction of the DoH through all its revisions. 
Physician-researchers are bound by the words: “The health of my patient will be my first 
consideration”20 (Declaration of Geneva) and “Any act or advice which could weaken 
physical or mental resistance of a human being may be used only in his interest”21 
(International Code of Medical Ethics). The 1964 DoH22 was the first formal declaration by 
the WMA for physicians doing research and served for the first time to distinguish 
biomedical researchers as a specific class of physicians23. 
Since its original formulation the DoH has undergone seven revisions and two clarifications. 
This is reflective of the fact that science and technology is progressing at a very rapid rate, 
since the nascent medical research of the 1950’s, and the DoH has evolved to keep pace 
with these developments. Similar to the Nuremberg Code, all versions of the DoH provide 
protections for the universal vulnerability of all those participating in research. The 
Declaration of Helsinki has been referred to as the most widely accepted guidance 
document globally on medical research and has also been incorporated into many national 
and international legal instruments14,15,18.   
5.2(A)1 Declaration of Helsinki – 196422 
The major shift from the Nuremberg Code in the 1964 DoH was contained in its section  
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II.18: 
“... If at all possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should obtain the 
patient’s freely given consent after the patient has been given a full explanation. In 
case of legal incapacity, consent should also be procured from the legal guardian; in 
case of physical incapacity the permission of the legal guardian replaces that of the 
patient.” 
The sufficiency of a legal guardian’s consent, i.e., the introduction of a role for a surrogate 
decision maker, was a pivotal departure from the Nuremberg Code which seemed to deny 
proxy consent a place in clinical research. Section II.1 of the 1964 DoH was an indication that 
the WMA recognised the ethical obligation to include those individuals with more than 
ordinary universal vulnerability in research and to expand on protections for them. This 
effort by the WMA also served as a safeguard against discriminating against those with 
added vulnerabilities from participating in a socially responsive exercise like research. In 
addition, the 1964 DoH introduced for the first time in research ethics documents a 
reference to vulnerable subgroups, i.e., those with inability to consent due to psychological, 
legal or physical incapacity. 
5.2(A)II Declaration of Helsinki – 197524  
The first revision of the DoH was adopted in 1975. It was a significant revision and was twice 
as long as its predecessor. It placed greater emphasis on informed consent and introduced 
the concept of vulnerability as a result of dependency9: 
“I.10 When obtaining informed consent for the research project the doctor should 
be particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent relationship to him or her or 
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may consent under duress. In that case informed consent should be obtained by a 
doctor who is not engaged in the investigation and who is completely independent 
of this official relationship.” 
Hence, not only did section I.10 create an additional subgroup – that of those subjects in 
dependent relationships - but it also made provisions to safeguard them against this 
dependency by introducing an added layer of protection in the consent.  
With regard to incapacity, it made specific reference to “mental” incapacity and stipulated 
that in the situation of incapacity, surrogate consent would have to be obtained in 
accordance with national laws: 
“I.11 In cases of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from the 
legal guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where physical or mental 
incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the subject is a 
minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in 
accordance with that of the national legislation.” 
By introducing the requirement for compliance with national legislation, section I.11 
increased the protections to the subgroup lacking in capacity to consent and hence 
transitioned the DoH from being weakly protectionist to strong protectionism. Reference 
was made to socio-economic vulnerability in section II.3: 
“II.3 In any medical study, every patient – including those of the control group, if any 
– should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.”  
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Giving assurance to those involved in the study that they would receive treatment 
following the study provided an undertaking that treatment would be continued 
even to those who could not as a rule afford treatment. 
Other aspects of the Declaration that could be perceived as introducing added protections 
include section I.2 which established the requirement that the experimental protocol be 
“transmitted to a specially appointed independent committee for consideration, comment 
and guidance.” While this added protection would apply to all participants and not just 
those with more than ordinary vulnerabilities, it was nevertheless an important addition to 
the Declaration.  
Therefore the 1975 DoH strengthened the consent requirements, introduced the concept of 
socio-economic vulnerability, established the need for independent review and overall, 
augmented the protections and safeguards for participants in research. 
5.2(A)III Declaration of Helsinki – 198325, 198925, 199627 
There were minor changes in the next three versions of the DoH (1983, 1989, 1996). The 
198325 version strengthened protections for minors even further by stipulating that where a 
minor is in a position to consent, this consent must be obtained in addition to that of the 
legal guardian (section I.11). The 198926 version, in section I.2, established that the review 
committee should be independent of the investigator and sponsor and should be in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the country in which the research experiment is 
performed. This introduced the concept of international research and provided for added 
protections for participants at distant sites with extant laws and regulations. However, this 
stipulation made no provision for those sites where laws and regulations for the protection 
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of participants in health research did not exist. This could be perceived as a weakness of this 
section. The 199627 version was a replication of the ‘89 version except for a minor wording 
change in I.4 and the introduction of the use of inert placebo where no proven diagnostic or 
therapeutic method existed (section II.3). There were no further additions as regards 
vulnerable groups. 
5.2(A)IV Declaration of Helsinki – 200028  
The 200013 version of the DoH was arguably a significant advance over the previous ones. It 
has also been the most controversial version requiring further clarifications, in 200229 on the 
subject of placebos and 200430 on the subject of post-trial access to therapies. It is the first 
version to make direct reference to vulnerable populations and their rights to protections: 
“A.8 Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote respect for all 
human beings and protect their health rights. Some research populations are 
vulnerable and need special protection. The particular needs of the economically and 
medically disadvantaged must be recognised. Special attention is also required for 
those who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves, for those who may be 
subject to giving consent under duress, or for those who will not benefit personally 
from the research and for those whom the research is combined with care.”               
In just one section, six different vulnerable populations or groups were highlighted:  
1. the economically disadvantaged,  
2. the medically disadvantaged,  
3. those lacking capacity to consent,  
4. those subjected to consenting under duress,  
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5. those who would not benefit personally from research; and  
6. patients (research combined with care). 
The requirements for consent are strengthened even further in this version. Sections B.24 
and B.26 state that where proxy consent is necessary because of a lack of capacity to 
consent, these groups should not be included in the research unless the study being 
undertaken is necessary to promote the health of the population represented and this 
research cannot instead be performed on legally competent individuals; i.e., special 
justification will be necessary if research is undertaken in these vulnerable groups. It is 
interesting to note the 2000 DoH was silent on the need for special justification when 
enrolling into research the other vulnerable groups that it highlighted. This is possibly due to 
the inordinate obsession with autonomy and consent that seems to be the norm in clinical 
care and research.  
Another section of the 2000 DoH that was expanded substantially was section B.13 on ethics 
review. While earlier versions had introduced the concept, it was for the very first time that 
the committee was called an ethics review committee. Although there were several stricter 
standards introduced for ethics review, the protections in this section were considerably 
weakened by the words “where appropriate” with regard to approval. In other words, it was 
necessary to submit the protocol for consideration, comment or guidance, but ethics 
approval was not an absolute requisite for the conduct of research. Therefore, the 2000 
version of the DoH, in my opinion is not an example of strong protectionism. 
5.2(A)V Declaration of Helsinki – 200831   
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The 2008 version of the DoH16 refers to vulnerability in several sections. It gives recognition 
to the fact that vulnerable populations could be denied access to research and specifies in 
A.5 that those populations who are underrepresented in research should be provided with 
appropriate access to research participation. Section 9 refers to some research populations 
as being particularly vulnerable and requiring special protections. “Particularly” is used to 
qualify vulnerable, hence drawing a distinction between universal vulnerability and specific 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerable populations are those without the ability to consent and 
those who may be subject to “coercion” or “undue influence”. 
Section B.17 stipulates that medical research involving disadvantaged or vulnerable 
populations or communities is only justified if it is responsive to their health needs and 
priorities and there is a reasonable likelihood that they stand to benefit from the results of 
the research. This section introduces another vulnerable population, namely, the 
disadvantaged, but by the use of “or”, also brings in the notion that “disadvantaged” could 
be used interchangeably with “vulnerable”. By extrapolation, perhaps “disadvantaged” 
could replace the contentious term “vulnerable” with all its many complexities. However, 
disadvantaged lacks the gravitas of vulnerable and is perhaps too weak a term as compared 
to vulnerable. Section B.26 is similar to I.10 of the 1975 DoH and part of A.8 of the 2000 
version where safeguards are stipulated against consent during duress. Section B.27 states 
that where potential research subjects are incompetent, they must not be included in 
research that has no likelihood of benefit for them unless the research is intended to 
promote the health of the population represented by the potential subject, the research 
cannot be performed with competent individuals and the research entails only minimal risk 
and minimal burdens. The minimal risk and burden stipulation could be perceived as being 
126  
 
protective to the point of being restrictive. With regard to ethics review and approval, it is 
interesting to note that the “where appropriate” with regard to approval has been omitted, 
hence strengthening and giving authority to the ethics approval process and thereby 
bringing back strong protectionism in the DoH . 
The DoH had, through its evolution, up until 2008 established protections for particularly 
vulnerable populations and individuals with specific added vulnerabilities. 
The DoH’s particularly vulnerable populations included: 
1. those in dependent relationships, 
2. the economically disadvantaged,  
3. the medically disadvantaged,  
4. those lacking capacity to consent,  
5. those subject to consenting under duress or coercion,  
6. research combined with care (patients), 
7. disadvantaged communities,and 
8. those subject to undue influence. 
5.2(A)VI The Declaration of Helsinki – 201332 
This latest version of the DoH was adopted in Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013. Sections 19 
and 20 of this version are specific to vulnerability and are entitled “Vulnerable Groups and 
Individuals” and addresses how they should be treated. During the revision process, there 
were suggestions that the different vulnerable populations be explicitly mentioned in the 
Declaration. There were too many different vulnerable populations suggested for inclusion 
and hence a selection would have had to be made. In addition, while certain populations 
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mentioned did have large numbers of vulnerable individuals, not all individuals in the 
proposed groups were necessarily vulnerable33. Hence, in an impressive move away from 
what has become the norm in international guidelines as regards vulnerable groups, groups 
have not been named explicitly in the current version which offers a general definition of 
vulnerability and briefly specifies the requirements for their participation in health research, 
as an alternative.    
According to Section 19:  
“Some groups and individuals are particularly vulnerable and may have an increased 
likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm. All vulnerable groups 
should receive specifically considered protection.” 
This is the first version that has used “wrong” thereby giving emphasis to the moral 
significance associated with harms to vulnerable participants in health research. Wiesing 
and Ehni refer to “may have an increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring 
additional harm” as the definition of vulnerability. They state that this definition has 
advantages in that it incorporates different reasons for individuals or groups to be 
considered vulnerable. Furthermore, the form of special protections they receive may vary 
depending on the type of vulnerability33. While this shortened definition is attractive, it is 
lacking in that it has left out an additional requirement for vulnerability: that of not being 
able to safeguard one’s own interests. As will be seen in Chapter 7, just being at increased 
likelihood of being wronged or harmed does not necessarily make one vulnerable. Not being 
able to protect oneself in the context of being harmed or wronged is at the heart of what 
makes one vulnerable. The reasons offered for vulnerability in the 2013 DoH are research 
combined with medical care, i.e., patients (Section 14),  dependence on others (Section 27), 
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consenting under duress (Section 27) and being incapable of giving informed consent 
(Section 28 and 30). Similar to the 2008 DoH, subjects who are incapable of providing 
informed consent can only be involved in research where risks and burdens are minimal. 
Again, the minimal risk and burden stipulation could be perceived as being protective to the 
point of being restrictive. 
Section 20 states that: 
“Medical research with a vulnerable group is only justified if the research is 
responsive to the health needs or priorities of this group and the research cannot be 
carried out in a non-vulnerable group. In addition, this group should stand to benefit 
from the knowledge, practices or interventions that result from research.” 
While the three conditions laid out in this section strengthen the protection to participants 
with vulnerabilities and are introduced for the first time in this version of the DoH to apply 
generally to all vulnerable groups, similar provisions had already been established in the 
General Ethical Principles section of the CIOMS Guidelines (2002)34 and the SA Ethics 
Guidelines2 in 2004 in section 5.12. The 2000 and 2008 versions of the DoH do make 
reference to these provisions but only in the context of incapacity to consent.   
Protection of vulnerabilities is bolstered even further with the principle in Section 15 stating 
that there must be appropriate compensation and treatment for subjects who are harmed 
as a result of participating in research. This is further enhanced in Section 22 which makes it 
necessary for information on provisions for treating and / or compensating subjects who are 
harmed as a consequence of participating in the research to be included in the protocol that 
is submitted to the Research Ethics Committee for review. This requirement for 
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compensation is of unquestionable assistance for RECs in their roles of safeguarding and 
protecting participants as this is an issue that RECs have had great problems with, within the 
context of international research sponsored by federal funds from the US35. SA GCP which 
makes compensation necessary in this regard has been flagrantly disregarded by these 
sponsors and researchers (including those from South Africa) and important research 
projects are delayed as RECs struggle with researchers and sponsors to get them to honour 
this obligation35.  
An additional requirement in this version is that Research Ethics Committees must be duly 
qualified. This means that the people safeguarding the interests of participants with 
vulnerabilities need to be competent to do so. This reads well with the SA Ethics Guidelines 
(section 4) which makes it necessary for institutions to ensure that their RECs are 
adequately resourced to ensure competent functioning and Section 72 (6)b of the National 
Health Act no 61 of 2003 which stipulates that the National Health Research Ethics Council 
must register and audit RECs. The DoH of 2013 is certainly an improvement over previous 
versions on the approach to and protections of participants with vulnerabilities. However, 
while it has not named any specific group in its section on “Vulnerable Groups and 
Individuals”, it can be criticised for continuing to make reference to vulnerable groups. 
“People / Individuals with Vulnerabilities” would have perhaps been more appropriate.   
Although there are claims that the 2013 version does not explicitly name any vulnerable 
groups33, the following four groups are identified in the document: 
1. research combined with medical care, i.e., patients (Section 14),   
2. dependence on others (Section 27),  
3. consenting under duress (Section 27), and  
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4. being incapable of giving informed consent (Sections 28 and 30). 
There is no doubt that the DoH has changed substantially over time as regards participants 
with vulnerabilities with the latest version narrowing down the identifiable vulnerable 
groups to four. While the DoH has not named specific subtypes within these groups, the 
CIOMS Guidelines, on the other hand have used a combined approach of broad categories 
or groups and specific subtypes.   
5.2(B) Protecting the Vulnerable in Research: International Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects (CIOMS)34 
The Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), an international 
non-governmental organization in official relations with the WHO and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), was established in 1949 and 
undertook work on ethics in relation to biomedical research with the WHO in the late 
1970’s.  The aim of its guidelines was to establish the manner in which the principles of the 
DoH could be effectively applied, particularly in developing countries in light of their 
socioeconomic conditions, laws and regulations. The result of the CIOMS / WHO 
collaboration was the “Proposed International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects” in 198236.  These guidelines were endorsed in September 1981 
by the 56th Session of the CIOMS Executive Committee, and in October 1981 by the 23rd 
Session of the WHO Advisory Committee on Medical Research before adoption in 198236. 
The guidelines have undergone two further revisions (199337, and 200234) and are currently 
under review again. CIOMS states that the reviews have been necessitated by rapid 
advances in science and technology, changing research practices such as increasing 
multinational and international research, studies involving vulnerable populations, and a 
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changing view in both rich and poor countries that human subjects’ research is largely 
beneficial and not threatening, and there is the need to build in effective safeguards against 
exploitation 34. According to CIOMS, applying universal ethical principles to research in a 
multicultural world where health care systems and standards of health care are 
considerably diverse is a fundamental challenge to international research ethics. A related 
issue is that of the human rights of research subjects in a range of sociocultural contexts. All 
these issues hinge around largely two principles, that of respect for autonomy and 
protection of dependent or vulnerable populations34. Just as the the DoH equated 
“vulnerable” with “disadvantaged”, the CIOMS equates “vulnerable” with “dependent”. 
However, it is unlikely that dependent could serve as a suitable substitute that would cover 
all types of vulnerabilities. The CIOMS has also published guidelines for researchers doing 
epidemiology research. This set of guidelines will not be discussed here.    
5.2(B)I CIOMS 198236 
There are two parts to the first version of the CIOMS document. The first part is a report on 
a survey that was undertaken by CIOMS and WHO in 1976  to inform the guidelines and the 
second part is made up of the set of guidelines themselves, which uses as its foundation the 
principles of the 1975 DoH. The guidelines focussed on developing country issues and 
justified this stance by stating that while the principles laid down in the DoH were regarded 
as being universally valid, their modes of application varied in differing special 
circumstances. The aim of the guidelines was therefore not to duplicate or amend the DoH 
but to suggest how its principles could be applied in the special circumstances of the many 
developing countries. 45 national health administrations and 91 medical faculties in 
countries in which medical research was being undertaken on a limited scale and / or where 
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there were no explicit national criteria for protecting research subjects from involuntary 
abuse responded to the questionnaires that were sent out by CIOMS. A total of 60 
developing countries replied to the questionnaires.  
Aspects of the general survey will be discussed in detail as many issues highlighted then are 
still applicable in developing countries today. In terms of the survey, up until that time 
biomedical research had been undertaken predominantly in highly developed countries. The 
focus of the research was directed to diseases of “global relevance”, on diseases affecting 
primarily the wealthy countries. However, there was growing acceptance of the need for 
increased collaboration with developing countries where communicable diseases, 
malnutrition, and unconstrained population growth were endemic, raising the likelihood 
that more applied biomedical research would have to be undertaken in those countries.  
There was recognition though that untoward pressure could crop up for research unrelated 
to local priority issues to be transferred to these countries. The survey report stated that 
costs of research and development could rise to inhibitory levels in developed countries and 
this could result in studies being undertaken in areas where they could be done the least 
expensively and with the least restriction. There was concern that this type of practice, once 
started, could rapidly gain in momentum. The concerns raised with regard to external 
sponsorship were as follows: 
 “... -     the investigation may subserve external rather than local interests. 
- foreign investigators and sponsors may not possess adequate insight into local 
mores, customs and legal systems. 
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- the absence of any long-term commitment to subjects involved in the research, 
and withdrawal of out-posted personnel on completion of their task, may result 
in local disillusionment. 
- lack of accountability may deprive subjects of any form of compensation for 
incidental injury.”       
It is clear from the above that there was disquiet with regard to developing country subjects 
being exposed to exploitation and other forms of harms as a result of being involved in 
research sponsored by more wealthy countries, and while not specifically mentioned in the 
CIOMS (1982), the underlying issues here were context specific vulnerabilities. Of note, the 
concerns raised by the respondents to the questionnaires in 1982 remain very real concerns 
in developing countries even today.  
In the guidelines section of the document, additional safeguards for those individuals and 
groups who required added protections were highlighted and discussed extensively in 
relation to informed consent. Guideline 6 asserted that informed consent in itself was an 
imperfect safeguard for the subject and for it to be effective as protection, it should always 
be complemented by independent ethical review of research proposals. In addition, many 
individuals, including children, adults who were mentally ill or defective, and those who 
were totally unfamiliar with modern medical concepts, were incapable of giving adequate 
consent. For these individuals, consent implied a passive and uncomprehending 
participation.  Independent ethical review would be imperative if these individuals were to 
be adequately protected. It could be stated that the confidence of these guidelines in 
independent ethical review as an added layer of protections was somewhat naive as history 
has gone on to reveal that subjects in research have been harmed in the decades that 
134  
 
followed despite independent review38. With regard to children, it is interesting to note that 
the guidelines required the consent of a parent or other legal guardian and “willing 
cooperation” of the child to the extent that it was feasible. “Assent” was not mentioned. 
However, in the older child (no age mentioned) consent would be necessary together with 
the consent of parent or other legal guardian. The need for risk analysis was underscored in 
section 10 which pertained to pregnant and nursing women. However, the guidelines stated 
that there were no special problems with eliciting informed consent in this group. On the 
issue of mentally ill and mentally “defective” persons, the guidelines stated that the ethical 
considerations for this group were similar to those applying to children. While the 
agreement of the immediate family for their participation should be sought, the guidelines 
drew attention to the possibility that this permission could sometimes be of doubtful value 
as mentally “deranged” or “defective” patients were sometimes regarded by their families 
as an unwelcome burden. This is of particular importance and should perhaps be 
underscored in all relevant protections instruments.     
Section 13 pertained to “Other Vulnerable Groups”. Hence, it can be extrapolated that all 
the groups already mentioned in the guidelines were considered to be vulnerable as well. 
Section 13 stated that the quality of consent of potential subjects who were junior or 
subordinate members of a hierarchically structured group should be carefully considered as 
their willingness to volunteer could be unduly influenced by the expectation of 
“adventitious” benefits. Medical and nursing students, subordinate laboratory and hospital 
personnel, employees of the pharmaceutical industry and members of the armed forces 
were examples that fell into these groups. Sections 14 and 15 were specific to subjects in 
developing communities. It drew awareness to the likelihood that rural communities in this 
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situation may not have an understanding of the concepts, techniques and implications of 
experimental medicine and might therefore not be in a position to give adequate informed 
consent to the investigator. It was recommended that the decision as to whether or not the 
individual should participate should be elicited through the intermediary of a trusted 
community leader. The guidelines were silent on the possible negative impact the 
community leader could have on the voluntariness element of informed consent.              
5.2(B)II CIOMS 199337 
Eleven years later, after a process of consultation and revision, the 1993 CIOMS guidelines 
were introduced entitled “International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects”37. This was similar to the DoH in that the first version was in 1964 and the 
second in 1975, eleven years later. This set of CIOMS guidelines comprised fifteen ethical 
standards for use internationally as a tool for the protections of human subjects involved in 
research, especially in the developing world. These tools established protections for general 
universal vulnerability and enhanced protections for specific additional vulnerabilities. Nine 
of these focussed on informed consent, ranging from individual consent to consent in 
specific contexts. 
The subgroups stipulated for enhanced protections in the informed consent section are 
children, persons with mental or behavioural disorders, prisoners, and subjects in 
underdeveloped communities. With regard to children, guideline 5 stipulated that children 
must not be involved in research that might be equally carried out in adults and that the 
purpose of the research must be to obtain knowledge relevant to the health needs of 
children. Similarly, guideline 6 stated that persons with mental or behavioural disorders 
could not be enrolled in research if that research could have been carried out with those 
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persons in full possession of their mental faculties. Moreover, the purpose of the research 
had to be that of obtaining knowledge relevant to their particular health needs. In guideline 
8, subjects in underdeveloped communities were contextualised in both developed and 
developing countries with the proviso that research could only be conducted in these 
communities if the research could not be reasonably well conducted in developed 
communities and that the research was responsive to the health needs and priorities of 
those underdeveloped communities. Hence special justification was required if research was 
to be conducted in these groups. However, with regard to research involving prisoners, 
there was no special justification requirement and guideline 7 stipulated only that prisoners 
who were seriously ill or at risk of serious illness were not to be arbitrarily denied access to 
investigational drugs, vaccines, or other agents that showed promise of therapeutic or 
preventative benefit.               
Of note, immediately following individual consent, guideline 4 pronounced on inducement 
to participate and while it allowed for payment and medical services to subjects, these could 
be not be so large as to induce prospective participants to consent to participate in the 
research against their better judgement and hence serve as an undue inducement.  
Guideline 10 on equitable distribution of burdens and benefits made specific reference to 
vulnerability and stipulated that special justification was necessary when vulnerable 
individuals were invited to participate in research, and if they were selected, the means of 
protecting their rights and welfare had to be particularly strictly applied.  
Selection of pregnant or nursing (breastfeeding) women as research subjects was the focus 
of guideline 11 which stipulated that these women could only be subjects in research that 
involved no more than minimal risk to the fetus or nursing infant and the object of the 
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research was to obtain new knowledge about pregnancy or lactation. It also stipulated that, 
as a general rule, pregnant or nursing women should not be the subjects of just any clinical 
trials. Their involvement in trials should only be where the trials were designed to protect or 
advance these women, foetuses or nursing infants and where women who were not 
pregnant or nursing would not be suitable subjects.  
Other relevant safeguards in this 1993 document included the requirement for ethics review 
and approval by an ethical review committee prior to the research being conducted 
(guideline 14), and in the case of international research, the protocol had to be submitted 
initially to the sponsor country’s scientific and ethics review committees, and only after 
approval from those committees was the protocol to be submitted to the appropriate 
authorities in the host country for review and approval. The ethical and scientific review of 
the sponsor country had to be in line with the norms set by that country and were not 
allowed to be less exacting than they would be if the research were to be carried out in the 
sponsor country.  Hence double standards for review were proscribed.  
The 1993 CIOMS guidelines reveal an unfolding of two broad categories of vulnerability as a 
result of special contexts: vulnerabilities arising because of issues with informed consent 
and vulnerabilities as a result of subject selection as follows: 
A. Special Context – Informed Consent Challenges: 
1. Children, 
2. Persons with mental or behavioural disorders, 
3. Prisoners, and 
4. Underdeveloped communities. 
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B. Special Context – Selection  
1. The economically disadvantaged or dependent (fair subject selection),  
2. Pregnant women, 
3. Fetuses, 
4. Nursing (breastfeeding) women, 
5. Nursing infants. 
5.2(B)III CIOMS 200234  
The subsequent revision of International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects resulted in the 2002 CIOMS Guidelines34, a substantially improved set of 
standards. The Guiding Ethical Principles of the Guidelines utilises the principles of Respect 
for Persons, Beneficence and Justice as espoused by the Belmont Report6. Specific reference 
to vulnerability is made in the discussion of respect for persons and justice as follows: 
“Respect for persons incorporates at least two fundamental ethical considerations, 
namely: 
a) respect for autonomy, which requires that those who are capable of deliberation 
about their personal choices should be treated with respect for their capacity for 
self-determination; and 
b) protection of persons with impaired or diminished autonomy, which requires 
that those who are dependent or vulnerable be afforded security against harm or 
abuse.” 
“Justice refers to the ethical obligation to treat each person in accordance with what is 
morally right and proper, to give each person what is due to him or her. In ethics of 
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research involving human subjects the principle refers primarily to distributive justice, 
which requires the equitable distribution of both the burdens and the benefits of 
participation in research. Differences in distribution of burdens and benefits are 
justifiable only if they are based on morally relevant distinctions between persons; one 
such distinction is vulnerability. ‘Vulnerability’ refers to a substantial incapacity to 
protect one’s own interests owing to such impediments as lack of capability to give 
informed consent, lack of alternate means of obtaining medical care or other expensive 
necessities, or being a junior or subordinate member of a hierarchical group. Accordingly 
special provision must be made for the protection of the rights and welfare of 
vulnerable persons.” 
In positioning vulnerable individuals in discussions of respect for persons and justice, CIOMS 
2002 intricately aligns their protections with the need for enhanced safeguards during the 
process of informed consent, and / or selection as illustrated by the need to ensure fair and 
just treatment especially in the context of distributive justice, or both. Where the burdens 
and benefits are distributed such that particular groups with specific vulnerabilities (e.g. the 
underprivileged) are compelled to bear the risks of research for the benefit of the privileged, 
the principle of justice would be violated.  
The principle of justice in the guidelines goes on further to lay down that sponsors and 
investigators should not take advantage of the relative inability of low resource countries or 
vulnerable populations to protect their own interests by avoiding their sponsor country’s 
regulatory systems and conducting the research cheaply with weakened regulatory 
safeguards in order to develop products for their lucrative markets. This stipulation brings in 
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the notion of vulnerability in research as that of extending beyond individuals and 
populations to entire countries.                 
Distributive justice protections in the Guidelines also require that research projects in low 
resource countries or communities should improve their situation and leave them better off 
or at least no worse off. The research should be responsive to their health needs and 
products developed from the study should be made reasonably available to them. The study 
team should attempt to leave the population in a better position to obtain effective health 
care and protect its own health. The laudable intentions of justice in this aspect are watered 
down considerably by the words “reasonably available” which leaves post trial availability of 
treatments very much to the discretion of the sponsor and investigator.  
In continuing its discussion on justice, the CIOMS principle extends its protections, from 
populations and countries to the needs of individual vulnerable subjects by stipulating that 
justice also requires that the research is responsive to the health conditions and needs of 
vulnerable subjects and that the least vulnerable should be selected to accomplish the 
purpose of the research. This gives recognition to the fact that the degree of vulnerability 
differs between individuals within vulnerable groups and hence the exposure to risk would 
also differ. CIOMS links justice to risk by pronouncing that risk from involvement in the 
research that does not hold out the prospect of direct health-related benefit to the subject 
must be justified by the anticipated benefit to the population that the research subject 
represents.    
In Guideline 12 which is specific to the equitable distribution of burdens and benefits in the 
selection of groups of subjects in research, it is stated that there has been the perception, at 
times correct, that certain groups are overused as research subjects. Overuse has been 
141  
 
based on the ease of administrative availability of the populations in certain cases. This 
situation of overuse could arise at research sites and hospitals which are located where 
members of the lowest socio-economic groups reside, students in investigators’ classes, 
residents of long-term care facilities, and subordinate members of hierarchical institutions. 
Because of their willingness to serve as subjects in return for relatively small stipends, 
indigent (impoverished) groups have also been overused as research subjects. In addition, 
prisoners, because of their regimented lives and conditions of economic deprivation, have 
been considered ideal subjects for phase 1 clinical trials. Overuse in research could extend 
beyond groups within a certain society, and to entire communities or societies as well.        
By the emphasis given to vulnerability in the discussion of the principle of justice in 
research, CIOMS clearly gives significant credence to the fact that the notion of vulnerability 
in health research is complexly entangled with justice.     
CIOMS 2002 has a full guidance point (Guideline 13) specific to vulnerability. This is followed 
by a comprehensive commentary. The guideline underscores the need for special 
justification and a strict application of rights and welfare protections when vulnerable 
individuals are invited to participate in research. The commentary commences with a 
definition of vulnerable persons as:  
“... those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own 
interests. More formally, they may have insufficient power, intelligence, education, 
resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own interests.”   
This definition is an expansion of the description of vulnerability in its section on guiding 
principles. However, it is clear from both descriptions that vulnerability, while context 
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specific, is caused by an inability to protect one’s interests. The commentary then goes on to 
specify children and persons with mental or behavioural disorders as classes of individuals 
that are conventionally considered vulnerable because of a limited capacity to consent. 
Other vulnerable groups detailed in this commentary are:  
1. Junior or subordinate members of a hierarchical group: medical and nursing 
students, subordinate hospital and laboratory personnel, employees of 
pharmaceutical companies, who, because they work closely with investigators, tend 
to be called upon more often to serve as research subjects. 
2. Elderly persons: are vulnerable only once they acquire vulnerability-defining features 
such as dementia, or when they are institutionalised. 
3. Residents of nursing homes. 
4. People receiving welfare benefits or social assistance,  
5. The unemployed. 
6. Patients in emergency rooms. 
7. Ethnic and racial minority groups. 
8. Homeless persons. 
9. Nomads. 
10. Refugees or displaced persons. 
11. Prisoners. 
12. Patients with incurable diseases. 
13. Individuals who are politically powerless. 
14. Members of communities unfamiliar with modern medical concepts. 
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15. Persons with serious, potentially disabling or life-threatening diseases (they are 
highly vulnerable). 
It is interesting to note that women and pregnant women have been excluded from the list 
above. Guideline 16 gives recognition to the importance of not excluding women from 
research based on their potential to get pregnant. Guideline 17 on pregnant women as 
research subjects states that pregnant women should be presumed to be eligible for 
participation in research but with the proviso that special protections are necessary based 
on potential risks to the fetus. Fetal vulnerability is acknowledged in the commentary which 
states that where fetal abnormality is not recognised as an indication for abortion, and 
where there is a realistic basis for concern that fetal abnormality may occur as a 
consequence of the women’s participation in the research, pregnant women should not be 
recruited in the study.     
Analysis of the CIOMS guidelines reveals an emergence of both broad categories of 
vulnerabilities, similar to the DoH, and a highlighting of specific groups. The definitions of 
“vulnerability” in both documents, while having similar elements, differ considerably as 
well. 
Table 2: DEFINITIONS OF VULNERABILITY: DOH (2013) AND  CIOMS (2002)   
DoH 2013 CIOMS 2002 
• “Some groups and individuals are particularly 
vulnerable and may have an increased 
likelihood of being wronged or of incurring 
additional harm” 
• “A substantial incapacity to protect 
one’s own interests owing to such 
impediments as lack of capability to give 
informed consent, lack of alternate 
means of obtaining medical care or other 
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expensive necessities, or being a junior or 
subordinate member of a hierarchical 
group”. 
• “All vulnerable groups should receive 
specifically considered protection.” 
• “Accordingly special provision must be 
made for the protection of the rights and 
welfare of vulnerable persons.” 
 
5.2(C) Protecting The Vulnerable In Research: The ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline. 
Guideline For Good Clinical Practice (GCP) E6(R1)9 
The International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use developed its GCP Guidelines through a 4 
step consultation process between 1995 and 1996 with the final version being approved in 
June 19969. The set of guidelines for GCP is an international ethical and scientific quality 
standard for designing, conducting, recording and reporting trials that involve the 
participation of human subjects and will be discussed only briefly because of its highly 
technical nature. The parties to this tripartite ICH GCP are the European Union (EU), Japan 
and the United States (US). The objective of the document is to provide a unified standard 
for these parties so the mutual acceptance of clinical trial data by the regulatory authorities 
of their jurisdictions is facilitated. When drawing up the guidelines, good clinical practices of 
the three parties and Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries and the WHO were taken into 
consideration. It is a comprehensive guide to the technical and operational aspects of 
scientific research. The guidance to researchers and sponsors spans the entire research 
process from the writing of the protocol and the investigator brochure to the final clinical 
study report. Details as regards REC membership and the review process are described. The 
process for monitoring and reporting of adverse events are also detailed.  
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“Vulnerable Subjects” are defined in section 1.61 of the Glossary as follows: 
“Individuals whose willingness to volunteer in a clinical trial may be unduly 
influenced by the expectation, whether justified or not, of benefits associated with 
participation, or of a retaliatory response from senior members of a hierarchy in case 
of refusal to participate. Examples are members of a group with a hierarchical 
structure, such as medical, pharmacy, dental and nursing students, subordinate 
hospital and laboratory personnel, employees of the pharmaceutical industry, 
members of the armed forces, and persons kept in detention. Other vulnerable 
subjects include patients with incurable diseases, persons in nursing homes, 
unemployed or impoverished persons, patients in emergency situations, ethnic 
minority groups, homeless persons, nomads, refugees, minors and those incapable 
of giving consent.” 
Two broad categories of vulnerable groups emerge from this description: Groups with 
hierarchical structures and “other”. Similar to CIOMS, ICH GCP has identified specific types 
of vulnerabilities to be included under these broad categories. A major criticism of the ICH 
GCP approach, though, is that “other” is too broad and ubiquitous a class, especially as the 
broad categories comprise only two types.  
Section 3.1.1 of ICH GCP stipulates that an IRB / IEC should pay special attention to trials 
that may include vulnerable subjects when carrying out its mandate of safeguarding the 
rights, safety and well-being of all trial subjects.  
Informed consent is discussed extensively in section 4.8 which starts off by requiring that 
when the investigator obtains informed consent, ethical principles that have their origin in 
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the DoH should be complied with. With regard to vulnerability, it is required that subjects 
should not be coerced or unduly influenced to participate or continue participating in a trial. 
A legally appointed representative is expected to consent on behalf of a subject who is 
incapable of giving informed consent. An impartial witness is to be present during the entire 
informed consent discussion where a subject or the legally appointed representative is 
unable to read. Specific mention is made of minors or patients with severe dementia. Added 
protections include not only a legally appointed representative but also the requirement 
that the subject be informed about the trial to the extent compatible with his or her 
understanding and, where capable, the subject should sign and personally date the 
informed consent. The process of obtaining consent is also highlighted in the emergency 
situation. Where prior consent is not possible, and the legally appointed representative is 
not available, the IRB/IEC should have to approve or give a favourable opinion with regard 
to enrolling the subject and deferred consent should be obtained. A clear category of 
vulnerability due to challenges with obtaining informed consent has now emerged. 
Hence, the broad categories of vulnerability teased out of the ICH GCP Guidelines are: 
1. groups with hierarchical structuring, 
2. challenges with informed consent, and 
3. other.       
Table 3: CATEGORIES OF VULNERABILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES 
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2013 DoH   2002 CIOMS       1996 ICH-GCP 
•Patients  
•Dependence on others 
•Consenting under duress 
•Incapable of giving 
informed consent 
•Patients 
•Juniors /subordinates  
•Elderly persons 
•Limited capacity to consent 
•Residents of nursing homes 
•On welfare / social 
assistance 
•Unemployed 
•Patients in emergency 
rooms  
•Ethnic / minority groups 
•Homeless persons 
•Nomads  
•Refugees /displaced 
persons  
•Prisoners 
•Patients with incurable 
diseases 
•Politically powerless 
•Unfamiliar with modern 
medical concepts  
•Serious, potentially 
disabling or life-threatening   
diseases  
•Groups with hierarchical 
structuring 
•Challenges with informed 
consent 
•Other 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
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As has been shown above, the approach to vulnerability in the guidelines have been too 
broad and too narrow as evidenced by the numerous groups that are vulnerable. The 
questions that arise is where do individuals with vulnerabilities who do not belong to any of 
the groups fit in and what, if any special protections are accorded to them? Are they 
adequately protected by the guidelines?  The 1964 DoH was the first international 
instrument to develop protections for subjects involved in research that went beyond 
universal vulnerabilities. The DoH demonstrated a need to expand on safeguards for 
vulnerable individuals and groups and while an extensive list of categories of vulnerability 
emerged from the different versions through time, the latest version seems to be heeding 
the call in the literature over the past few years to do away with group / population 
terminology towards a more reasoned approach to protecting participants with 
vulnerabilities. The approach in the CIOMS Guidelines is too wide-ranging and almost 
anyone who is involved in research will require protections for special vulnerabilities. This 
approach is therefore of not much assistance to Research Ethics Committee members when 
reviewing protocols where potential participants may have vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, as 
will be shown in the chapter that follows, the SA Ethics Guidelines approach to people with 
vulnerabilities is very similar to CIOMS. This chapter considered the approach to 
vulnerability from the perspective of three major international guidelines. The following 
chapter discusses the approach to vulnerability in guidelines from a national country-level 
perspective.  
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Chapter 6: NATIONAL GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS: United States and South Africa 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was seen in the previous chapters, despite the very public Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial 
which gave rise to the Nuremberg Code in 1947 and the World Medical Association setting 
its standards for ethics in research through its 1954 Resolution on Human Experimentation: 
Principles for those in Research and Experimentation and the Declaration of Helsinki in 
1964, these guidelines did not prevent the chain of disasters in the United States during and 
following this period. Some of these were elaborately demonstrated in Beecher’s 
publication in 19661. Even after Beecher’s exposé, there was a succession of tragedies 
including the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, news of which emerged in 19722,3, and the 
Gautemala STD research, news of which has emerged only recently4. 
In South Africa, prior to 1979, there were no national guidelines or policies for participant 
protections in research. As discussed in chapter 4, following the publication of Beecher’s 
paper1, the Committee for Research on Human Subjects (Medical), the first REC in SA, was 
established at the University of the Witwatersrand.  From the seventies, tertiary institutions 
at which health research was conducted established local RECs. In 1979, the South African 
Medical Research Council (SAMRC), produced the first set of guidelines at a national level5. 
The protections espoused in those guidelines applied to any research being funded by the 
SAMRC or conducted by researchers affiliated to the SAMRC. These guidelines have 
undergone several revisions. While an important milestone in the participant protections 
endeavours in South Africa, the MRC guidelines did not have regulatory authority for non 
SAMRC associated research. Furthermore, there was no uniformity of functioning between 
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the local institutional RECs that had been set up. Standards of review ranged from 
exceptionally high at some RECs to very poor at others and some RECs even served as mere 
“rubber-stamping” committees. Hence, in my experience, anecdotal evidence of ethics 
“shopping” was not uncommon in the country and protectionism ranged from weak to 
strong depending on the institutional commitment to safeguards. The promulgation of the 
NHA brought about far-reaching changes, with research participant protections and the 
functioning of RECs now being regulated by the country’s statutory laws.           
The examination of protections from a national perspective will start off with an appraisal of 
the Belmont Report6 , and the Code of Federal Regulations7, both of which were outcomes 
of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research in the US. The Commission was appointed as a consequence of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis study. The US guidelines are discussed because, and as stated previously, 
a large proportion of international research conducted in SA is sponsored by funders from 
the United States8,9. Research in SA is primarily a combination of investigator driven, US 
federally funded initiatives and pharmaceutical multinational research where the parent 
company is, in the main, situated in the United States9,10. Only a small proportion of 
research is funded by sponsors in other countries in the West. Furthermore, as stated in the 
previous chapter, the Belmont Report is a key text that directed the development of the SA 
Ethics Guidelines11. An appraisal of the ethical and regulatory approach to research 
participant protections in South Africa will follow the discussion on the US documents. .    
6.2 NATIONAL GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS: THE UNITED STATES 
Because of the disregard of codes and guidelines by prominent researchers during the 
sixties, several scholars developed an interest in research ethics through this decade. One of 
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them was Paul Ramsey, a theologian from Princeton. His landmark work in 1970, ‘The 
Patient as Person”12, underscored that where it was possible to obtain consent, “no man 
[sic] is good enough to experiment on another without his consent”13. In the context of 
research, he stressed the importance of establishing a partnership between the researcher 
and the subject in order to ensure that the subject would not be treated as a mere means to 
an end, a utilitarian approach, which he stated was morally indefensible. By 1970, the 
notion of consent was well established as a principle in research. 
Just two years later though, press reports on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (see chapter 4), 
where subjects were not informed participants, came to light2. It was clear now that 
consent was weakly implemented in practice. The US Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare stopped the research3,14 and a federal panel, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc 
Panel, was appointed to review the study. One of its recommendations was that Congress 
should establish a federal panel to regulate federally sponsored research on human 
subjects13.      
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study elicited quite a forceful influence on law and policy formulation 
in the United States. On 12th July, 1974, the National Research Act15 (Pub. L. 93-348) was 
signed into law. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research was established as a result of the Act. The 
Commission was charged, among others, to identify the basic ethical principles that should 
underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioural research involving human subjects and 
to follow this with the development of guidelines to ensure that such research was 
conducted in accordance with those principles. In carrying out its mandate, the Commission 
was directed to consider3:  
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“(i) the boundaries between biomedical and behavioral research and the accepted 
and routine practice of medicine, 
 (ii) the role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria in the determination of the 
appropriateness of research involving human subjects, 
 (iii) appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for participation in 
such research, and  
(iv) the nature and definition of informed consent in various research settings.”  
The National Commission functioned between 1974 and 19783. The 1979 Belmont Report6, 
a statement of ethical principles to guide research involving humans, was one of its final 
outcomes. It was the result of a four-day period of rigorous discussions that were held in 
February 1976 at the Smithsonian Institution's Belmont Conference Centre together with 
the monthly deliberations of the Commission that were held over a period of nearly four 
years3. The National Commission also influenced the development of the Code of Federal 
Regulations and the 1991 Common Rule, a set of regulations to govern research in the 
United States7.  
6.2(A) The Belmont Report6 
The Belmont Report, while a brief document, exhibited outstanding vision and has 
“provided something of a textual bedrock for the succeeding decades”3. It identifies three 
comprehensive principles or general prescriptive statements that are relevant to research 
involving human subjects and incorporates them in an analytical framework to assist in the 
resolution of ethical dilemmas in research. It distinguishes between research and clinical 
practice in order to identify the activities that should undergo ethics review for protecting 
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humans involved in health research. It defines practice as interventions that are designed 
specifically to enhance the wellbeing of individual patients and that have a reasonable 
expectation of success. Research is defined as “an activity designed to test an hypothesis, 
permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.” The need for this distinction could denote that at that time most of research 
was done on patients with medical conditions. In the DoH, the distinction is between 
“clinical research combined with clinical care” and “non-therapeutic clinical 
research”(1964), which was changed to “Medical research combined with professional care 
(clinical research)” and “Non-therapeutic biomedical research involving human subjects 
(non-clinical biomedical research)” in 1975.  
 The Belmont Report is divided into three sections. Section A is specific to the boundaries 
between practice and research, section B, the three basic ethical principles and section C, 
the application of the principles. For the purpose of this chapter, only pertinent aspects of 
sections B and C which relate to vulnerabilities will be discussed.  
According to section B of the Belmont Report, the three basic ethical principles, respect for 
persons, beneficence and justice, refer to “those general judgements that serve as a basic 
justification for the many particular ethical prescriptions and evaluations of human actions.” 
All three make reference to vulnerabilities although the term is not used explicitly in this 
section.  
Respect for persons has two separate moral requirements. The first is to acknowledge and 
respect the autonomy of those individuals capable of self-determination and the second is 
the requirement to protect those individuals with diminished autonomy who have 
decreased levels of or no capacity for self-determination. The principle draws to attention 
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that the capacity for self-determination matures during an individual’s life. Illness, mental 
disability or circumstances that severely restrict liberty result in some individuals losing this 
capacity partially or completely. Protecting the immature while they mature and the 
incapacitated while they are incapacitated is necessary if these individuals are to be 
respected. The degree of protection required will range from extensive (to the point of 
excluding individuals from activities that may harm them) to very little where all that is 
necessary is to ensure voluntary participation and an awareness of possible adverse 
consequences. The extent of protection depends on the risk of harm and likelihood of 
benefit. The degree of autonomy should be periodically re-evaluated. The section further 
states that in some situations the application of the principle of respect for persons may not 
be obvious, and uses prisoners as research subjects as an example. The principle requires 
that prisoners are not deprived of the opportunity to volunteer for research. However, it 
should also be recognised that under prison conditions they may be subtly coerced or 
unduly influenced to partake in research activities that they would otherwise not normally 
involve themselves in. Respect for persons would prescribe that prisoners be protected and 
the resultant dilemma would be that of balancing the competing claims urged by the 
principle of respect itself, i.e., to allow prisoners to volunteer vs protecting them.  This 
principle focuses on vulnerable individuals with diminished autonomy and correlates the 
amount of protections with the risk of harm and likelihood of benefit. From this it can be 
extrapolated that a meticulous benefit / risk analysis will be necessary when vulnerable 
individuals with diminished autonomy are to be involved in research. This principle further 
brings to light that prisoners are a vulnerable population or group.  
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Beneficence is described in the Report as an obligation to make efforts to secure the well-
being of persons. It formulates two general rules as being complementary expressions of 
beneficent actions; the rule of “do not harm” and the rule of “maximize possible benefits 
and minimize possible harms”. These two rules are both necessary to ensure adequate 
protections of vulnerable individuals and groups. The Report further states that the principle 
of beneficence often occupies a well-defined justifying role in many areas of research and 
illustrates this point by using children as an example. Dilemmas arise when research 
involving children presents more than minimal risk without immediate prospect of direct 
benefit to the children involved. While deontological arguments would stress that research 
of this nature should not be conducted, utilitarian arguments would highlight the 
consequences of this limitation as ruling out much needed research which could be of great 
benefit to children in the future. It is clear that when research is conducted on vulnerable 
groups the rules within the principle of beneficence come into conflict, challenging the 
researcher to make difficult choices. By using children as an example, this principle gives 
credence to children being a vulnerable group.  
The principle of justice in the Report examines who ought to receive the benefits of 
research and bear its burdens. It goes on to explain that when a burden is unduly imposed 
or when a benefit to which a person is entitled is denied without good reason, an injustice 
results. Several examples of injustice are used in the Report to demonstrate the principle. 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the burdens of serving as research subjects fell onto poor 
ward patients. However, the benefits of improved medical care were enjoyed primarily by 
private patients. This is an issue of concern for RECs in SA, especially in light of our two-tier 
health system. Additional concerns include issues of distributive justice in international 
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research. Other examples include the exploitation of unwilling prisoners as research 
subjects by the Nazis and the exploitation of disadvantaged rural black men in the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study. According to the Report justice would require that the selection of research 
subjects must be meticulously examined to ensure that some populations are not 
systematically selected because of their easy availability, their compromised position, or 
their manipulability instead of reasons directly related to the problem under study. The 
populations used as examples in this section are welfare patients, particular racial and 
ethnic minorities, and persons confined to institutions. Furthermore, the principle 
elucidates that those persons from groups that are unlikely to be beneficiaries of the 
subsequent applications of research should not be unduly involved in the research. This 
principle designates welfare patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, and persons 
confined to institutions as vulnerable groups / populations. 
Section C of the Report is on the application of each principle to conflicts in research. 
Informed consent is discussed as an application of the principle of respect for persons, 
risk/benefit assessment as an application of the principle of beneficence and subject 
selection as an application of the principle of justice.        
The elements of informed consent considered in Section C are information, comprehension 
and voluntariness. The latter two elements focus on protecting the interests of vulnerable 
individuals and groups. The comprehension element highlights the need to adapt the 
presentation of information to the subjects’ capacity to understand because the latter is a 
function of intelligence, rationality, maturity and language. The greater the risk, the greater 
is the obligation on the investigator to ensure comprehension. To ensure this obligation is 
met in situations when comprehension is severely limited, special provisions may need to be 
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made where conditions of immaturity or mental disability exist in research subjects, either 
as individuals or as populations. Examples of populations that are considered incompetent 
are infants, young children, mentally disabled patients, the terminally ill and those that are 
comatose. Even in these situations, respect for persons places an obligation on the 
investigator to give them the opportunity to choose, to the extent that they are able, 
whether or not to participate and also to seek permission from other relevant parties to 
enrol them in the research. The latter should be those that are in a position to most likely 
understand the incompetent subject’s situation and to act in that individual’s best interests. 
In this way, these individuals will be protected against harm both by respecting their wishes 
and that of the surrogate decision-maker. This section of the Report clearly affirms the 
importance of respecting the moral status and human dignity of the research participant.                                       
The voluntariness element stresses that there should be no coercion or undue influence 
when the subject participates in research. Coercion arises when an overt threat of harm is 
deliberately raised by one person to another so as to achieve compliance. Undue influence 
is when an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other overture is 
offered to a subject in order to gain compliance. It is highlighted that an inducement that is 
ordinarily acceptable may become undue if the subject is particularly vulnerable. The Report 
continues to explain that unjustifiable pressures usually occur when persons in positions of 
authority or commanding influence advocate a course of action for a subject, but because a 
continuum of such existing factors may be present, it is impossible to state at which precise 
point justifiable persuasion gives way to undue influence. Examples of undue influence cited 
in this section are actions that manipulate a person’s choice through the controlling 
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influence of a close relative and threatening to withdraw health services to which an 
individual would otherwise be entitled.  
The application of the principle of beneficence as expressed by the risk / benefit assessment 
states that when vulnerable populations are involved, the appropriateness of involving 
them should be demonstrated. Such judgements are made using a number of variables 
including the nature and degree of risk, the condition of the particular population involved 
and the nature and level of the anticipated benefits. Many types of harms need to be taken 
into account. These include risks of psychological, physical, legal, social and economic 
harms.  
Selection of subjects is the application of the principle of justice in the Report. Here there is 
a moral requirement that procedures and outcomes in the selection of research subjects be 
fair. This is relevant at both the individual and population levels. Potentially beneficial 
research should not be offered to only some patients because they are favoured by the 
researcher while only “undesirable” individuals are selected for risky research. The same 
would apply to populations. In addition, an order of preference is appropriate when certain 
populations are selected (e.g., adults before children). Furthermore, some populations may 
be involved only under certain conditions, if at all (e.g., the institutionalised mentally infirm 
or prisoners).     
The section draws to attention that social, racial, sexual and cultural biases institutionalised 
in society could result in injustices. Furthermore, some populations, especially 
institutionalised ones, are already burdened in many ways because of their infirmities and 
environments and should not be involved in research that involves risks without a 
therapeutic component. In such situations, less burdened populations should be selected 
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unless the research is directly related to the specific burdened population. In addition, it is 
unfair that the economically disadvantaged population using public sector health care 
facilities should constitute a pool of preferred research subjects for the benefit of the more 
advantaged populations who are likely to be the recipients of proven interventions. 
The section ends by discussing a special instance of injustice that results from the 
involvement of vulnerable subjects. It states that certain groups such as racial minorities, 
the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalised may continually be 
sought as research subjects because of their ready availability in settings where research is 
conducted. It cautions that they should be protected against the danger of being involved in 
research exclusively because of administrative convenience or because they are easy to 
manipulate for reasons of illness or socioeconomic conditions. They need protection 
because of their frequently compromised capacity for free consent and their dependant 
status. The principles in the Belmont Report, similar to the DoH, are greatly influenced by 
deontology and virtue ethics. 
Table 4: VULNERABLE GROUPS AND CONDITIONS AS RELATED TO THE BELMONT PRINCIPLES 
Respect for persons 
 
Beneficence 
 
Justice 
 
 Illness  
 Mental disability 
 Circumstances that 
severely restrict liberty: 
coercion or undue 
influence 
 Immature (age): infants, 
young children 
 Incapacitated: severely 
limited comprehension, 
terminally ill, comatose 
 Prisoners 
 
 Children : when research 
presents more than 
minimal risk without 
immediate prospect of 
direct benefit 
 People at risks of harm:  
physical, legal, social, 
economic   
 
 Poor ward patients 
 Unwilling prisoners being 
exploited 
 Disadvantaged rural 
black men  
 Welfare patients 
 Particular racial and 
ethnic minorities 
 Persons confined to 
institutions  
 The economically 
disadvantaged 
 The very sick 
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The Belmont Report, as a statement of basic ethical principles and guidelines, assists in 
resolving ethical problems that may arise when conducting research with human 
participants. The Report describes its ethical principles in detail and refers to vulnerable 
groups and populations as an application of all three of its principles. 
6.2(B) The Code of Federal Regulations7 
The Belmont Report greatly influenced the current United States regulatory system for the 
protection of human subjects. Using this report to underpin their documents, in 1981 the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) revised their existing human subjects regulations to make them as compatible as 
possible under their respective statutory authorities.  Fourteen other Federal departments 
and agencies, in 1991, joined the DHHS in adopting a uniform set of rules as the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) for the Protection of Human Subjects in research7. The DHHS 
regulations, also known as 45 CFR 46, are made up of 4 subparts. Most collaborative 
research in South Africa, because of the sponsor being in the USA, needs to abide by the 
stipulations in these Regulations.  Subpart A is also known as the Federal Policy or the 
“Common Rule”, Subpart B is on additional protections for pregnant women, human 
foetuses and neonates, Subpart C, additional protections for prisoners and Subpart D, 
additional protections for children. The protections in Subparts B, C and D are in addition to 
the general protections imposed by the Common Rule. The Code of Federal Regulations was 
revised on 15th January 2009. This revised version became effective from July 2009.       
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6.2(B)I Subpart A - The Common Rule7 
The Common Rule outlines the basic provisions for Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), 
informed consent and Assurances for Compliance. Vulnerability is mentioned in its section 
46.111 under its criteria for IRB approval of research. Subsection (a)(3) states that selection 
of subjects should be equitable and in making this assessment, IRBs should take into 
account the purpose of the research and the setting in which the research is to be 
conducted and should be “particularly cognizant of the special problems of research 
involving vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.” Subsection B 
goes further to state that when all or some of the subjects in those populations are likely to 
be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, additional safeguards must be included in the 
studies so as to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects. This section gives 
recognition to the fact that not all individuals within a population may share the 
population’s vulnerability.    
6.2(B)II Subpart B – Additional Protection for Pregnant Women, Human Fetuses and 
Neonates Involved in Research 
This Subpart details as part of the special protections, stringent conditions that need to be 
satisfied by researchers and that IRBs have to take into consideration when reviewing 
research involving pregnant women, their foetuses and neonates. Meticulous risk / benefit 
assessments are mandated. Only the woman’s consent is required where the research 
involves both her and the fetus. In the case of research involving the fetus only, the consent 
of both the woman and the father must be obtained. Where the father is unavailable, 
incompetent, has temporary incapacity or the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, his 
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consent need not be obtained. With regard to neonates who are of uncertain viability, 
research can only be conducted where it holds out the prospect of enhancing survival of the 
neonate to the point of viability and the risks are the least possible for achieving the 
objective or the biomedical knowledge from the research cannot be obtained by any other 
means and there will be no added risk to the neonate as a result of the research. Informed 
consent from either parent or legally authorised representative is requisite, except in the 
case of the pregnancy resulting from incest or rape where the father’s consent is not 
deemed necessary.  
6.2(B)III Subpart C – Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research Involving Prisoners as Subjects. 
This subpart recognises that prisoners need additional safeguards because they may be 
under constraints as a result of their incarceration which could affect their ability to make 
truly voluntary and uncoerced decisions whether or not to participate in research. The 
additional safeguards include that the majority on the IRB have no association with the 
prison(s) involved except for their membership on the Board and that at least one member 
of the IRB is a prisoner or a prisoner representative with appropriate background and 
experience to serve in that capacity. Where the research is reviewed by more than one IRB, 
only one Board need satisfy the latter requirement. Other safeguards focus on the principle 
of justice: fairness in subject selection, avoiding undue inducements and coercion, the risks 
of the research being commensurate with acceptable risks involving non prisoner volunteers 
and provision for post-study follow up examination or care that takes into consideration the 
varying lengths of individual prisoner sentences.  
6.2(B)IV Subpart D – Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research 
169  
 
In this Subpart, scrupulous attention is paid to risk with added safeguards provided for 
several categories of risk: 
a. Research not involving greater than minimal risk ; 
b. Research involving greater than minimal risk but presenting the prospect of direct 
benefit to individual subjects; 
c. Research involving greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct benefit to 
individual subjects, but likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subject’s 
disorder or conditions; and 
d. Research not otherwise approvable which presents an opportunity to understand, 
prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of children.  
Stipulations with regard to child assent and parent or guardian permission are also detailed.  
In addition, regulations pertaining to children as wards of the state or any other agency, 
entity or institution are provided.     
Where children are able to provide assent (affirmative agreement to participate in 
research), adequate provisions need to be made for obtaining the assent. The age, maturity 
and psychological state of the child must be considered when determining the child’s ability 
to assent. This determination may be for all children or each child in a particular protocol as 
deemed appropriate by the IRB. Where the capability of some or all children is very limited 
and they cannot be reasonably consulted, or the research intervention or procedure holds 
out the prospect of direct benefit which is so important to the health and wellbeing of the 
children and is available only in the context of health research, the assent of children will 
not be a necessary condition for proceeding with the research and the IRB may waive the 
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assent requirement. Adequate provisions need to be made to obtain parent or guardian 
consent. Only one parent’s consent is required when the research is no greater than 
minimal risk or when the research is greater than minimal risk but holds out the prospect of 
direct benefit to the child, or the monitoring procedure in the research is likely to contribute 
to the child’s wellbeing. Should the IRB be of the opinion that parent or guardian permission 
is not reasonable to protect the child, the IRB may waive this requirement on condition an 
appropriate mechanism for protecting the children in the research is substituted.  
When children who are wards of the state or any other agency, entity or institution are 
included in research, they can be enrolled if the research is related to their status as wards, 
or the research is conducted in schools, camps, institutions, or similar settings in which the 
majority of children are not wards. Where children as wards are enrolled in research, the 
IRB would require the appointment of a neutral advocate for each child to act in the best 
interests of the child even if there is a guardian or individual in the position of loco parentis 
acting on behalf of the child.                    
Table 5: VULNERABLE GROUPS IN THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Subpart A 
 
Subpart B 
 
Subpart C 
 
Subpart D 
 
 Coercion or undue 
influence: children, 
prisoners, pregnant 
women, mentally 
disabled persons, 
economically or 
educationally 
disadvantaged persons. 
 
 Pregnant Women 
 Fetuses 
 Neonates 
 
 Prisoners  
 
 Children  
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6.3 NATIONAL GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS: SOUTH AFRICA 
Although medical research had been conducted in South Africa since the 1800’s16, and 
despite oversight mechanisms being set up at individual institutional levels, there was no 
national guideline or policy until 1979. Even this document was limited in scope in that it 
applied only to researchers affiliated with the SAMRC, either as recipients of funding from 
the SAMRC or as researchers within its institutes, units or groups.  
In the 19th century, Cape Town, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Kimberley 
were large thriving towns with many doctors in practice. They formed their own 
associations as branches of the British Medical Association (BMA). By the 1920’s, these 
branches had spread throughout South Africa and in 1927, they joined to form a national 
association, the Medical Association of South Africa (MASA). The MASA later joined the 
WMA when it was established. The MASA was replaced by the South African Medical 
Association (SAMA) on the 21st May 1998.The SAMA as we know it today is the result of the 
unification of the fragmented pre-democracy medical groups17. Although there were no 
safeguards for participants in research at a national level for many decades, doctors 
involved in research were bound by the WMA’s guidelines and declarations. At this juncture 
a brief history of health research in South Africa is appropriate for an understanding of the 
evolution of participant protections in this country.     
6.3(B) History of Medical Research in South Africa 
In South Africa, medical scientists were busy with discoveries and innovations as far back as 
the 1800s. Ova of bilharzia were discovered in the urine of a patient from Uitenhage by Dr 
John Harley in 1864. About 30 years later, in 1895, the cycle of nagana, a disease of cattle 
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spread by a species of tsetse fly, was uncovered by Sir David Bruce, of the British Royal Army 
Medical Corps in Zululand. Because of this, he was able to associate the disease with human 
sleeping sickness caused by a related parasite and transmitted by other tsetse flies. In 1912, 
the South African Institute for Medical Research (SAIMR) was established as a joint venture 
between the South African Government and the Chamber of Mines represented by the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. While some research was conducted at the 
SAIMR, a major aspect of its activities was directed to routine screening and diagnostic 
work16. It has been argued that early medical research in South Africa was established to 
keep the mines in production and not to protect the population of miners against the high 
incidence of serious tropical diseases which the mine workers were succumbing to. It is 
suggested that the goal of medical research in South Africa at that time was based on 
narrow economic rather than humanitarian reasons16, undoubtedly a utilitarian view.   
The SAIMR played a substantial role in research involving pneumococci which subsequently 
resulted in the development of the pneumococcal vaccine. In addition, the SAIMR 
researchers determined the transmission cycle of plague and identified 2 species of 
anopheles mosquito, principally responsible for the transmission of malaria. As a result of 
rapid scientific and industrial development during the Second World War, research in many 
fields gained momentum in South Africa, especially at the University of Cape Town. In 1944, 
Dr Basil Schonland from the University of the Witwatersrand was requested by General Jan 
Smuts, then Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the country, to create the legislative 
basis for scientific research and the Scientific Research Council Act was promulgated in 
1945. This Act established the principle of overall government control of research and led to 
the establishment of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) soon 
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thereafter. The CSIR controlled the practical administration of research in the country. 
Although the CSIR’s brief, while broad, did not include medicine, it established a 
coordinating committee (Committee for Research in Medical Sciences) within the 
organisation to take forward medical research. It was this Committee that established 
several research units and sponsored research programs in medical schools. It also 
participated in collaborative research with institutes outside South Africa. The established 
and fully fledged universities at that time were the Universities of Cape Town, the  
Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch and Pretoria16.                 
In December 1967, the historic first human heart transplant was done in Cape Town, South 
Africa. Although it is unclear how much research preceded this procedure, there is no doubt 
that the operation was done in a research setting18 and it had far reaching impact. Spurred 
by this dramatic feat in therapy, Senator Walter Mondale of the USA that year introduced a 
Bill in Congress, the Senate Joint Resolution (SJRES 145) which called for a National 
Commission on Health, Science and Society to “evaluate the integrity and direction of 
research and to assess the impact of the technological advances on society including issues 
of social justice generated by research.”18 The Bill generated little support and was not 
enacted in the form that it had first been introduced. After several attempts by Mondale, 
only a few aspects of the Bill were incorporated into legislation some years later18. 
While most people around the world showered praise on South Africa, there were murmurs, 
although somewhat stifled, that research could have been better channelled in other 
directions towards the greater good for a greater number of South Africans and that the 
research was only possible because of South Africa’s oppressive apartheid policies16. 
However, Barnard’s heart transplant was undoubtedly a major medical achievement. It also 
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underscored the need for order in the organisation of medical research in the country. The 
need for this order led to the enacting of the Medical Research Act (No 19 of 1969), and the 
establishment of the Medical Research Council in 1969. Its most important mandate was 
promoting the improvement of health and the quality of life of the people in SA through 
research, development and technology transfer. The MRC was funded solely by an annual 
government grant. Initially there was no provision for the acceptance of funds from other 
sources. It was to co-ordinate medical research within the country and to determine the 
distribution of government funding for such research16. 
6.3(C) Participant Protections in South Africa: The SAMRC Research Ethics Guidelines. 
In 1978, almost a decade after the establishment of the SAMRC, the then vice president of 
the SAMRC, de V Lochner, following a visit to the WHO in Geneva, wrote out the first set of 
guidelines for participant protections in research at a national level in South Africa. These 
guidelines have been revised and updated regularly so as to be in line with international 
research ethics standards5.   
6.3(C)I SAMRC Research Ethics Guidelines 197919 
In December 1979, the SAMRC published its first set of guidelines entitled “A Guide to 
Ethical Considerations in Medical Research.”19 While not mentioned explicitly in the text, 
the bibliography to these guidelines includes The DoH (1964), The Nuremberg Code and 
some proposed US Federal Policy documents20. The guidelines emphasised in the 
introduction that it was of paramount importance for any ethical code relating to medical 
research to err in the “... direction of stringency rather than laxity, and no man should find 
himself in the position of solely being judge of his own morals in research.” The guidelines, 
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which also referred to itself as an “Ethical Code”, underscored that safeguarding the rights 
and welfare of human subjects involved in activities supported by grants or contracts from 
the SAMRC was of paramount importance and that the responsibility for this was to be 
borne by the investigator, the heads of departments and the institutions concerned. The 
guidelines further stated that it was the policy of the SAMRC that no grant or contract for an 
activity involving human subjects would be made without prior review and approval of the 
application by an appropriate “Institutional Committee” acceptable to the SAMRC. 
Substantial prominence was placed on the law and it was stressed that particularly relevant 
to the decision of the Committee were those rights of the subject that were defined by the 
law. The Committee was advised to familiarise itself with those statutes and common law 
precedents which could have bearing on its decisions. It was further stated that:  
“The provision of this Code may not be construed in any manner or sense that would 
abrogate, supersede, or moderate more restrictive applicable law or precedential 
legal decisions.”   
Furthermore, in its Statement of Principles, it was affirmed that institutions should adopt a 
Statement of Principles that would assist in their discharge of responsibilities for the 
protection of rights and welfare of subjects. It went on to state that;  
“This official guide of the SAMRC may be used as a guideline for such a statement 
and care should be exercised to ensure that the principles outlined in the said 
statement do not supersede SAMRC policy or any legal rule.”   
176  
 
It was ironic that for the safeguarding of rights and dignities of participants, such 
importance was placed on the law, especially as this was in the context of the apartheid era 
where people of colour were oppressed and their rights trampled upon.  
Section 4.3.9 of the Code listed a number of different subjects and activities that would 
require special consideration. Fetuses, pregnant women, minors and the institutionalised 
mentally infirm were included in the list.  
In attaching “A Patient’s Bill of Rights” as an appendix to the Code, it gave recognition to 
patients being particularly vulnerable. In its Appendix VI, it provided special safeguards for 
fetuses and pregnant women as research subjects, the institutionalised mentally infirm and 
minors. The protections for fetuses and pregnant women were very much in line with 
Subpart B of the Code of Federal Regulations. The mentally infirm included those in 
institutions who were mentally ill, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or senile 
regardless of their legal status or basis of institutionalisation. It stated that additional 
safeguards were required for them because their freedoms and rights were potentially 
subject to limitation as they were confined to institutional settings; they might have been 
unable to sufficiently comprehend information to give an informed consent and they might 
have been legally incompetent to consent. Where possible, assent should be secured. There 
should be no undue inducements and procedures for subject selection, securing consents, 
protecting confidentiality and monitoring continued participation should be adequate. It is 
interesting to note that monitoring of research was a consideration even at that time. 
On the issue of minors, it stressed that sufficient maturity should be ascertained and the 
minor given the opportunity to consent where appropriate; however, the consent of the 
guardian should also be obtained. It went on to state that normally, parents would be the 
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guardians with the father having the final say (my emphasis), but where the child was 
illegitimate, its mother alone was its legal guardian. The law applicable here was the then 
Children’s Act (No 33 of 1960). The document further stated that the position was more 
complicated where Black Africans were concerned. Most “Bantu” women were usually in 
the position of minors and fell under the guardianship of their father or head of the kraal if 
unmarried, and under their husband if married. The guardianship of a “Bantu” child was 
difficult to establish as the South African Law and the State imposed Bantu Law were in 
conflict on that point. A customary union was not recognised as a lawful marriage according 
to South African Law. This created uncertainty as to whose consent would have to be 
obtained for a child born in a customary union. It recommended that the consent of the 
legal guardian recognised by each system be obtained in order to avoid any problems that 
might have arisen from this uncertainty. It is remarkable that the SAMRC placed such 
importance on the laws, especially considering there were two sets – the South African Law 
and the “Bantu” Law. The latter applied to indigenous Black South Africans, who clearly 
were not acknowledged as being on par with others in the country. They were considered a 
lesser form of life with no moral status or human dignity and hence did not qualify to 
benefit from the protections offered by South African Law. I have used the word “Bantu” in 
inverted commas as this term was used in a derogatory manner to describe Black South 
Africans during the period of apartheid. “Bantu” actually refers to more than 400 ethnic 
groups in Africa in countries ranging from Cameroon to South Africa. They form a common 
language group, the Bantu language family21.  
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6.3(C)II SAMRC Research Ethics Guidelines 198722 
Eight years after the first edition, the SAMRC launched its “Ethical Considerations in Medical 
Research. Revised Edition: 1987.” Again, while not explicitly mentioned in the text, the DoH 
of 1964 (despite the 1983 version being in force), the Nuremberg Code and the two Federal 
Documents listed in the Bibliography of the earlier Code were recorded in the Bibliography. 
There are no recorded external influences on the revised guidelines and the reason given for 
the revision was that medical science was progressing at a rapid rate and new ideas and 
questions that did not seem to be significant just a decade back had become part of the 
ordinary problems that researchers had to deal with regularly. Certain aspects, e.g., 
biohazards and the use of animals for experimentation were revised extensively and there 
was a more logical chapter arrangement. Of note, the focus on complying with the legal 
framework was carried through into the second edition. Appendix V, on Informed Consent, 
carried an additional safeguard which required that special care had to be taken when 
dealing with uneducated or underdeveloped communities to ensure that the subjects were 
not misled and their ignorance not exploited. Similar to the previous edition, it cautioned 
researchers to be cognisant of patients’ mental and emotional conditions when discussing 
risks of research. With regard to individuals and groups requiring special considerations the 
only change in this guideline was to include prisoners and detainees. However, in Appendix 
VI all that was stated about this group was that although clinical experimentation was not 
legally forbidden with prisoners and detainees, the accepted government policy was that 
prisoners or detainees should not be used as subjects in such experiments under any 
circumstances. Hence, the SAMRC did not believe it was necessary to lay down any 
guidelines for that group. The other change to Appendix VI was that the section on Minors 
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referred to the Child Care Act (No 74 of 1963) and not to the Children’s Act as it did in the 
first edition. However, the principles as regards protections remained unchanged. 
Additional changes included replacing the term “Bantu” with “Black” and expanding on Kwa-
Zulu law for Black women living in Natal whose status upon acquiring majority at the age of 
21 was no longer determined by a guardian. Moreover, the Kwa-Zulu Act on Medical and 
Surgical Treatment (No 11 of 1986) allowed for a married woman in certain circumstances 
to consent independently to treatment. The situation with regard to Black children born of a 
customary union was also clarified. According to indigenous law the consent had to be given 
by both the father and the head of the kraal. Where the child was illegitimate, consent had 
to be given by the mother and her legal guardian. The Code went on to state that these 
stipulations were valid only where the researcher and subject were both Black. Where the 
researcher was not Black, the ordinary principles of South African Law were valid and the 
legal incompetence of Black women according to traditional law did not apply. It is highly 
likely that these discriminatory distinctions between professionals created many tensions 
and conflicts and even confusion.           
6.3(C)III SAMRC Research Ethics Guidelines 199323 
With the promise of transition from apartheid to democracy just around the corner, the 
early nineties in South Africa witnessed a flurry of activities towards change in laws and 
policies that took into consideration the rights and dignity of all South Africans. In the 
context of research, the Medical Research Act of 1969 was replaced by the Medical 
Research Council Act (No 58 of 1991) and the guidelines were further amended and 
replaced by “Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research – Revised Edition, 1993”. This 
edition was much more comprehensive than previously and drew substantially on reports 
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from the Royal College of Physicians of London. Some other documents that also influenced 
this edition included the DoH and the CIOMS Guidelines. Of note this set of guidelines made 
no reference to separate laws for Black population groups and South African Laws for other 
groups, as had been the case in the previous guidelines. The guidelines and laws referred to 
in this document applied to all South African equally, irrespective of colour. This is probably 
because SA was on the brink of liberation and a democratic government.     
The report addressed vulnerability extensively in its sections on Special groups (sec 6.2), 
Research on patients (sec 7) and Consent (sec 8). It also made a strong statement on 
vulnerability in its section on Considerations in risk assessment (sec 5.4.2) where it states 
that particular care should be exercised when identifying risk in vulnerable population 
groups because some patients would already have been exposed to extreme risk and it 
would be unacceptable to increase that degree of risk by adding to it the physical and 
emotional risks of being a research subject. While this could have resulted in such 
populations being therapeutic orphans and the perception that it would have been 
inappropriate to exclude them from reaping the benefits of research, added protections had 
to be afforded these groups in order to ensure a just distribution of risks as well. It stressed 
that the burden of proof had to be on why it was necessary to study a particular vulnerable 
group and that institutionalised individuals could only be research subjects if the research 
was pertinent to their problems. Section 7 on patients was quite extensive as regards 
protection of patients as research subjects.  
Women, children, the elderly, the mentally handicapped, prisoners, students, junior 
colleagues and others were listed under its Special Groups (sec 6). Studies were not to be 
conducted on these groups if they could have been equally done on other adults to obtain 
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the same information. With regard to women, all the guidelines stated was that special 
consideration should be paid to the risk of damage to the fetus which was a possibility in 
women of child-bearing potential. Clearly this indicates that the fetus was part of a special 
group and not women. Protection for children was approached from the perspective of 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic research and in the latter situation, greater emphasis 
should be placed on risk assessment. As regards the elderly, the guidelines stipulated that 
particular care had to be paid to the subject’s ability to comprehend what participation in 
research entailed. It also recognised that it would be appropriate to conduct physiological 
and pharmacological studies on the elderly that were relevant to their age provided that 
particular care was taken to confirm their fitness for the proposed study. Research on the 
mentally handicapped would be acceptable on condition that precautions similar to those 
that applied to children were taken. Research on prisoners, although controversial, was not 
considered unethical and these guidelines allowed for such research, a very different stance 
as compared to the previous guidelines. However, it cautioned that particular care had to be 
taken to avoid coercion and any impression that inducements like reductions in sentence or 
pardon or other favours would result from their participation. It also stated that for some 
prisoners the opportunity to contribute positively to the well-being of society could be of 
help in re-establishing self-esteem and rehabilitation. It stipulated that RECs should pay 
critical attention when reviewing protocols involving prisoners so as to ensure that they 
would not be exploited. Students were recognised as being particularly vulnerable to 
academic, personal and financial pressures. When students were to be involved in studies, 
the investigator should not be involved in recruitment and negotiations about 
remunerations if he was in any way involved in the student’s tuition. There should be no 
impression created that participation in the study would benefit the student or that non-
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participation would result in discrimination against him. Junior colleagues were considered 
vulnerable because over-enthusiasm or lack of enthusiasm could impact his future career 
positively or negatively respectively.  Under other groups, the unemployed were used as an 
example. It cautioned that researchers needed to be aware that financial rewards would be 
a particular incentive for them and that they should not be enrolled in an excessive number 
of studies.          
Section 8 explained in detail the added requirements for informed consent for the special 
groups mentioned above. In addition, it included informed consent procedures from proxies 
for two other groups: research into sudden unexpected events and research on the severely 
ill or unconscious patient.    
The 1993 Guidelines were a remarkable improvement on the previous sets both from the 
perspective of substantive considerations and a greater application of the principles of 
ethics in its recommended guidance points. The influence of deontology and virtue ethics is 
also obvious in these guidelines. 
6.3(C)IV SAMRC Research Ethics Guidelines 200224 
Almost a decade after the SAMRC’s 3rd edition of guidelines were published, the next set of 
revisions were issued. This was because of a number of important factors including major 
socio-political reform in South Africa and great interest globally in the field of ethics in 
research, especially as a resurgence of transgressions around the world were getting 
exposed25. For its 4th edition, the SAMRC placed emphasis on South African needs and 
incorporated the principles of the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution, 1996 into 
its guidelines26. In addition, developing country concerns were also stressed. The current 
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edition comprises 5 booklets of guidelines. Booklet I is on general ethical principles on 
medical research24; Booklet 2 is on ethics in reproductive biology and genetic research27; 
booklet 3 is on ethics in the use of animals in research28, booklet 4 is on ethics in the use of 
biohazards and radiation29; and booklet 5 is on ethics in HIV vaccine trials30.  For the purpose 
of this chapter, only Booklet 1 will be described and analysed.  
The importance of consent is highlighted in section 5 in Booklet 1. Additional safeguards as 
regards consent are provided for the following groups: the mentally ill or mentally 
handicapped, the elderly, pregnant women, unconscious patients, the dying, minors, 
patients and members of vulnerable communities in international collaborative research 
(sec 5 and 11). Special groups are discussed in section 7. Pregnant women, children, 
prisoners, people with mental impairment, the elderly, students, persons in dependant 
relationships and vulnerable communities are discussed. Most of the guidance points for 
these groups are similar to those in the 1993 edition.  Persons in dependent relationships 
are described as those occupying junior or subordinate positions in hierarchically structured 
groups e.g., employees and employers, wards of State and guardians, and patients and 
healthcare professionals. The characteristics of a vulnerable community are described as 
including one or more of the following:  
 “i.  limited economic development; 
                ii.  inadequate protection of human rights; 
                iii.  discrimination on the basis of health status; 
                iv. inadequate understanding of scientific research; 
                v. limited availability of healthcare and treatment options; 
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                vi. limited ability of individuals in the community to provide informed consent.” 
This section underscores that South Africa is home to a large number of vulnerable 
communities and particular caution must be taken prior to permission being given by RECs 
for research to be undertaken here. The above characteristics are also used in the SA Ethics 
Guidelines to define vulnerable “communities” and the SA Guidelines11 state that this is the 
definition used by UNAIDS.    
One of the important aspects of this edition is the stress on vulnerable communities, 
especially in the context of international research. 
6.3(D) Participant Protections and the South African Department of Health 
In 200031, the National Department of Health’s Guidelines on Good Clinical Practice in 
Clinical Trials was published. This was followed by a revised edition in 200632. These 
guidelines are an adaptation of the International Conference on Harmonization’s Good 
Clinical Practice Guidelines (ICH-GCP) which was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
The most significant milestone in the history of participant protections in South Africa was 
the inclusion of research and experimentation in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution26 and 
the statutory legislation of protections in the NHA. Section 12(2)(c) of the Bill of Rights, on 
Freedom and Security of the Person, affirms everyone’s right to bodily and psychological 
integrity including the right “not to be subjected to medical and scientific experiments 
without their informed consent.” 
Other protections for research in the Bill include the rights to equality (sec9), human dignity 
(sec10), life (sec11), and privacy (sec14).  
The NHA and its protective instruments will be discussed in the section that follows.  
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6.3(D)I The National Health Act (No 61 of 2003) 
For the first time in the history of South Africa, protections for participants in research were 
made mandatory by statutory law in 2003, hence strong protectionism as mandated by 
legislation. Health research in terms of section 1 of the NHA includes: 
“... any research which contributes to the knowledge of – 
(a) the biological, clinical, psychological or social processes in human beings; 
(b) improved methods for the provision of health services; 
(c) human pathology; 
(d) the causes of disease; 
(e) the effects of the environment on the human body; 
(f) the development of new applications of pharmaceuticals, medicines and related 
substances; and  
(g) the development of new applications of health technology.” 
This definition is very broad and covers a wide range of research activities, which, in terms 
of section 73 of the Act, will need to be reviewed by health research ethics committees 
which are registered with the National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC). Section 71 
of the Act affirms that written consent from a research participant is requisite prior to 
involvement in health research. This section includes special safeguards for minors (anyone 
less than 18 years of age). It also uses the therapeutic / non-therapeutic distinctions for 
minors. Where minors are involved in therapeutic research, the consents of the parent or 
guardian and of the child where s/he is capable of understanding are necessary. As regards 
non-therapeutic research, not only will the consents of the parent / guardian and child be 
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necessary, but the Minister will need to give consent too. No mechanisms have been 
instituted by the Department of Health to facilitate the process of obtaining consent from 
the Minister. This stipulation is unreasonably restrictive and will serve to obstruct necessary 
research involving children to their disadvantage as a vulnerable group. Hence, in my 
experience, it would seem that most RECs in South Africa have chosen to ignore this 
specification in the Act and it is “business as usual” at the level of RECs when it comes to 
reviewing non-therapeutic research in children.  
The establishment of the NHREC is provided for in section 72 of the Act. The function of the 
NHREC includes, among others, that of determining guidelines for the functioning of health 
RECs. “Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes”11 is the guideline 
book from the NHREC which all RECs and researchers in the country need to abide by as 
regards health research.                
6.3(D)II Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes11 
This is the guideline document for ethical conduct of research in the country as determined 
by the law. Interestingly, section 5 is specific to groups and research requiring additional 
attention.   
Groups requiring additional attention include: 
“1.Minors 
2.Persons with intellectual or mental impairment 
3.Disabled persons 
4.Persons in dependant relationships 
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5.Persons participating in research as groups (collectivities) 
6.Pregnant women” 
Research that requires additional attention includes: 
“1. Research involving indigenous medical systems 
2. Emergency care research 
3. Innovative therapy or interventions 
4. Research necessitating ambiguity of information for participants” 
Special mention of research requiring additional attention is probably made because the 
degree of risk associated with the research could be quite high and this in itself could 
initiate vulnerability in research participants who otherwise may not be vulnerable. 
The stipulations on minors is very similar to Subpart D of the DHHS Regulations (45 CFR 46) 
in that the research can only be conducted if it is minimal risk, more than minimal risk but 
provides possible benefit with the degree of risk being justified by the potential benefit or if 
greater than minimal risk with no prospect of direct benefit but high probability of providing 
significantly generalizable knowledge.  However, it differs in that the research mentioned 
includes observational research, and research with greater than minimal risk but no direct 
benefit must be justified by a “risk-knowledge ratio” and the risk must be no more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk. This aspect is unclear and somewhat inelegantly written in 
that “greater” is equated with “no more than minor increase”. Provisions for assent and 
parent or legal guardian consent or permission are also similar in some aspects to Subpart D 
of the DHHS Regulations (45 CFR 46). RECS need to ensure that the protocol outlines 
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adequate steps to obtain the child’s assent. The permission of one parent is sufficient when 
the research does not involve more than minimal risk, or involves greater than minimal risk 
but presents the likelihood of direct benefit to the child. Permission from both parents is 
required when the research is greater than minimum risk or is of no direct benefit to the 
child but is likely to produce generalizable knowledge. Unlike the DHHS Regulations, there is 
no allowance made for waiver of parent or guardian permission and child assent. An 
additional difference is the stipulation that when only one parent is available for reasons 
including death, incompetence or disappearance, or where the court has placed the child in 
the sole custody of one parent, then the permission of that one parent is sufficient for 
participation in the greater than minimum risk with no direct benefit research. Additionally, 
when views between parents conflict, the best interests of the child take precedence. 
However, there is no guidance on who determines the child’s best interests. Researchers 
will probably need to consult with RECs or the Courts in making this determination.   
The SA Guidelines have drawn extensively from Subpart C the DHHS Regulations (45 CFR 46) 
when it discusses prisoners. The only difference is the addition of the stipulation that RECs 
need to consider the extent to which research facilitates the empowerment of prisoners as 
a vulnerable group.                   
The groups designated as vulnerable are extensive and the guidelines seem to have drawn 
from the various versions of the DoH up to 2008, CIOMS (2002), ICH-GCP, the Belmont 
Report and the DHHS Regulations (45 CFR 46) and additional groups not included in these 
documents. The groups include  minors, adolescents, persons in dependant relationships, 
women, pregnant women, fetuses, those requiring emergency care, prisoners, vulnerable 
communities, collectivities, persons highly dependent on medical care, patients in intensive 
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care units, neonates, those at the end of life requiring terminal care, those with impaired 
capacity to communicate, the unconscious person, and other special groups. 
Those in dependent relationships are listed as: 
1. older persons  and their caregivers; 
2. persons with chronic conditions or disabilities and their caregivers; 
3. wards of State and guardians; 
4. patients and health-care professionals; 
5. students and teachers;    
6. prisoners and prison authorities; 
7. persons with life-threatening illness; 
8. employees and employers, including farm workers and their employers, and 
members of uniformed services and hospital laboratory staff and their employers.  
The Guidelines use the same definition as the MRC to characterise vulnerable groups, but 
refers to them as “vulnerable communities”. The Guidelines, in section 5.12, state that 
where factors relating to vulnerability are an aspect of the research, the researchers need to 
demonstrate how they will try to “redress” that vulnerability. This places a huge burden on 
the researcher whose duties are now extended to that of reparative justice. While the 
intention of the Guideline is laudable, this is highly aspirational and not really practical. The 
Guidelines go on to say that particular caution must be exercised prior to enrolling 
participants from such communities in research and that RECs should ensure: 
 “● persons in these communities will not ordinarily be involved in research that 
could be carried out in the non-vulnerable communities; 
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 ● the research is relevant to the health needs and priorities of the community in 
which it is to be carried out; 
● research participants should know they are taking part in research and the 
research should be carried out only with their consent. This requires that particular 
attention be paid to content, language and procedures used to obtain informed 
consent.”  
The first two stipulations are quite similar to those found in the international guidelines 
discussed earlier and the Belmont Report. These stipulations, while specific to consent in 
the DoH of 2000 and 2008, appeared in the 2013 version of the DoH for the first time as 
applicable to all vulnerable groups, years after the SA Guidelines had been promulgated. 
Although consent protections are required in all the other documents, additional obligations 
are placed on the researcher to ensure that consent is informed.  
Table 6: VULNERABLE GROUPS AND DEPENDANT RELATIONSHIPS IN ETHICS IN HEALTH 
RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
Vulnerable groups Dependent Relationships 
 Minors 
 Adolescents 
 Women 
 Pregnant women 
 Fetuses 
 Those requiring emergency care 
 Prisoners 
 Vulnerable communities 
 Persons highly dependent on medical 
care 
 Patients in intensive care units 
 Neonates 
 Older persons  and their caregivers 
 Persons with chronic conditions or 
disabilities and their caregivers 
 Wards of State and guardians 
 Patients and health-care professionals 
 Students and teachers    
 Prisoners and prison authorities 
 Persons with life-threatening illness 
 Employees and employers, including 
farm workers and their employers, and 
members of uniformed services and 
hospital laboratory staff and their 
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 Those at the end of life requiring 
terminal care 
 Those with impaired capacity to 
communicate 
 The unconscious person 
 Other special groups. 
 
employers.  
 
 
As can be seen from above there are a number of different but relevant vulnerable groups 
to be considered for special protections in research in the SA Ethics Guidelines, similar to 
the CIOMS  
Table 7: VULNERABLE GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL GUIDELINES 
Vulnerable groups  International National   
 A B C D E F 
Patients  X          x   X  X 
Patients with incurable diseases           x     
Those with serious life-
threatening diseases 
          x   X  X 
Those at the end of life requiring 
terminal care 
   X  X 
The unconscious/comatose     X  X 
Those requiring emergency care         x    X 
Persons with chronic conditions 
or disabilities 
     X 
Persons highly dependent on 
medical care 
     X 
Patients in intensive care units      X 
Challenges with informed consent X         x   X 
Consenting under duress X      
Coercion or undue influence    X      x  
Elderly persons with limited 
capacity to consent 
        x          X 
Those with impaired capacity to 
communicate 
   X  X 
Mentally disabled persons    X     x  
Children    X     X X 
Wards of State      X 
Neonates          x X 
Women      X 
Pregnant women         X X 
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Fetuses         x X 
Groups with hierarchical 
structuring 
         x    
Juniors / subordinates          x     
Students          x    X 
Employees      X 
Persons in dependant 
relationships 
X     X 
Persons confined to institutions    X   
Residents of nursing homes          x            
Prisoners          x  X      x X 
Those on welfare/social 
assistance 
         x  X   
Those that are unemployed          x     
Unfamiliar with modern medical 
concepts 
         x     
Those at risk of harm: physical, 
legal, social, economic 
         x         X   
Ethnic / Racial minority groups          x  X   
Homeless persons         x     
Refugees/displaced persons         x     
Nomads         x     
Disadvantaged rural black men            X   
Racial and ethnic minorities         x     
Politically powerless         x     
Economically disadvantaged 
persons 
           X     X  
Educationally disadvantaged 
persons 
        X  
Vulnerable communities             X 
Other           x          X 
 
A: DoH( 2013);  B: CIOMS (2002);  C: ICH-GCP;  D: Belmont Principles;                                                       
E: Code of Federal Regulations (US); F: Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and 
Processes (SA) 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The comparison between the international and national guidelines above illustrates clearly 
that the SA Ethics Guidelines has generated the greatest number of vulnerable groups with 
the CIOMS Guidelines close on its heels. There is overlap of vulnerable groups between the 
guidelines. The SA Ethics Guidelines overlaps with all the different guidelines. In addition, 
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the ICH-GCP and SA Ethics Guidelines, by having a category called “other” unambiguously 
indicates that the list of groups is limitless. The groups are currently so extensive that it 
would seem as though almost anyone participating in research in the country would be 
vulnerable. The concern that arises is that for the small number that escapes being 
categorised into one or other group and who may have unnamed vulnerabilities, there is no 
requirement in the guidelines for special protections. The danger here is that these 
individuals may be made even more vulnerable by the mere fact that they are not 
considered for special protections. In addition, a major challenge is the ever present 
tensions experienced by RECs between protecting these vulnerable groups and facilitating 
ethical research and in the SA situation, this is quite daunting as almost everyone is 
considered vulnerable. 
The following chapter will review and analyse contemporary research ethics literature which 
considers the complexities that have arisen in research and at the level of RECs in the 
context of vulnerable groups and communities in research.       
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Chapter 7: TOWARDS A PRACTICAL DEFINITION OF VULNERABILITY AND ITS APPLICATION  
IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As evidenced from the previous chapters, protecting vulnerable individuals against 
exploitation and other harms is at the heart of research ethics. It has been shown in the 
previous two chapters that, with the expansion of protective guidelines, the focus on 
vulnerability protections shifted from individuals to groups. Group and subpopulation 
terminology firmly entrenched itself into the complex tapestry of research participant 
protections. The guidelines have put the onus of protection of these vulnerable groups onto 
RECs, without suitable direction to these committees as to how to do so.  As the group 
approach unfolded, so have its challenges. It has become clear from the preceding chapters 
that there are so many different vulnerable groups that the term ‘vulnerable’ could have 
lost its significance with regard to who requires special protections, as almost anyone 
participating in research belongs to one or other group and would need the protections that 
are focussed at the specific group. On the other hand, participants with particular 
vulnerabilities that do not fall into any of the groups outlined in the guidance documents do 
not qualify for special protections and are at risk of harm because of insufficient protections. 
In addition, the guidelines are silent on the fact that vulnerabilities can differ between 
individuals within groups, i.e., that there are differing degrees of vulnerabilities between 
individuals within groups. Hence, while it is clear that the notion of vulnerability is obviously 
appreciated in the discipline of research ethics, adequate and appropriate analysis of the 
notion is lacking, the criteria for designating vulnerable populations are vague and its 
correct application in the field has not been suitably pieced together.    
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It is therefore not surprising that the scholarly literature over the past decade has been 
replete with criticisms of the group and subpopulation approach. Moreover, several journals 
have devoted complete issues or special sections to the subject1-3. While there have been a 
number of recommendations as to how the approach to vulnerable populations should be 
addressed, none has thus far managed to offer a comprehensive, yet uncomplicated, 
solution that could protect all vulnerable participants in health research. 
The aim of this chapter is to review, analyse and critique the literature on the group and 
subpopulation approach utilized by the guidelines with a view to constructing a 
comprehensive and practical definition, the application of which could assist REC members 
to identify vulnerabilities within the research context. This would then assist them with 
determining the most appropriate protections where required.   
7.2 CRITICISMS OF THE GUIDELINES APPROACH TO VULNERABILITY IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
Many authors express the concern that how and when vulnerable individuals are involved in 
research remain challenging questions in the 21st century4-7. The concept remains nebulous 
and vague and as yet there is no cogent definition. At best the definition of vulnerability in 
health research remains an unanswered question8-10.The source of much unease is that of 
finding the best balance between adequate protections and excluding vulnerable people 
from research. Excluding vulnerable people could result in obstructing valuable research, a 
social good that in actual fact should be promoted and not impeded. The controversies 
around the use of the term ‘vulnerable’ in the guidelines and regulations, both international 
and national include the fact that although the CIOMS guidelines, the latest version of the 
DoH and the SA Ethics Guidelines define the term, albeit inadequately, none of the other 
guidelines offers a definition. In addition, while the lists of groups are extensive, they are 
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not exhaustive, they are paternalistic in nature, in that they could at times be 
overprotective, and they could be demeaning and “sexist”11. The guidelines and various 
authors describe vulnerability by stipulating lists of characteristics and it is these lists of 
characteristics that create the perception that groups are more likely to be harmed as 
compared to the rest of the population.   
From an international guidelines perspective, vulnerability as an important concept did not 
surface explicitly in the Nuremberg Code12 or the early versions of the Declaration of 
Helsinki 13. It was the 2000 version of the Declaration of Helsinki that first made direct 
reference to the term. The objective of these documents to protect vulnerable individuals 
that were involved in research is clearly unquestionable. The most significant protection 
emanating from these documents was the requirement of informed consent to protect 
participants against research-related harms and exploitation. It is this fundamental 
protective intervention of informed consent that has informed safeguards for vulnerable 
groups in guidelines and regulations that have subsequently followed. Informed consent has 
been carried through those documents to inform the understanding of how vulnerable 
participants in research should be protected against being harmed. Moreover, this theme of 
informed consent has been used to guide the unfolding of the group and subpopulation 
focus of vulnerability in these documents.  
The Belmont Report14, which has, as previously discussed, had a major influence on 
international guidelines and has been a key text directing the development of the SA Ethics 
Guidelines, introduced “vulnerability” and the “group” or “subpopulation” lexicon into 
research ethics guidance documents. The SA Ethics Guidelines, it seems, adopted the 
Belmont approach to vulnerability without much question. The Report can be criticised for 
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being the root cause of the confusion and the “labelling” of people created in this arena. It 
mentions protections for vulnerable individuals in its Applications section and does this 
three times. “Vulnerable” is drawn into the discussions on the voluntariness aspect of 
informed consent. It is extended further into the risk and benefits section and the justice 
section and in the latter, the labelling of groups emerge for the first time in research ethics 
guideline documents as examples of vulnerable groups that require added protections. 
Moreover, it highlights that participants falling into these categories are potentially limited 
in their capacity to make informed decisions and hence also places informed consent 
problems as pivotal to the notion of vulnerability. Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds15 claim that 
the approach in the Belmont Report created a “... dual approach to, and confusion about, 
vulnerability in research that continues to permeate the literature.”    They say that 
confusion arises because the Belmont Report combined the general claim that all 
participants in research require protection by the use of informed consent with the more 
specific claim that additional duties of special protection against exploitations and other 
forms of harms are necessary for some participants who are more vulnerable than others.  
Because the relationship between universal vulnerability and special vulnerability has not 
been adequately examined, labelling some as especially vulnerable has led to the slippery 
slope of unjustifiable paternalism. The Belmont Report started the “labelling” approach by 
identifying certain groups as vulnerable in line with the existence or lack of certain 
characteristics16. The Belmont Report distinguishes at least three characteristics that point 
to members of designated groups being vulnerable: lack of capacity to consent, increased 
susceptibility to being exploited or coerced and being at increased risk of harms. The Report 
does not go further to explain the relationship between these characteristics.  
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According to Nickel17, the Belmont Report offers two related and overlapping notions of 
vulnerability. The first deals with the capacity to give autonomous and informed consent 
and the second relates to fairness. The fairness aspects focus on concerns that 
disadvantaged or dependant groups who lack the power to refuse to participate may be 
faced with an unfair burden of research participation. Additional fairness concerns revolve 
around the benefits of research being distributed unfairly and, in particular, the injustices 
that result as a consequence of being excluded from research are underscored. The Belmont 
recommendation that people with vulnerabilities be excluded from research as a blanket 
guidance leads to potential injustices and Nickel recommends that instead of using informed 
consent to remedy this injustice , benefit sharing should be brought into play.            
Nicholson18, in defence of the guidelines and regulatory instruments approach to 
vulnerability, claims that even if vulnerability is not explicit, as a concept it has been implicit 
since the earliest attempts to regulate medical research and that the approach in these 
documents is such that almost every research subject could fall into the category of 
vulnerable. He goes on to state that despite it being vague, it is nevertheless a useful 
concept and every research subject should be regarded as vulnerable “unless and until 
proven otherwise on an individual basis”18. The danger of this approach is that this could 
result in the systematic exclusion of some populations from research, thereby leading to 
missed opportunities to acquire valuable knowledge that could assist them and others in 
similar contexts10,19.  
Underlying the guidelines and regulations is the basic notion that certain categories of 
people are more likely to be misled, manipulated and mistreated in the research context as 
compared to others. It is the individuals in these categories that are considered to be 
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vulnerable. According to Levine et al., the status of being vulnerable creates the moral 
obligation of provision of special protections for them by RECs, regulators and researchers16; 
hence a strongly protectionist approach is recommended for individuals with vulnerabilities. 
In the early parts of the last decade, much of the discussion centred on whether or not 
certain groups should be added to the vulnerable category. The types of special protections 
were also considered, but to a lesser degree20,21.   
 From the middle of the last century, with rapid advances in science and technology and 
expansion of projects globally, research has evolved to include multidisciplinary, 
multinational approaches. However, the guidelines and regulations have lagged behind on 
the issue of how vulnerability in different settings should be addressed. The term 
‘vulnerable populations’ has also been criticised for implying that vulnerability is fixed and 
immutable and it risks labelling people who are vulnerable as “other” and the vulnerable 
“other” could be viewed as an object of pity or resentment22 and of a lower or no moral 
status. An additional concern here is that this could result in stigmatising the vulnerable 
“other”, and hence increasing the negative impression towards these people even further. 
The guidelines’ and regulations’ focus on vulnerability has ignored the fact that many  
participants, despite being vulnerable, possess agency23 and for those who do not possess 
agency, e.g., children and severely demented individuals, most jurisdictions allow for 
“agency by proxy” While these documents have played a major role in giving recognition to 
the concept of vulnerability and the need for protections, by not giving credence to the 
agency of participants, they have unwittingly introduced paternalism into REC functioning in 
that RECs could turn down projects or request unreasonably overprotective measures based 
on the fact that “vulnerable populations” would be enrolled. Respecting the agency of 
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participants allows for RECs to introduce ways in which their agency and hence autonomy 
can be strengthened, thereby leading to their empowerment and reducing the power-
imbalance gap between the researcher and participant.        
7.3 RECOMMENDED APPROACHES TO ADDRESS VULNERABILITY IN HEALTH RESEARCH  
7.3(A) Inability to Protect One’s Interests 
Broadly speaking, vulnerability is defined as an inability to protect one’s own interests. This, 
in the context of research, would indicate that being vulnerable implies that one (or many) 
are at higher risk of being harmed by the study as their capacity to protect their own 
personal interests is decreased4,6,24,25. This simple and appealing approach views 
vulnerability as a condition whereby one will not be able to protect his or her own interests. 
While this straightforward, uncomplicated approach is attractive, it could end up being 
problematic as there could be several different interests that could require safeguarding by 
RECs who would need to be alert to these. 
7.3(B)The Risks and Harms Approach       
Risk exists in almost all research studies for all research participants and there is a wide 
range of risks in this context. Risk is exacerbated when research involves vulnerable people 
and the possibility of a significant burden on the research participants will inevitably arise.  
A helpful analysis and categorisation of research related risk was proposed by Charles 
Weijer in 200026. This categorization would also be of assistance when considering 
vulnerability and the definition and assessment scale that is to be developed. The four 
broad risk categories are physical, psychological, social and economic: 
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1. Physical risks would be risks of bodily harms as a result of participating in the 
research and could range from minor to serious and immediate to delayed. This 
range, in my opinion is true for all categories of risk.     
2. Psychological risks would include risks to perceptions of self, feelings of anxiety or 
shame, i.e., emotional suffering, and behavioural and thought deviations.  
3. Social risks would be risks of being exposed to discrimination or other forms of social 
stigmatization as a result of participating in the research.  
4. Economic risks would be risks of having to bear financial costs related to research 
participation either directly or indirectly.     
The US National Bioethics Advisory Commission in 200127 listed six broad categories of 
harms to research participants that could arise as a result of their involvement in research. 
These include Weijer’s four categories as recorded above together with a further two, legal 
and dignitary. Legal ramifications as a result of research participation could arise when law 
enforcement agencies would use research data to prosecute participants, e.g., in regions of 
human rights abuses or where participants are illegal immigrants. Dignitary harms would 
result when people are not treated as persons, e.g., violating their privacy or not obtaining 
their informed consent. These two additional categories would also be of assistance when 
considering the tools to be developed in this thesis. The focus on protections should involve 
a balancing of the concepts of vulnerability and special risks of harms27.  
Similar to other authors, Hoffmaster28, in his analysis, made the point that most literature 
defines vulnerability as being at increased risk of harm and/or having a decreased capacity 
to protect oneself, and in the context of research ethics the term denotes greater than 
ordinary vulnerability while acknowledging that individuals differ in their exposure to risk 
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and in their abilities to deal with risks. When such vulnerabilities are identified, specific 
moral obligations and greater duties of justice are owed to these research participants.  
Ballantyne and Rogers4 state that because the potential to be harmed, i.e., risk is present in 
all research and hence all research participants are potentially vulnerable, it would be 
important to recognise that vulnerability “exists as a broad spectrum, rather than a simple, 
absent / present dichotomy.” The significance of their claim could be that as one moves 
along the spectrum, the potential of harm could increase and this could determine the type 
of vulnerability. They further claim that vulnerability is related to power inequalities in the 
researcher-participant relationship. The power imbalance arises in different ways and could 
result in researchers deliberately or unintentionally misusing power inequalities to coerce 
participation in research, even if this is against the best interests of participants. In addition, 
the misuse of power could result in the benefits of research not being shared fairly with the 
research participants. Integrating conceptions of risk and harms stratification when dealing 
with vulnerable people in research is a useful move away from the strictly vulnerable 
population approach utilised in research ethics guidelines.           
7.3(C) Source-based Approaches to Vulnerability  
Protecting the vulnerable participant has evolved from an emphasis being placed on 
safeguarding participants from being used in research without their consent to include the 
justice principle towards invoking a balance of access to benefits and protection from 
exploitation. What makes participants vulnerable is a matter of needs, promise and risk29.  
Justice would involve balancing the need for protection against the need to access new and 
needed therapies29 and the promise of novel and innovative treatments for future 
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wellbeing. Justice would also entail ensuring empowerment, especially in the context of the 
power imbalances in the researcher-participant relationship. 
According to Ballantyne and Rogers4 two sources of vulnerability should be discerned at a 
conceptual level: extrinsic and intrinsic. They state that extrinsic vulnerability arises from 
external circumstances, e.g., lack of socio-economic power, education or resources, and that 
intrinsic vulnerability emerges because of certain internal qualities of individuals 
themselves, e.g., mental illness, intellectual disability, severe illness, or extremes of age. 
Complex ethical issues appear in the research context as a result of these two types of 
vulnerabilities. In addition, these two types may be present independently, may coexist or 
at times may be interrelated. They maintain that in particular, those with intrinsic 
vulnerability are often extrinsically vulnerable because they lack power or live in poor 
resource settings with limited access to education and other social goods. According to 
them, it would be good for RECs to distinguish between these two types of vulnerabilities in 
order to consider the different mechanisms to best protect the interests of research 
participants.  There is merit in the conceptual distinction they propose and also in the 
recognition of the overlaps and interrelatedness of the two types of vulnerabilities.   
Schroeder and Gefenas5 claim that for a definition of vulnerability to be meaningful, it needs 
to include two elements, internal and external. The external element is the exposure to the 
possibility of harm, i.e., the danger. The internal element to vulnerability is the substantial 
lack of ability to protect oneself.  Just the exposure to harm is not adequate for vulnerability 
to materialise because one could have the power to protect oneself against this harm. 
Therefore, a definition of vulnerability will require both external and internal elements. The 
internal element is further broken down into intrinsic and contingent categories to explain 
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why some research subjects are unable to protect themselves. Intrinsic factors arise when 
there is an inherent lack of decision-making capacity resulting in a lack of ability to protect 
themselves, e.g., little children and severely mentally ill individuals. Contingent vulnerability 
to exploitation arises when people are competent enough to exercise self-determination 
but because of social, economic or political factors are unable to do so. In other words, they 
lack the means to protect themselves. As circumstances change, means change and so does 
vulnerability. Using this analytic process, Schroeder and Gefenas define vulnerability as5: 
“To be vulnerable means to face a significant probability of incurring an identifiable 
harm while substantially lacking ability and / or means to protect oneself.” 
The problem with this definition is that while the harm must be identifiable, there is no 
direction as to who is responsible for identifying the harm and a cogent definition ought to 
give direction on an approach to application of the concept defined. If identifying the harm  
is the responsibility of the REC, there is then an assumption that all RECs function at a basic 
level of competence that would allow for the identification of harms. This unfortunately is 
not necessarily the situation, especially for many RECs in developing countries30-33. 
Therefore, a definition of this nature without an additional guide to RECs that would assist 
implementation may not be of use to many RECs. The definition does not take into 
consideration that exposure to the possibility of harms comes in degrees and 
overemphasising danger could lead to an unnecessary expansion of vulnerable groups as 
has occurred in particular in the CIOMS and SA Ethics Guidelines. Everyone is not exposed to 
the same dangers and within each protocol different degrees of exposure and different 
dangers need to be identified. This is quite a problem with the external element in this 
definition. The authors do recognise that having a concise definition of this nature could 
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result in practical obstacles. However, on a positive note, this definition would safeguard 
against false categorisation of vulnerabilities, a severe criticism against group 
categorisations34. An example of false categorisation that could commonly arise in South 
Africa, which is viewed by many as a developing country, is as follows: Research participants 
in developing countries are categorised as vulnerable in the guidelines and by several 
authors that we have looked at already. However, a judge from the Constitutional Court in 
South Africa, while belonging to a developing country, does not face the same risks of 
identifiable harms as indigent men, women, children or even illegal immigrants living in 
either urban or remote rural areas. Furthermore, there are differing degrees of vulnerability 
between and within these groups.   
Some markers for identifiable harms offered in the paper by Schroeder and Gefaenas5 are 
an unfavourable benefit/risk ratio, breach of confidentiality or privacy, invalid consent, and 
lack of access to the benefits of research. They stress that some vulnerable participants may 
face a significant probability of incurring more identifiable harms in the same study as 
compared to other vulnerable participants. While this method of approaching the issue of 
vulnerability has merit, the authors have confounded the arguments by conflating individual 
and group protections. Although the importance of avoiding false categorisations is brought 
up, an adequate application of this notion is not carried through in the paper. 
Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds make the argument that research ethics needs an adequately 
theorised and nuanced conception of vulnerability15. They go on to explain that while most 
bioethics discourse associates vulnerability with risk of harm and exploitation and limited 
capacity for autonomy, there are several challenges to this approach. Challenges include not 
differentiating between universal human vulnerability and context-sensitive specific types 
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and origins of vulnerability and difficulties with balancing protections of the vulnerable with 
respecting their autonomy. In line with others, they also state that substantial ambiguities 
and tensions in the understanding and use of the term ‘vulnerability’ have led to issues of 
paternalistic overprotection of those considered to be vulnerable and neglect of those who 
are vulnerable but under existing classifications unrecognised as such. 
7.3(D) The Bioethical Taxonomy Approach 
One of the first articles in which a substantive critical analysis of vulnerability was achieved 
was that of Kipnis in 20018, in a commissioned paper for the US National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC). Clearly the NBAC must have been concerned with the nebulous 
approach to such an essential concept. Kipnis, like many other authors, challenges the group 
and subpopulation focus and starts off his paper by stressing that the concept of 
vulnerability has been8:  
“... grandfathered into the lexicon, lore, and literature of research ethics without 
undergoing stringent clarification.”  
He acknowledges that the subpopulation approach is an improvement in the way research 
ethics has unfolded but states that because of the many different types within a group or 
subpopulation, it is unclear what the common characteristic is that holds them together and 
it is not generically apparent how researchers respond when faced with a vulnerable 
subject. Approved standards for identifying and responding to vulnerability are absent. He 
also emphasises the existing guidelines are sufficient only to deal ethically with the 
“paradigmatic” research subject and fails the vulnerable one because, for the latter, ethical 
consideration has to go beyond the baseline. The baseline, he states is “... a mature, 
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respectable, moderately well-educated, clear-thinking, literate, self-supporting US citizen in 
good standing, that is, a man who could understand a 12-page consent form and act 
intelligently on the basis of its contents.”8           
Kipnis proposes an analytic approach in which he considers the circumstances that directly 
signal the vulnerabilities researchers should take into account. He claims that the concept of 
vulnerability points in two directions. One is a characteristic threat in the subject’s 
condition, that of being exposed to something that could harm the subject and therefore 
would be undesirable. The other is that there are those that are prone to take advantage of 
this exposure either intentionally or negligently and use others merely as a means to an 
end. The objective of the analytic approach would be to provide a checklist of circumstances 
in which, based on vulnerability, the permissibility of research could be questioned. The 
analysis would also recommend, based on intellectual reasoning, responses to the checklist 
questions and a determination of supplementary measures in light of the vulnerabilities. 
Thirdly, the analysis would provide a basis for a justifiable finding that a researcher has 
either intentionally or unintentionally taken unfair advantage of the vulnerabilities of 
research subjects8. 
Using this analytic approach, he distinguishes six discreet types of vulnerability applicable in 
the research context that form a “Bioethical Taxonomy”8. The types of vulnerabilities in this 
taxonomy are cognitive, juridic, deferential, medical, allocational, and infrastructural. Each 
of these is conceived as a cautionary signal signifying the need for safeguards, and not as a 
sign for exclusion. Each one is distinguished by a positive response to a distinctive question 
regarding the candidate subject (C-S)8:  
212  
 
  ● Cognitive:  Does the C-S have the capacity to deliberate about and decide whether or 
not to participate in the study? 
    ● Juridic: Is the C-S liable to the authority of others who may have an independent 
interest in that participation?  
   ● Deferential: “Is the C-S given to patterns of deferential behaviour that may mask an 
underlying unwillingness to participate?”   
   ● Medical: “Has the C-S been selected, in part, because he or she has a serious health 
condition for which there are no satisfactory remedies?” 
   ● Allocational: “Is the C-S seriously lacking in important social goods that will be 
provided as a consequence of his or her participation in research?”  
   ● Infrastructural: “Does the political, organizational, economic and social context of 
the research setting possess the integrity and resources needed to manage the 
study?” 
In a subsequent paper, Kipnis introduces a seventh type of vulnerability9, that 
of social. The question to be considered with this type is: “Does the C-S belong to a group 
whose rights and interests have been disvalued?”   
While distinct types of vulnerability comprise this taxonomy, individuals and groups could 
display several types of vulnerabilities and hence an overlap and interrelatedness of 
vulnerabilities. Kipnis’s approach has moved beyond consent-based vulnerabilities to 
vulnerabilities where the ability to avoid exploitation by the participant is limited, but the 
problem with Kipnis’s approach is that anyone corresponding to the categories is 
vulnerable. Moreover, he implies that anyone able to provide a truly informed consent is 
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not. His taxonomy is interesting and attractive for use in research ethics, but it also suffers 
from being somewhat ubiquitous and falls into Levine et al.’s account of vulnerability in 
health research as being too broad and too narrow at the same time20. Furthermore, from 
the practical perspective, this taxonomy could be seen as more of an academic exercise than 
an operational tool that could assist REC members during the review process.  
7.3(E) The Special Scrutiny Rubric  
Levine et al.20 have criticised the categorization of vulnerability by groups as resulting in the 
concept itself becoming too broad and at the same time too narrow. Many of those 
criticisms are relevant today, i.e., ten years later. They viewed the concept of vulnerability 
as having three basic related problems. To begin with, like many other authors, they 
stressed that too many categories of research subjects were deemed to be vulnerable. 
However, for many of these categories, the only guidance was that of special attention or 
consideration without clear direction on what these would comprise. They also stated that 
because of the many growing numbers of categories, almost anyone in research was 
vulnerable and hence RECs had to pay special attention to almost all protocols submitted for 
review. Furthermore, if RECs were to focus narrowly and almost unequivocally on consent 
as the underlying basis of group characteristics, attention would be deflected from features 
of the research itself, the institutional environment, and the socioeconomic context that 
could put participants at risk for harm.   Consideration would not be given to the reality that 
there are many other factors that can put participants at risk of harm and not just the fact 
that they belong to a particular vulnerable group. Finally, whole categories of individuals 
would be stereotyped by the concept of vulnerability. No room was made for distinguishing 
214  
 
between those in the group that had the special characteristics that needed to be taken into 
account and those that did not. 
They also made reference to certain circumstances which were not included in the group 
categories that made people vulnerable. These included timing of research (e.g., pregnant 
women in labour), the emotional impact of research, prior experiences, and other personal 
factors.  Similar to other authors, they made a compelling argument that the need for 
special protection requires consideration beyond group categorization and has to take into 
account the particular features of the research project and the environment in which it is 
conducted20. They have offered a rubric to assist RECs carry out a more focussed review in 
order to provide more targeted forms of protections for research participants which they 
call “special scrutiny”. The three criteria to be used in their rubric are20: 
“(1) the research involves initial experiences of translating new scientific advances 
into humans, especially when the intervention is novel and / or irreversible; 
  (2) there is a known or credible risk of significant harm (death or serious disability 
being the clearest examples) and there is no potential of offsetting direct medical 
benefit; or 
  (3) the protocol raises ethical questions about research design or implementation 
for which there is no consensus.” 
They claim that the special scrutiny rubric should provide appropriate protection for all 
research participants and not only those that are considered to be vulnerable. This claim is 
flawed as the rubric is restricted to the scientific aspects of research only and the risks that 
have been considered are no more than those that cause physical harms. Social and other 
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related aspects of research participation and the research context have not been considered 
at all. This approach is somewhat narrow and restrictive. 
7.3(F) Context Dependent Vulnerability                   
Context-dependant vulnerabilities, because of their consequences within specific settings, 
require ethical responses. Rendtorff includes social, political, environmental, and cultural 
sources of vulnerability in his approach to the subject35. Vulnerabilities have also been 
defined in political terms in that people are particularly open to exploitation in situations 
where they lack basic rights and liberties36. Suitable moral responses to vulnerability will be 
facilitated by recognising its sources and the various modes in which the latter manifest. 
This could also assist in avoiding responses that are too broad (false categorisation leading 
to paternalistic protections) or too narrow (not identifying a source that would warrant a 
response)15. Rendtorff further elaborates that an adequate conception of vulnerability will 
also respond to how the developmental capacities for robustness and the social conditions 
for advancing agency and autonomy are to be met35.        
Ruth Macklin, whose arguments focus more on multinational research in resource poor or 
developing countries, claims that vulnerability is a concern in bioethics because vulnerable 
individuals and groups are subject to exploitation and exploitation is morally wrong24. She 
affirms, however, that this in itself is a somewhat simplistic approach because while there is 
agreement almost everywhere that exploitation is wrong, there is distinct divergence of 
opinion as to what constitutes exploitation. Not all acts that are wrong are necessarily 
exploitative and some situations may involve the inflicting of harm on vulnerable people 
without exploiting them. She also claims that acts of protection could be interpreted as 
being paternalistic and questioned by those that one is trying to protect.  It is therefore 
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necessary to examine what criteria are necessary to determine vulnerability (group or 
individual) and exploitation. Moreover, it is also important to appraise when actions with 
good intent could be construed as paternalistic and hence questionable from an ethical 
point of view. Macklin highlights three main ethical concerns when international research is 
conducted in developing countries. Research participants might be vulnerable “... by virtue 
of their low educational level or lack of familiarity with modern scientific concepts, their 
poverty or powerlessness and therefore open to exploitation in some manner.”24 Macklin 
has noticeably placed significant reliance on the categorization of vulnerability in the CIOMS 
guidelines.  
The lack of basic health services in some of these countries could mean that subjects enrol 
in research as a means of accessing care. They could also fall prey to the therapeutic 
misconception. While she states that RECs are mandated to ensure special protections for 
the vulnerable she does acknowledge that in many developing countries effective 
mechanisms for research oversight are absent or where present they may not be of an 
adequate standard24.  In such situations, effective processes for identifying and sanctioning 
researchers who exploit vulnerable subjects would be lacking. Because of this, in her 
opinion, all research subjects in those contexts would be vulnerable. She defines 
exploitation as the situation that occurs when “... wealthy or powerful individuals or 
agencies take advantage of the poverty, powerlessness, or dependency of others by using 
the latter to serve their own ends (those of the wealthy or powerful) without adequate 
compensating benefits for the less powerful or disadvantaged individuals.”24, a definition 
that could be supported by utilitarian arguments.  Macklin provides valuable analyses on 
vulnerability and moves beyond the consent-based approaches to include justice 
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considerations of fairness and equity. While her approach is attractive, it is lacking in that it 
is silent on other social problems that could be associated with vulnerability, e.g., 
discrimination that could arise as a result of privacy and confidentiality violations during 
research participation.  Neither does she provide clear recommendations on how special 
protections should be approached. Furthermore, she also falls into the trap of using the 
vulnerable population approach, similar to the guidelines.  
7.3(G) A Wrongs Approach 
An interesting approach proposed by Samia Hurst10 is that if vulnerability is a claim to 
special protections then it should be understood as “an identifiably increased likelihood of 
incurring additional or greater wrong”. Vulnerability is therefore understood as extending 
beyond an inability to consent or to protect one’s own interests. In addition, using “wrong” 
recognises that participants who are harmed as a result of their involvement in research are 
not necessarily always wronged. “Wrong” denotes greater moral burden and significance as 
compared to “harm”.  It indicates a moral transgression10. A criticism of the definition is that 
one would expect special protections when there is a likelihood of incurring any wrong. 
According to this definition, special protections are only necessary when “additional” or 
“greater” wrongs are expected to be experienced. This could be perceived as existing or 
lesser wrongs and reduced degrees of moral transgressions do not require special 
safeguards. Any wrong, irrespective of whether existing or of a lesser degree, is a moral 
transgression and special safeguards must be established-to protect research participants 
from such wrongs.        
Hurst recommends the following four step approach when applying this definition of 
vulnerability in research10:   
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“1) Are any potential research subjects at risk of being wronged in any way by this 
research project?  
2) Are some potential subjects identifiably more likely than other persons to incur 
this wrong, or likely to incur it to a greater degree? 
3) Is our IRB among those who share in the duty to minimize, or avoid, this wrong? 
4) If yes, what should we do to avoid this wrong, or minimize this increased 
likelihood or degree, or ensure it is compensated in ethically justifiable ways?”   
This approach is somewhat out of line with her definition as it includes wrongs that are not 
necessarily additional or greater. It is also flawed in that step 3 allows for “task-shifting” by 
the REC and condones an evasion of its duty to protect the participant against being 
wronged. While there are often others who would share in the duty to minimise or avoid 
wrong, the REC always has a duty to protect potential research participants. After all, this is 
the moral purpose of the REC.     
7.4 SUMMARY 
It is clear that despite vulnerability remaining an abstract concept; it has concrete effects 
both on those who are labelled vulnerable and those who are not. It is imperative that 
researchers and RECs are able to identify who is vulnerable in order to qualify for special 
protections and fair benefit37,38. The term “special” protections is appropriate as currently 
RECs protect all research participants, even those who are not affected by specific 
vulnerabilities and do not have any particular interests that require protection. This overall 
oversight role of RECs is an essential minimum or basic standard afforded to all participants 
in light of the universal vulnerability that we all have by virtue of being human as discussed 
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in chapter 3. Where specific vulnerabilities are detected by RECs, “special” protections will 
be necessary as an additional requirement to the basic standard. Vulnerability in itself raises 
a valid moral claim for protections and safeguards. RECs are the ones who play a critical role 
in efforts to achieve the balance between protections, scientific progress and access to fair 
benefits39. Moreover, RECs need to identify when their efforts at protections result in 
paternalistic practices and exclusions. Protection should be viewed not as exclusion but as 
allowing participants to volunteer without the risk of abuse40. Hence, it is necessary to 
develop a robust, focussed and comprehensive definition of vulnerability that, when applied 
in the research ethics review process, will allow for a recognition of potential participants 
who could be vulnerable and of their degrees of vulnerability, a building of moral responses 
(aimed at duties of protection) and an identification of the situations in which the moral 
responses towards improving the plight of vulnerable individuals are justified. 
7.5 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF VULNERABILITY IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
The several different suggestions outlined above towards the approach to vulnerability in 
health research, while individually lacking in some aspect or the other, taken together 
jointly complement each other and aspects of these approaches have been used to develop 
the practical working definition of vulnerability and its application that follow. Earlier 
chapters of this thesis have also informed this process. The objective of this activity is to 
create a harmonized approach towards protecting the vulnerable research participant when 
RECs review research proposals.                 
7.5(A) A Practical Working Definition of Vulnerability and its Application in Health 
Research 
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“Vulnerability is an inability or decreased ability of a research participant to 
sufficiently safeguard her/his own needs and interests resulting in her/him being at 
an increased likelihood of being identifiably wronged in varying degrees if special 
safeguards to protect her/him are not invoked by the Research Ethics Committee” 
 The baseline protective safeguards essential to this definition are the basic protections for 
all participants that are enrolled in research. The use of deontological and virtue principles 
combined with Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles approach and direction from the 
guidelines will adequately protect universal vulnerability. Implicit in this definition is the 
distinction between universal vulnerability and increased vulnerability.  
This definition is also a substantial improvement over the definition in the current version of 
the DoH which reads: “… may have an increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring 
additional harm” as it brings in the inability to protect one’s interests as a necessary 
component to being vulnerable which the DoH does not. 
It also takes into consideration degrees of abilities or inabilities to protect oneself as not all 
participants in research are equally vulnerable. In addition, the potential wrong must be 
identifiable in order to allow the REC to position the special safeguards. The definition also 
establishes the obligation of the REC to develop the special safeguards. It moves away from 
being consent-based, access-based, or harms and risks based and hence it is not narrowly 
restrictive. Neither is it too broad as it avoids categorisation of vulnerability into numerous 
groups and is quite specific as to what the criteria are for a research participant to be 
vulnerable. A definition of this nature would avoid situations whereby participants who are 
vulnerable but do not fall into particular categories would not qualify for special protections 
by the REC. This definition could be easily utilised in practice by RECs if aided by a simple but 
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focussed and routinely applied “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale which asks relevant 
questions in sequential order. 
7.5(B) The “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale 
This scale would assist RECs implement the definition of vulnerability developed above 
during the review of protocols. As has been seen in chapter 3, vulnerabilities are firmly 
linked to correlative responsibilities. The more vulnerable the person, the greater is the 
agent’s responsibility to protect the individual’s interests. Vulnerability is seen as a matter 
of degree dependant on the number of needs arising in the researcher-participant 
relationship and the amount of assistance that would be required to meet those needs.  To 
optimise protections, RECs would need to answer the questions posed in sequential order.   
1. Has the essential minimum standard afforded all participants in light of universal 
vulnerability been met? 
2. Has the baseline for respecting human dignity been met? 
3. Will any participant be used in the research as a means to an ends she/he may 
not endorse?      
4. Will all the research participants in this study be able to safeguard their own 
needs and interests? 
5. If no, is there an increased likelihood of any of them being identifiably wronged 
as a result of their participation in the study? 
6. Is there an increased likelihood of any participant being identifiably wronged to a 
greater degree than other participants? 
7. Have the identifiable wrongs been recognised?   
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8. Have special safeguards been developed to protect those participants in need of 
such safeguards? 
The REC would also be assisted by developing clusters of pertinent easily identifiable 
wrongs. These could be categorised for ease of reference as follows:  
Table 8. IDENTIFIABLE WRONGS: Clusters and Examples  
Cluster of Wrongs Examples  
Physical Wrongs Medical physical risks outweighing benefits, non-medical 
physical wrongs, e.g., pain, discomfort 
Consent Wrongs Exploitation because of, e.g., : 
Lack of capacity (e.g., extremes of age, mental disorders, 
anxiety, emergency) 
Understanding barriers (e.g., language, low levels of literacy) 
Diminished freedom or voluntariness (e.g., manipulation, 
coercion) 
Social Wrongs Confidentiality breach / inappropriate dissemination of results 
of research (e.g., stigmatisation, stereotyping, discrimination, 
physical / gender-based violence, job loss, legal sanction) 
Psychological Wrongs         Anxiety, stress, emotional suffering (e.g., could be triggered 
by research tool, e.g., sensitive questions in interview 
schedule)   
Justice Wrongs       no post study access to proven intervention, inequitable 
standards of care usually with international research, no 
provision for compensation for research-related injuries. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale and the clustering of identifiable wrongs to specific 
contexts could aid RECs in the review process such that they would be able to plan directed 
protections for the potential research participants. In this way, both RECs and research 
participants benefit from the use of these tools. It could be stated that the guidelines 
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categorization and sub- categorization of research populations is a convenient approach for 
RECs in that it makes their task much simpler than the “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale  
offered. However, the pitfalls of the former approach and the resultant wrongs have been 
clearly illustrated. The Scale offered will require RECs to execute focussed and 
comprehensive wrongs assessments from the protocol to include the scientific aspects, 
social context and moral implications of the study and in so doing guide the researcher on 
how potential participants ought to be protected based on their individual needs and 
capabilities. RECs make the decisions on how participants in research are to be protected 
but the actual implementation of the safeguards is the responsibility of the professionals 
that conduct the research. This is why the researcher-participant relationship in which the 
moral status of the participant is respected and her / his human dignity is upheld is so 
important. This approach in no way detracts from the key duty of the REC which is to 
protect participants in research. It essentially enhances protections by assisting RECS in 
guiding researchers on its implementation and hence strengthens and enriches strong 
protectionism. 
This chapter has culminated in the definition of the concept of vulnerability in health 
research and the tool for its application to facilitate participant protection. In the following 
chapter I will apply these tools to two Court Judgements involving research participants to 
demonstrate that their utility extends beyond the REC review process.  
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Chapter 8: APPLYING THE DEFINITION AND VULNERABILITY SCALE TO CASE STUDIES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
Researchers and RECs in South Africa, despite our relatively early history of research 
participant protection programmes and our robust ethico-regulatory framework for 
participant protections, have been heavily criticised both in the scholarly literature and lay 
media for our inability to adequately protect participants in research1,-4. At times, 
participants have resorted to the Courts for protections, however, with morally 
disappointing results as judgements have been based on strictly legal criteria rather than 
moral obligations5,6, 7.  
In this chapter I describe pertinent aspects of two judgements5,7 by the South African 
Courts, and then proceed to show how research participants have been wronged, using the 
definition of vulnerability and the Vulnerability Scale that I have developed. These wrongs 
could have been averted, or “righted” had there been a definition and Scale in place for use 
along the lines that I have developed.  
It will become clear at the end of this chapter that the tools developed in this thesis are 
simple and uncomplicated, yet robust and comprehensive, and if used appropriately would 
optimise the protection of research participants with vulnerabilities and also be of great 
value as an adjudication instrument. 
8.2 CASE STUDY 1: NM AND OTHERS v SMITH AND OTHERS (FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
INSTITUTE AS AMICUS CURIAE) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC)5 
A synopsis of the evidence and information contained in the judgement in this complex case 
is described below and then analysed using the vulnerability instruments developed in this 
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thesis. Dr M Botes, head of the Immunology Clinic in the University of Pretoria Medical 
Faculty, enrolled participants into the FTC 302 Trials at the Kalafong Hospital, Pretoria. 
These were HIV clinical trials, the objective being that of testing the efficacy of a 
combination of drugs that could decrease viral loads. The trials commenced in August 1999. 
At enrolment, potential participants were required to sign informed consent forms to 
participate.  
Participants brought up concerns about illnesses and mortality in the trials soon after the 
trials had started. This was eventually brought to the attention of the then Minister of 
Health who, in April 2000, called for the South African Regulator, the Medicines Control 
Council (MCC), for a report. The MCC found that a causal association between the drugs and 
deaths was probable and suspended further enrolment of participants while additional 
investigation and full reports could be compiled on the serious adverse events and deaths 
associated with the trial interventions. 
While at a support group meeting for people with HIV/ AIDS, participants and in particular 
three women complained to the leader of the group, Johan Viljoen, a former priest, about 
their adverse experiences in the trials. In March 2000, Viljoen approached Patricia De Lille, a 
member of Parliament at that time, and who was well known as an activist in relation to the 
rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, for assistance as he was quite concerned at the large 
numbers of participants that were getting ill while on the trials. De Lille met with members 
of the support group on the 28th March 2000 where the clinical trial participants complained 
that the consent form was never properly explained to them and that Dr Botes attributed 
their adverse symptoms to their illness and not to the side effects of the drugs. They also 
complained that she was unsympathetic to their complaints. This was followed by a meeting 
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with the REC, Dr Botes, De Lille, journalists and a representative from the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation at which the REC requested signed statements from the 
participants. These were obtained from the three women participants by Viljoen and sent to 
the REC in May 2000. The statements were also subsequently sent to the South African 
Human Rights Commission. With pressure now mounting, the Pretoria Academic Hospital 
set up an internal investigation, headed by a medical practitioner, to consider the 
complaints. The report of this internal investigation was submitted to the REC and the 
University Registrar, Professor Grove, in July 2000 and to De Lille in October 2000. She was 
satisfied that the participants’ complaints were included and expressed in the report. 
In August of the same year, Pretoria University appointed Professor SA Strauss, a leading 
legal academic, to conduct an external enquiry to complement the internal one. The three 
participants who had signed the statements and others involved in the clinical trials were 
invited to this enquiry. The three participants retracted their statements during the external 
enquiry. Nowhere in the Strauss Report were the reasons for this about-turn made 
available. Professor Strauss’s report, which was delivered to the University on 30th May 
2001, exonerated the Medical Faculty and stipulated that there was no substance in the 
three statements and no evidence of improper conduct on the part of Dr Botes. The Strauss 
Report was sent to De Lille without its annexures. The latter comprised the consents 
furnished to Strauss, the informed consents at enrolment of the trials and copies of 
statements sent by De Lille to the REC. The Report was also sent to several journalists. The 
Report included the names and HIV status of the three women. The introductory section of 
the Report stated that their names had been published in terms of the consents they had 
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given but did not highlight that this was for the purposes of the Report only. The Report did 
not state that the contents were confidential; neither was the Report marked “confidential”.  
In March 2002, 5000 copies of an authorised biography of De Lille were published and 
distributed to various bookshops in the country. A journalist, Charlene Smith, had been 
commissioned by De Lille to write the biography. One of the chapters in the book was on De 
Lille’s activism on the rights of people living with HIV / AIDS. The chapter included 
information on her involvement with the issues raised in the FTC 302 trials. The internal 
report and the Strauss Report had been given to Smith, who after many unanswered 
attempts at obtaining the annexures to the Strauss Report from Strauss, the REC and the 
University, included the names of the three trial participants who had signed the statements 
of complaint, together with their HIV positive status in the chapter. The three women, who 
were unemployed, lived in informal settlements and had little to no formal education, were 
informed of this disclosure by Dr Botes. They feared that their families and lovers would 
now discover their HIV status and that they would be thrown out of their homes. At that 
time, and even perhaps today, the stigma and subsequent maltreatment associated with an 
HIV positive diagnosis were entrenched in South African society. Hence, because of serious 
personal and social consequences as a result of inappropriate disclosure, protection of 
privacy and confidentiality as to HIV status were at that time and even today are necessary 
and justified.      
Dr Botes directed the women to the University of Pretoria’s Law Clinic and an application to 
interdict further publication of the book was lodged in the Pretoria High Court. This 
application was opposed and ultimately withdrawn. In the meantime, one of the women 
had her shack burned down by her lover who subsequently left her. She later attempted 
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suicide by dousing herself in flammable liquid and setting herself on fire. A second informed 
her mother of the disclosure. She was rejected and thrown out of the house. The third 
woman had retreated from society and had not informed her family of her HIV status and 
the disclosure in the book. She experienced serious fears that her family would find out. In 
July of that year, the women sent a letter to Smith’s, De Lille’s and the publisher’s attorneys 
requesting the removal of their names from the book. This request was rejected by the 
former two and not responded to by the latter. They were subsequently sued for damages 
by the women in the Johannesburg High Court6. The claim was that their rights to privacy, 
dignity and psychological integrity had been violated.    
The women (Applicants) claimed for: 
a) a private apology from Smith, De Lille and the publishers (Respondents 1, 2 and 3 
respectively); 
b) removal of their names from all unsold copies of the book; 
c) payment of R200 000 to each of them; and 
d) costs of the suit.  
In May 2005, the High Court dismissed with costs the action against the 1st and 2nd 
respondents. Some of the reasons for the dismissal contained in that judgement were that 
the women were illiterate in and claimed no understanding of English and that there was no 
possibility of confrontation in the future by anyone in their community as to the disclosure 
of their HIV status in the book (quite inappropriate reasoning in my opinion as lack of 
literacy is no reason for not protecting dignity and moral status). However, the 3rd 
respondent was ordered to pay each of the women a sum of R15000 and their costs. The 3rd 
respondent was also ordered to delete the women’s names from all copies of the books that 
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it still had in its possession and not to sell any further copies of the book until such deletion 
was made. The women applied to the Supreme Court of Appeal to appeal against the 
judgement in terms of Respondents 1 and 2. This was dismissed without reasons being 
specified. They subsequently approached the Constitutional Court5 of South Africa on 
Appeal.     
The Constitutional Court held that the High Court was incorrect in its findings that 
Respondents 1 and 2 were not liable for any damage suffered by the women at the time of 
publication of the book and that the publication of their HIV status constituted wrongful 
publication of a private fact and that the rights to privacy of the women had been breached 
by all the respondents. In addition, as it was an affront to disclose their HIV status without 
their consent, and because of the indignity of the public stigma, degradation and 
indiscrimination that accompanied being HIV positive, their dignity and psychological 
integrity had been violated. The application for leave to appeal was granted and the 
quantum of damages was set at R35 000 per woman as this was considered a fair 
assessment of damages suffered. The women’s names were to be deleted from all copies of 
the books that had not been sold, the High Court decision was set aside and each party was 
to pay its own costs.   
8.2(A) Analysis of the Case 
The definition of vulnerability as formulated in the previous chapter will be employed to 
start off the analysis.  
 “Vulnerability is an inability or decreased ability of a research participant to sufficiently 
safeguard her/his own needs and interests resulting in her/him being at an increased 
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likelihood of being identifiably wronged in varying degrees if special safeguards to protect 
her/him are not invoked by the Research Ethics Committee” 
Using the definition of vulnerability above, it would need to be determined as to whether 
these women would be vulnerable and if so why?  
Hence, the question to start off with is: Was there an inability or decreased ability of the 
research participant to sufficiently safeguard her or his own needs and interests?  
This was an HIV clinical trial which started in the late nineties when access to antiretroviral 
therapy was not available to the poor and indigent in the country. Some of the participants, 
who joined the trial as a means of accessing therapy towards their needs and interests, 
would have not been in a position to sufficiently safeguard their own interests from the 
perspective of access to care. In addition, poverty is usually associated with lack of access to 
education8 and hence poor research participants as in the case of these three women would 
have been more likely to be illiterate or have low levels of literacy. This would mean that 
their interests as autonomous decision-makers would be affected should they not 
understand the content of the informed consent forms and if there were weaknesses in the 
informed consent process. Poverty in South Africa was also associated with a negative social 
context in terms of having HIV with potential for stigma, intolerance, discrimination and 
violence against the individual should there be indiscriminate disclosure9,10. Because of the 
social context they would not be in a position to adequately safeguard their own interests.  
Would this result in her / him being at an increased likelihood of being identifiably wronged 
in varying degrees if special safeguards to protect her / him are not invoked by the Research 
Ethics Committee? 
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The answer here is an unequivocal yes. The wrongs would include physical should they 
suffer side effects of the intervention being tested and there was no provision for 
monitoring and treatment. If the informed consent process was not appropriate, the 
participants may not have been in a position to realise that they were experiencing side 
effects and report this to the study team on time. Moreover, in this case, the physician 
researcher was dismissive of the Applicants’ complaints of illness after joining the trial. The 
three participants were aggrieved enough to have taken their concerns to Viljoen at a 
support group meeting.  Furthermore, the enrolment into the trial was suspended by the 
MCC because of a probability of a causal association between the interventional drugs and 
deaths. Hence there was an increased likelihood of experiencing physical wrongs if the REC 
did not invoke special safeguards to protect the participant. Because of poverty coupled 
with low levels of literacy and resultant understanding barriers and diminished 
voluntariness as a consequence of the so-called promise of much-needed healthcare within 
the context of the trials, the 3 participants would have been at an increased likelihood of 
consent wrongs. Moreover, because of the South African social context, inappropriate 
disclosure of the participant’s HIV status would have resulted in stigmatization, 
discrimination and violence resulting in them being at an increased likelihood of social 
wrongs, and as a consequence, in a violation of dignity and an undermining of moral status. 
Several special safeguards to protect the three participants were required to be instituted 
by the REC. 
It is clear that the three women would be defined as vulnerable.        
The “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale is applied as follows:  
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9. Has the essential minimum standard afforded all participants in light of universal 
vulnerability been met?   
It is not possible to comment on this as this information was not available nor 
contained in the Judgement. However, it is worth mentioning that at that time, in 
the late nineties and at the turn of this century, there was no national basic standard 
as determined by the law in South Africa, as there is today. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the University of Pretoria’s REC could have derived its basic standards 
to protect universal vulnerability of participants from the DoH and SAMRC 
Guidelines that have been discussed in previous chapters.    
10. Has the baseline for respecting human dignity been met? 
The intrinsic worth of the 3 participants had been violated by the Dr Botes who 
seemed not to take their concerns as regards the side effects of the drugs seriously. 
It is also of concern that they may not have understood the contents of the informed 
consent documents with resultant disrespect to their rights to bodily integrity.  Their 
rights to privacy and confidentiality had also been violated by the Strauss Report and 
the biography.    
11. Will any participant be used in the research as a means to an ends she/he may not 
endorse? 
Without ensuring proper consent, both for participation in the study and for 
disclosing their HIV status, and by not taking their concerns as regards the side 
effects seriously they were used as a means to an ends they did not endorse.  
12. Will all the research participants in this study be able to safeguard their own needs 
and interests? 
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In terms of the situation in South Africa at that stage, not all research participants in 
the FTC 302 Trials would have been able to safeguard their own interests as this 
would depend on the social backgrounds of participants. Some participants could 
have been from contexts of social privilege, with access to education, adequate 
levels of literacy secure jobs and support of family and friends and hence be in a 
position to safeguard their interests11. This would differ from the participant on the 
opposite end of the social ladder, like the three women who came forward with 
complaints during the trials.    
13. If no, is there an increased likelihood of any of them being identifiably wronged as a 
result of their participation in the study? 
In the case of these three women, the identifiable wrongs that they were at 
increased likelihood of were physical, consent social and psychological.  
14. Is there an increased likelihood of any participant being identifiably wronged to a 
greater degree than other participants? 
Yes. This would depend on the socio-economic status of each participant, the level of 
literacy of each participant and the social contexts in which the different participants 
found themselves, as in the case of the three women. 
15. Have the identifiable wrongs been recognised?                                                                   
It does not seem that the REC successfully identified the wrongs that could arise and 
hence the lack of adequate protections for these three women. 
16. Have special safeguards been developed to protect those participants in need of such 
safeguards? 
No. This opinion is based on the almost silence of the REC to respond to the 
women’s needs and concerns. When the women felt that their complaints regarding 
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their illnesses since joining the trials were not being taken seriously by Dr Botes, they 
complained to Viljoen rather than to the REC. Without having access to the informed 
consent form that they signed, one can only speculate as to its contents, and as to 
whether each participant did indeed receive a signed copy of the document. It is 
possible that the REC did not ensure that its contact details were made available to 
participants on the form should there have been a complaint or concern that they 
would have had in terms of their rights as research participants. It is also possible 
that the REC did not advise the researchers of the need for this information to be 
included in the informed consent forms or of the problems of social context and the 
specific safeguards required. One also wonders whether the REC did receive reports 
on adverse events and how it responded to these. The suspension of enrolment was 
determined by the MCC. The REC, as part of its post-approval responsibilities, should 
have also been appraising the adverse events reports and making recommendations 
to researchers. Protections of participants by an REC does not terminate once a 
protocol is reviewed and approved. The REC continues its protections role 
throughout the study through to dissemination of results. There is no evidence that 
the REC instituted an investigation as to the concerns of the three women despite 
the meeting with the 2nd Respondent. It was only after copies of the women’s 
statements were sent to the Human Rights Commission that the Pretoria Academic 
Hospital, and not the REC, responded by conducting an internal investigation. The 
report of this investigation was submitted to the REC and University in July 2000.  
The women’s complaints were included in this report. It is unclear how the REC 
responded to this report nor why the University instituted an “external” 
investigation to “complement” the internal one. It is also surprising that the women 
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would after all this time suddenly repudiate their statements during the external 
investigation without explanation for this being recorded in the Report. It is expected 
that the REC, as an entity in the University, would have been presented with the 
Strauss Report which contained the names of the three women and their HIV status. 
It is also expected that the REC ought to have raised concerns as to disclosures in the 
Report which did not carry a clear statement declaring that it was confidential nor 
that the consents obtained from the women as regards disclosure of their identities 
were qualified and limited. There is no record of the REC intervening because of the 
implications of inappropriate disclosure of the women’s information even at that 
stage.  
8.2(B) Discussion 
Section 14 of the South African Constitution12 affirms the right to privacy which includes the 
right not to have the privacy of one’s communications infringed (14d). The right to privacy 
basically is the right to limit access to, or control data about one’s self. Other people having 
unauthorised access to that personal information may result in negative emotional 
reactions like fear, embarrassment and humiliation, and also stigmatization and 
discrimination. Limiting informational resources about one’s self is important in shaping 
relationships, e.g., differing amounts of information are shared with family members, 
friends, healthcare practitioners and researchers. Very importantly, once unauthorised 
information about one’s self is disclosed by a third party, the loss of privacy in that context 
is irreversible. In the case of these women, their medical information as regards HIV status 
was personal and highly sensitive and public disclosure would have the potential to result in 
negative repercussions. As the Strauss Report was not marked confidential, the REC had a 
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moral obligation to intervene and request that the women’s identities be removed. It was 
an affront to the dignity and psychological integrity (also a Constitutional protection in 
section 1212) of the women for their HIV status to be made public without their consent. 
Because of the many years of indignities suffered as a result of the oppression of  the 
majority of people in South Africa that were not of the white racial category, a constant 
theme in our Constitution is the importance of restoring human dignity. Apartheid was a 
denial of our common humanity, and the aim of the struggle against apartheid was that of 
restoring human dignity. Because human dignity is foundational in the Constitution it must 
be aggressively safeguarded and protected. Section 10 of the Constitution makes dignity a 
justiciable and enforceable right.  It is unfortunate that the stigma associated with HIV 
undermines dignity in that it denies those living with HIV a life without shame, humiliation 
and fear. For privacy to be adequately protected it must be respected by others – and this 
was what the REC should have ensured. It is my opinion that as the REC failed to safeguard 
the vulnerabilities of these three participants from the commencement of their 
participation in the trials. It is unlikely that the REC had considered their specific 
vulnerabilities during the review of the research. 
The case also highlights that problems of access faced by the research participants went 
beyond medical treatments to include lack of access to adequate and competent legal 
advice. The women were harmed by the inappropriate disclosure which resulted in them 
being wronged. The question that should have been considered by their legal team was: 
“Who was the source of the harms and wrongs?” Clearly, the response would be the original 
author of the document and the University. However, the women were being assisted by 
staff of the Law Clinic of the University who may not have been totally objective in the 
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assistance given. It is my opinion that the application ought to have been brought against 
Professor Strauss and the University in the first instance, and if this had been the case, the 
women would not have had to endure the anxieties and stresses of having to appeal to the 
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court thereafter. 
8.3 CASE STUDY 2: VENTER V ROCHE PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD ET AL (11285/08) [2013] WCHC 
7 MAY 2013 
This case was heard in the High Court of South Africa and the judgement which is described 
below was delivered on 7 May 2013. In 2005, Mr Venter, the plaintiff, after signing a patient 
information leaflet and informed consent document (PIL ICON), was enrolled into a phase III 
multi-national clinical trial, the aim of which was to evaluate the efficacy and safety of a 
cancer intervention in patients with non-metastatic carcinoma of the colon, breast or lung. 
The study was initiated by Hoffman-La Roche AG (FHLR), a pharmaceutical company based 
in Switzerland. FHLR developed the study protocol. Roche SA (1st defendant) was contracted 
by FHLR to conduct the SA arm of the trial and to make the necessary applications to the 
regulatory body, the MCC and the RECs. The RECs that reviewed and approved the trials 
were Pharma-Ethics and the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical) of the University 
of the Witwatersrand (HREC). Dr L Gouws and Partners Inc, also known as GVI Oncology (2nd 
defendant), was contracted by Roche SA to be principal investigator on the trial. The trial 
commenced once all the necessary approvals had been obtained. The plaintiff, because he 
satisfied the criteria for inclusion, was enrolled into the trial five days after he took the PIL 
ICON home to discuss with his wife and after the document had been gone through with 
him “point by point” as highlighted in paragraph 17 of the judgement. The PIL ICON 
provided for inter alia the payment of compensation to a participant in the event of him or 
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her suffering a trial-related injury. As will be seen below, a proper construction of the terms 
of the PIL ICON was central in the adjudication of the issues between the parties.  
Nine days after randomisation to the intervention arm of the study, the plaintiff 
experienced acute abdominal pain, was hospitalised, and underwent a laparotomy and 
repair of a bowel perforation. Bowel perforation was a side effect described in the PIL ICON 
as occurring in up to one in ten patients.  A month later, he underwent a cholecystectomy. 
These events were reported by GVI Oncology as trial related serious adverse events (SAE) 
and FHLR approved payment of costs. The plaintiff thereafter contended that he suffered 
damages as a direct result of the trial-related injury. A dispute arose subsequently between 
the parties as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim compensation for pain, 
suffering, and loss of income and general damages over and above medical costs. It was 
recommended by FHLR that the issue be submitted to an independent expert for an opinion 
but because the parties could not reach agreement in this regard, the matter proceeded to 
litigation.                    
The plaintiff’s causes of action arose from the meeting between him and GVI at which he 
signed the PIL ICON. He advanced that a tacit contract was concluded in terms of which 
Roche SA represented by GVI gave a contractual undertaking to him that compensation 
would be awarded for trial-related injuries equivalent to the damages that would normally 
be awarded to a plaintiff by South African or British Courts for similar injuries where liability 
is accepted. This was based on the compensation clause in the PIL ICON.  
The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with costs with the judgement entered into being in 
favour of the defendants. In determining his judgement, the Judge felt it necessary to 
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ascertain who the actual entity was in terms of the tacit contract and exactly what the offer 
of compensation entailed.  
As the sponsor was FHLR and this is made clear in the PIL ICON in which FHLR is mentioned 
many times and because section 4.5 of the SAGCP guidelines allows for a sponsor to transfer 
trial-related functions to a local organisation, FHLR was the contracting party and not Roche 
SA or GVI Oncology. In fact Roche SA was not mentioned in the PIL ICON at all. Furthermore, 
section 4.11 of the SAGCP guidelines provides that it is the sponsor who has the obligation 
to provide compensation. 
As regards compensation, the clause in the PIL ICON read as follows:  
“COMPENSATION IN CASE OF RESEARCH-RELATED INJURY 
The investigational medications will be given to you free of charge and you will not 
have to pay for any study visits or any tests required by the study. F Hoffman-La 
Roche Ltd will pay for the cost of medical treatment with the study medications 
when used as stated in the study protocol. The compensation available is in 
accordance with the ‘Clinical Trial Compensation Guidelines’ published in 1991 by 
the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) 
You may obtain a copy of these ABPI guidelines from your doctor. No other 
compensation is offered. ” 
The interpretation of this clause in the PIL ICON was considered in detail by the Judge. The 
heading of the clause referred to “compensation” but the body stated that FHRL would pay 
the cost of medical treatment for trial-related injuries only and in accordance with the ABPI 
Guidelines. Compensation and costs denoted different concepts, with the former conveying 
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a broader interpretation to include damages to which the individual may be entitled which 
could include an award for pain, suffering and loss of income. This wording was revisited 
against the background section of the ABPI Guidelines which did not lay down any legal 
obligations in terms of compensation. The guidelines were in fact only guidelines that made 
recommendations to the sponsor of the trial. According to the Judge, incorporation of “… in 
accordance with … (ABPI),” did not elevate compensation to a legally enforceable obligation 
and hence, the compensation clause in the PIL ICON did not provide a legal basis for the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages.   
8.3(A) Analysis of the Case 
Definition 
“Vulnerability is an inability or decreased ability of a research participant to sufficiently 
safeguard her/his own needs and interests resulting in her/him being at an increased 
likelihood of being identifiably wronged in varying degrees if special safeguards to protect 
her/him are not invoked by the Research Ethics Committee” 
With the assistance of the use of the criteria in the definition of vulnerability, it is obvious 
that the plaintiff as a research participant was vulnerable in that he was not able to 
understand the content of the PIL ICON. This is evident from his lack of comprehension of its 
compensation clause. I am of the opinion that although his physical illness may have 
resulted in research-related vulnerability, he was not wronged from this perspective as 
special safeguards constituting treatment of research-related injuries had been instituted to 
protect him in this regard.  
 
245  
 
The Vulnerability Scale 
1. Has the essential minimum standard afforded all participants in light of universal 
vulnerability been met?                                                                                                           
As the participant agreed in 2005 to participate in the trial, the expectation is that 
the REC would have been conducting its reviews in line with the SA Ethics Guidelines 
which have been discussed in chapter 5, and which were in use in the country at that 
stage and hence ought to have met this basic standard of safeguards.          
2. Has the baseline for respecting human dignity been met?                                                  
I am of the opinion that this was not achieved in light of the participant’s lack of 
understanding of the implications of participating in the trial. In this way his bodily 
integrity had been violated.  
3. Will any participant be used in the research as a means to an ends she/he may not 
endorse?                                                                                                                           
Because the participant was enrolled in the research without his understanding of 
the PIL ICON being ascertained, he was used in the study as a means to an ends he 
did not endorse. 
4. Will all the research participants in this study be able to safeguard their own needs 
and interests?                                                                                                                          
No. This was an oncology trial involving participants with non-metastatic carcinoma. 
Participants’ abilities to safeguard their own interests could differ in terms of socio-
economic need, medical need, physical response to the intervention, anxiety and 
stress over their current medical condition and the ability to understand what 
participation in the trial would entail.     
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5. If no, is there an increased likelihood of any of them being identifiably wronged as a 
result of their participation in the study? 
Yes.  This would depend on their individual particular vulnerabilities.  
6. Is there an increased likelihood of any participant being identifiably wronged to a 
greater degree than other participants?                                                                           
Yes. This would be the case if participants were not able to adequately protect 
themselves and special safeguards were not initiated by the REC towards their 
particular vulnerabilities. In the case of the plaintiff he was at an increased likelihood 
of experiencing consent wrongs.  
7. Have the identifiable wrongs been recognised?                                                                   
It is clear in the case of this participant that both the RECs did not identify the 
potential for consent wrongs and hence did not respond accordingly. 
8. Have special safeguards been developed to protect those participants in need of such 
safeguards? 
 There had been consent wrongs to the participant as both the RECs approved the 
research without proper and adequate clarification on the meaning and implications 
of compensation in accordance with the ABPI Guidelines. It must be highlighted from 
my personal experience that this situation remains currently unchanged. It would be 
important for the potential participant to understand exactly what is and what is not 
covered by insurance for research-related injury and that this cover is provided on a 
moral basis without any legally binding obligations. An examination of the ABPI 
Guidelines13 reveals that it is recommended that compensation should only be paid 
for the more serious injury of an enduring and disabling character and not for pain or 
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discomfort or less serious or curable complaints (s1.4). The Guidelines do not apply 
to phase I trials either (2.2). I have not seen this type of information included in the 
information to participants in the fifteen years that I have reviewed clinical trials on 
the several different RECs that I have served on, and currently serve on, both locally 
and nationally.  Participants who require this type of knowledge are not having their 
needs and interests safeguarded by RECs in the country. 
In the case of the plaintiff, despite him having the PIL ICON with him for about five 
days together with a member of GVI Oncology taking him through all the points in 
the document, it is clear that he did not understand that compensation in that clause 
was limited to the cost of treatment only and was not broad as it is commonly 
understood to be. Despite FHRL being mentioned in the PIL ICON many times and no 
reference being made to Roche SA, it would seem that he did not understand that 
Roche SA was not the sponsor.  
8.3(B) Discussion 
This case highlights the importance of ensuring that information in the informed consent 
documentation is clearly understood and is comprehensive. Participants’ abilities to 
understand differ and cautioning researchers that going through all the points in the 
document is not sufficient is a necessary safeguard to guide researchers. It would also be 
necessary to ascertain from the participants how much they really understand. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the plaintiff, because he was literate and from a privileged 
social background, as he was able to engage legal counsel at his own costs, unlike the three 
women in the above case, may have not been considered vulnerable from the perspective 
of a lack of understanding of the informed consent document. This is because the norm in 
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research as a result of the effect of the guidelines’ emphasis on vulnerable populations is 
that lack of understanding would be a feature of a vulnerable group that was poor and 
disadvantaged. This is an example of how vulnerability can be overlooked because the 
participant does not fall into a particular subgroup. 
Compensation for research-related injuries was recognised as a moral requirement as early 
in 1900 as discussed in chapter 4. Walter Reed and his Yellow Fever Board, in a written 
contract for local workers in Cuba that explicitly explained the risks if involved in the  
research proposed by the Board, offered a payment of $100 compensation for those who 
became ill with yellow fever14. The Belmont Report15, however, is silent on the issue of 
research-related injuries. In 2013, the DoH16 stressed the importance of compensating 
injured participants by, for the first time including compensation in its “General Principles”. 
Section 15 states that, “Appropriate compensation and treatment for subjects who are 
harmed as a result of participating in research must be ensured”. It goes on further under 
“Scientific Requirements and Research Protocols” to state, in section 22 that protocols 
should contain, “… information regarding provisions for treating and/or compensating 
subjects who are harmed as a consequence of participation in the research study.” The DoH 
contradicts itself in that in its principles it is explicit that both compensation and treatment 
must be ensured. However in the implementation it provides for “… treating and/or 
compensating … ” (itallics – my emphasis), and in so doing, weakens its newly introduced 
principle considerably. However, the DoH does differentiate between the two different 
concepts of compensation and cost as discussed above and does make allowance for both.  
The CIOMS17 states in Guideline 19 that “Investigators should ensure that research subjects 
who suffer injury as a result of their participation are entitled to free medical treatment for 
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such injury and to such financial or other assistance as would compensate them equitably 
for any resultant impairment, disability or handicap. In the case of death as a result of their 
participation, their dependants are entitled to compensation. Subjects must not be asked to 
waive the right to compensation.” Hence these guidelines provide for two well-defined 
entitlements, that of free medical treatment and compensation for accidental injury; and 
that of dependants to material compensation. This guideline takes into consideration that 
compensation and costs denote two different concepts.   
The ICH GCP Guidelines18, in section 5.8 on “Compensation to Subjects and Investigators”, 
states that the sponsor should provide insurance if required by the applicable regulatory 
requirements and the method and manner of compensation should comply with these 
requirements. The sponsor’s policies should address the costs of treatment in the event of 
trial-related injuries. These guidelines are quite feeble and watered down in terms of 
ensuring protections for injuries as a result of trial participation, and in my opinion has failed 
to differentiate between compensation and cost. 
The principal motivation for ensuring participants that are injured in research are taken care 
of involves the principles of justice and fairness, and more specifically compensatory justice 
as discussed in chapter 2. Participants involved in research, where the informed consent 
process is above reproach, accept risks associated with the research and at times place their 
lives on the line. Because it is usually society that benefits from the participants’ acceptance 
of the risks, it is only fair that participants are protected from the harms that may arise. Not 
doing so would result in participants being used as a means to the sponsor’s, researchers’, 
or society’s ends. The SA Ethics Guidelines19 fails research participants in this regard as all it 
states on the issue is in section 2.6 on “Informed Consent”. It outlines some points that 
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participants may (my emphasis) find useful in the informed consent, with one of them 
being, “Explanation as to whether compensation will be given for research-related injuries”. 
This Guideline does not make explicit the need for compensation and treatment as a moral 
entitlement to research participants and it infringes the principle of justice and fairness. 
While the SAGCP20, as mentioned in the judgement above includes the principles of the ABPI 
Guidelines, the South African ethical and regulatory framework is only weakly protectionist 
in this regard. It is therefore imperative that RECs ensure appropriate and adequate strong 
protections in the event of research-related injuries. Currently, it would seem that the best 
way to do this is by ensuring that participants truly understand the information given to 
them during the informed consent process.      
8.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have utilised two Court Judgements to test the utility of the definition and 
Vulnerability Assessment Scale developed in the previous chapter. In the first case the tools 
demonstrated clearly that the participants had suffered consent, social, physical, and 
psychological wrongs. With the use of the tools, it was also established that different types 
of access require consideration in contexts of social deprivation, and that lack of access to 
competent legal advice and guidance could also result in participants being wronged. In the 
second case the tool assisted in highlighting the importance of the understanding element 
of informed consent being satisfied for consent to be deemed valid. It also brought to light 
and made material the concern with the subgroup classification of vulnerability in the 
guidelines in that a participant who is not categorised into a particular vulnerable group may 
not be considered as needing special protections. Health research in S A, as defined by the 
NHA (see chapter 1) is quite broad and includes not only medical interventional studies but 
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also research into the biological, clinical, psychological or social processes in human beings, 
health service provision research, and epidemiological studies. These tools could be easily 
applied to any of these studies by RECs during the review process.  The tool is of immense 
value in that it can be utilized during the review process, during the course of the research 
and even after the research is over to assist RECs to guide researchers, sponsors and even 
political authorities on optimizing protections for participants in research. Moreover, it 
could also be used as an adjudication tool should a dispute arise.  
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSION 
I concluded chapter 7 with the advancement of a definition of vulnerability in health 
research and a Vulnerability Assessment Scale to assist RECs guide researchers on focussed 
protections of vulnerable individuals. In chapter 8, I was able to demonstrate the utility of 
these tools. These instruments recognise heterogeneity between individuals and unlike the 
guidelines’ subpopulations approach to vulnerability, they steer away from arbitrary 
distinctions. They adopt a holistic approach which addresses both the individual and 
structural causes of vulnerability and makes positive action to prevent wrongs to research 
participants with vulnerabilities morally obligatory. Hence, the definition and Scale confer a 
responsibility to address vulnerability. 
The definition and Scale have benefitted by being derived from a combination of a 
normative, metaethical and historical inquiry. Using this method of analysis, in which the 
major ethical theories of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics together with the four 
principles of medical ethics have assisted substantially, I have been able to deduce that the 
categorization of people into vulnerable groups is not justified and that RECs have 
responsibilities derived from common morality to ensure special protections for research 
participants who are vulnerable in order to safeguard them from being wronged. I have also 
been able to demonstrate that despite vulnerability remaining an abstract concept, it has 
concrete effects both on those who are labelled vulnerable and those who are not and that 
it is imperative that researchers with guidance from RECs are able to identify which 
vulnerable individuals qualify for special protections without paternalistic impositions. 
I have argued earlier that vulnerability is an ontological condition of our humanity. This 
ordinary or universal human vulnerability is also linked to the inherent sociality of human 
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life in that embodied social beings are both dependant on the care and support of others 
and also vulnerable to their actions. It is unambiguous that the human condition in itself 
implies vulnerability. The definition and Scale consider safeguards for universal vulnerability 
for all participants in research as a basic minimum standard and provide additional 
protections for participants with more than universal vulnerability.  I have made the 
argument that research ethics mandates special protections for participants considered to 
be vulnerable because of the danger of exploitation by researchers and the need to respect 
the intrinsic value and dignity of those who do not have the means and/or ability to protect 
themselves. Exploiting the vulnerabilities of participants is one of the ways in which justice 
as fairness is violated in research. I have demonstrated that these concerns over 
vulnerabilities have been intricately linked with issues of moral status and human dignity of 
the research participant and that the recognition and respect of the moral status of the 
research participant is important because it supports essential moral protections in the 
context of vulnerability.  Respecting the moral status of the participant with vulnerabilities 
in health research would serve to caution that safeguarding her or him against exploitation 
would be a morally justifiable action that would also give regard to protecting her or his 
dignity as a human being. As inferred in chapter 3, human dignity is an articulation of a 
fundamental value that is widely accepted as seen by the fact that reference to and reliance 
on human dignity is found in most leading international documents. In the Constitution of 
South Africa, the supreme law of the land, human dignity is a constant refrain.  
Respecting human dignity translates to respecting the intrinsic worth of the research 
participant, independent of the individual’s capacity of rational autonomy. This in turn 
translates to how the researcher as one moral agent treats the vulnerable research 
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participant, another moral agent with reciprocal moral status. Coercive acts are 
incompatible with respect for the dignity of participants. Being demeaned or humiliated as a 
result of participation in research clearly violates the dignity of participants. This type of lack 
of respect could destroy or reduce the self-respect that is so necessary to the intrinsic worth 
of being human. Respect for intrinsic worth of the research participant recognises that she 
or he is entitled to her or his own beliefs, attitudes, ideas and feelings. Physical or 
psychological coercion is as striking an affront to human dignity as physical abuse or mental 
torture both within and outside the research context. Human beings are morally important 
because they have dignity, which is the inviolable core of being human and also of what 
gives one moral status. I have made an argument in my analysis on the link between moral 
status, human dignity and vulnerability that respect for human dignity and moral status are 
indispensable components of ethical standards for the treatment of participants in health 
research and that every human being, regardless of the degree to which he or she is 
autonomous, or vulnerable, has intrinsic worth. Human dignity and moral status are natural 
properties of research participants which must be recognised by researchers and REC 
members. Respecting human dignity and moral status is core to protecting the vulnerable 
research participant against exploitation and other forms of harms and wrongs. Moreover, 
this ensures that because of her or his inherent worth they are protected from being 
treated as a means to an end they may not endorse. Exploitation of vulnerability 
unequivocally results in violation of human dignity and disrespect of moral status.  
From a historical perspective, as has already been discussed, because of the disasters and 
disgrace in medical research generated by the Nazi doctors during the 2nd World War, 
protectionism in health research emerged, with the Nuremberg Code of 1947 being the first 
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protectionist international document in research ethics. This was followed by the DoH in 
1964 and as science and technology advanced, the DoH was revised and the WMA in 
October 2013 published the eighth version of the Declaration. The DoH is recognised as the 
leading research ethics guideline internationally. After many other abuses of vulnerable 
subjects in research in the United States, the Belmont Report was produced and Federal 
Rules were established for protecting vulnerable participants enrolled in studies. In SA 
establishing protections for participants of research commenced in the late sixties at the 
level of individual institutions. The protectionist approach was not as a response to scandals 
and tragedies inflicted on vulnerable participants by South African researchers but because 
of a sense of moral agency, moral responsibility and moral accountability of researchers in 
this country towards people they enrolled in research, especially since sponsors and 
researchers from well-resourced countries, and in particular the US, had started finding less 
resourced areas highly attractive for the conduct of clinical research. 
I have indicated earlier that the Belmont Report which had a major influence on 
international and the SA Ethics Guidelines, introduced “vulnerability” and the “group” or 
“subpopulation” lexicon into research ethics guidance documents. The Report is therefore 
the root cause of the confusion and the labelling of people created in this arena. From an 
international guidelines perspective the 2000 version of the Declaration of Helsinki first 
made direct reference to the term. The themes of justice and informed consent were used 
to guide the unfolding of the group and subpopulation focus of vulnerability in these 
documents. While the objective of the early documents to protect vulnerable individuals 
that were involved in research is clearly unquestionable, the challenges created by the 
subpopulation and group approach have been vigorously articulated in this thesis.  
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It became clear during the analysis that protection should be viewed not as exclusion but as 
allowing participants to volunteer without the risk of abuse and of being wronged and that 
what was actually required was a robust, focussed and comprehensive definition of 
vulnerability to start off with. This definition, when applied in the research ethics review 
process, would allow for the REC to provide guidance to researchers on how:  
a. to recognise vulnerability in potential participants  
b. to recognise their degrees of vulnerability 
c. to build moral responses (aimed at duties of protection) and  
d. to justify these moral responses. 
Not only has an appropriate operational definition been developed but a Vulnerability 
Assessment Scale has also been extracted from it. The Scale essentially enhances 
protections by assisting RECs in guiding researchers on the implementation of the definition 
and hence strengthens and enriches strong protectionism. 
The utility of the definition and the Vulnerability Assessment Scale was tested in the 
previous chapter through reference to two court judgements. The value of the definition 
and Scale was clearly demonstrated to extend beyond the review process. These 
instruments can also be used during the course of research, after the research is over and as 
an adjudication tool should a dispute arise. The tools developed in this thesis offer a guide 
on the moral obligations of RECs and researchers in terms of avoiding wrongs to research 
participants with vulnerabilities by respecting them or their proxies (where relevant) as 
autonomous agents; guarding against them being harmed; behaving justly and fairly 
towards them and optimizing benefits to them. The definition and Scale are strongly 
protectionist and are compatible with all the moral philosophical systems described in this 
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thesis. Despite rejecting the subpopulation and group approach, they are also in line with 
the principles as articulated in the DoH and other international and national guidelines, 
including those from South Africa.  
I conclude this thesis by establishing that this ethical inquiry has resulted in the concept of 
vulnerability in health research no longer being nebulous and vague and that there is now a 
cogent definition that assists with finding the best balance between adequate protections 
and excluding individuals that need to be excluded from research. The definition of 
vulnerability is no longer an unanswered question. Neither can it be criticised for being an 
extensive albeit non-exhaustive list that at times could be paternalistic and demeaning. 
Moreover, this approach towards recognising and instituting protections for the vulnerable 
participant would safeguard against the participant in research being used as a means to an 
end that she or he may not endorse. Furthermore, should this practice become the norm in 
health research, it would go a long way in easing the suspicions that the public has against 
researchers, improve respect from the public towards REC functioning and promote a 
researcher-participant relationship built on trust. 
The definition and Vulnerability Assessment Scale (Annexure IV: Guidelines for Protecting a 
Research Participant who is Vulnerable) will be offered to RECs in South Africa and further 
afield for use in advancing the most appropriate and ethical approach towards vulnerable 
participants in health research.  
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Annexure 2: The Nuremberg Code 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.  
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so 
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any 
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or 
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the 
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened 
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision 
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and 
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or 
person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.  
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each 
individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and 
responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.  
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, 
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in 
nature.  
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal 
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem 
under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.  
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4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental 
suffering and injury.  
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that 
death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the 
experimental physicians also serve as subjects.  
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian 
importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.  
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the 
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.  
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest 
degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those 
who conduct or engage in the experiment.  
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the 
experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of 
the experiment seems to him to be impossible.  
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to 
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably cause to believe, in the exercise of 
the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the 
experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject. 
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Annexure 3: Circular of the Reich Minister of the Interior Concerning Guidelines for New 
Therapy and Human Experimentation, 28 February 1931. 
(As Reprinted in History and Theory of Human Experimentation. Eds  Schmidt U, Frewer A. 
Franz Steiner Verlag. Germany (2007): 333-335)  
The Reich Health-Council (Reichsgesundheitsrat) has set great store in ensuring that all 
physicians receive information with regard to the following Guidelines. The Council has 
agreed that all physicians in open and closed healthcare institutions should sign a 
commitment to these guidelines when entering their employment.  
Final Draft of Guidelines for New Therapy and Human Experimentation 
1. Medical science, if it is not to come to a standstill, cannot refrain from introducing in 
suitable cases New Therapy using as yet insufficiently tested agents and methods. 
Also, medical science cannot dispense completely with Human Experimentation. 
Otherwise, progress in diagnosis, therapy, and prevention of disease would be 
hindered or even rendered impossible. 
 The special rights to be granted to the physician under these new guidelines 
must be balanced by the special duty of the physician to be aware of the grave 
responsibility which he bears for the life and health of each individual undergoing 
New Therapy or Human Experimentation. 
2. The term New Therapy used in these Guidelines defines therapeutic experimentation 
and modes of treatment of humans which serve the process of healing, i.e., pursuing 
in specific individual cases the recognition, healing or prevention of an illness or 
suffering, or the removal of a bodily defect, even though the effects and 
consequences of the therapy cannot yet be adequately determined on the basis of 
available knowledge.  
3. The term Human Experimentation, as defined in the Guidelines, means operations 
and modes of treatment on humans carried out for research purposes which are 
non-therapeutic; it includes the side-effects and consequences which cannot yet be 
adequately determined on the basis of available knowledge. 
4. Any New Therapy must be in accord with the principles of medical ethics and the 
rules of the medical arts and sciences, both in its design and in its realization.  
A consideration and calculation of possible harms must be undertaken to 
determine whether they stand in a suitable relationship to expected benefits.  
New Therapy may only be initiated after being tested in animal 
experimentation, where this is at all possible.  
5. New Therapy may only be applied if consent or proxy consent has been given in a 
clear and undebatable manner following earlier appropriate information.  
New Therapy may only be introduced without consent if it is urgently 
required, and cannot be postponed because of a need to save life or prevent severe 
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damage to health, and if prior consent could not be obtained owing to special 
circumstances. 
6. Introduction of New Therapy in the treatment of children and minors under eighteen 
requires especially careful examination. 
7. Medical ethics rejects any exploitation of social and economic need in conducting 
New Therapy.  
8. New Therapy using living micro-organisms requires heightened caution, especially in 
the case of live pathogens. Such therapy may only be considered permissible if a 
relative degree of harmlessness in the procedure can be assumed, and if the 
achievement of equal benefits by other means cannot be expected under any given 
circumstances.  
9. In medical ethics, polyclinics, hospitals or other health care institutions, New 
Therapy may only be conducted by the chief physician himself or, at his specific 
request and with his full responsibility, by another physician.  
10. A written report on any new therapy is required, containing information on therapy 
design, its justification and execution. Such a report shall state especially that the 
subject, or his legal representative, has been adequately informed and has given 
consent. If New Therapy is applied without consent, according to (5.2), the report 
must clearly outline these pre-conditions.  
11.  Publication of results of New Therapy must respect the patient’s dignity and the 
commandments of humanity. 
12. Numbers 1 through 11 of these Guidelines are equally applicable to Human 
Experimentation (Art.3). In addition, the following requirements for such 
experimentations apply:  
a) Without consent, non-therapeutic research is under no circumstances 
permissible. 
b) Any human experimentation which could as well be carried out in animal 
experimentation is not permissible. Only after all basic information has been 
obtained, should Human Experimentation begin. This information should first be 
obtained by means of scientific biological or laboratory research and animal 
experimentation for reasons of clarification and safety. Given these 
presuppositions, unfounded or random Human Experimentation is 
impermissible.     
c) Experimentation with children or minors is impermissible if it endangers the child 
or minor in the slightest degree.  
d) Experimentation with dying persons conflicts with the principles of medical 
ethics and therefore is impermissible. 
13. Assuming that, in accordance with these Guidelines physicians and, in particular, 
responsible directors in charge of medical institutions will be guided by a strong 
sense of responsibility toward the patients entrusted to them, it also is to be hoped 
that they will maintain a readiness responsibly to seek relief, improvement, 
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protection or cure for the patient along new paths, when the accepted and actual 
state of medical science, according to their medical knowledge, no longer seems 
adequate. 
14. In academic teaching, already, every opportunity should be used to stress the special 
duties of a physician undertaking New Therapy or Human Experimentation; these 
special responsibilities also apply to the publication of the results of New Therapy 
and Human Experimentation.   
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Annexure 4: Guidelines for Protecting a Research Participant who is Vulnerable 
 
RECs make the decisions on how participants in research are to be protected but the actual 
implementation of the safeguards is the responsibility of the professionals that conduct 
research. This is why the researcher-participant relationship in which the moral status of the 
participant is respected and her / his human dignity is upheld is so important. The Definition 
of vulnerability and the Vulnerability Assessment Scale below, together with the example of  
clustering of identifiable wrongs to specific contexts could aid RECs in the review process 
such that they would be able to plan directed protections for the potential research 
participants. In this way, both RECs and research participants benefit from the use of these 
tools. The Scale offered will require RECs to execute focussed and comprehensive wrongs 
assessments from the protocol to include the scientific aspects, social context and moral 
implications of the study and in so doing guide the researcher on how potential participants 
ought to be protected based on their individual needs and capabilities.  
 
A Practical Working Definition of Vulnerability and its Application in Health Research 
“Vulnerability is an inability or decreased ability of a research participant to 
sufficiently safeguard her/his own needs and interests resulting in her/him being at 
an increased likelihood of being identifiably wronged in varying degrees if special 
safeguards to protect her/him are not invoked by the Research Ethics Committee” 
 The baseline protective safeguards essential to this definition are the basic protections for 
all participants that are enrolled in research. This definition is quite specific as to what the 
criteria are for a research participant to be vulnerable takes into consideration degrees of 
abilities or inabilities to protect oneself in research. The REC is mandated to develop 
focussed safeguards to protect participants against identifiable wrongs.  
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A simple but focussed and routinely applied “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale which asks 
relevant questions in sequential order is a necessary complement to the definition in 
determining vulnerability. 
The “Vulnerability Assessment” Scale 
This scale assists RECs implement the above definition of vulnerability during the review of 
protocols. Vulnerabilities are firmly linked to correlative responsibilities. The more 
vulnerable the person, the greater is the agent’s responsibility to protect the individual’s 
interests. Vulnerability is seen as a matter of degree dependant on the number of needs 
arising in the researcher-participant relationship and the amount of assistance that would 
be required to meet those needs.  To optimise protections, RECs would need to answer the 
questions posed in sequential order.   
1. Has the essential minimum standard afforded all participants in light of universal 
vulnerability been met? 
2. Has the baseline for respecting human dignity been met? 
3. Will any participant be used in the research as a means to an ends she/he may 
not endorse?      
4. Will all the research participants in this study be able to safeguard their own 
needs and interests? 
5. If no, is there an increased likelihood of any of them being identifiably wronged 
as a result of their participation in the study? 
6. Is there an increased likelihood of any participant being identifiably wronged to a 
greater degree than other participants? 
7. Have the identifiable wrongs been recognised?   
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8. Have special safeguards been developed to protect those participants in need of 
such safeguards? 
The REC would also be assisted by developing clusters of pertinent easily identifiable 
wrongs. These could be categorised for ease of reference in the example below:  
IDENTIFIABLE WRONGS: Clusters and Examples  
Cluster of Wrongs Examples  
Physical Wrongs Medical physical risks outweighing benefits, non-medical 
physical wrongs, e.g., pain, discomfort 
Consent Wrongs Exploitation because of, e.g., : 
Lack of capacity (e.g., extremes of age, mental disorders, 
anxiety, emergency) 
Understanding barriers (e.g., language, low levels of literacy) 
Diminished freedom or voluntariness (e.g., manipulation, 
coercion) 
Social Wrongs Confidentiality breach / inappropriate dissemination of results 
of research (e.g., stigmatisation, stereotyping, discrimination, 
physical / gender-based violence, job loss, legal sanction) 
Psychological Wrongs         Anxiety, stress, emotional suffering (e.g., could be triggered 
by research tool, e.g., sensitive questions in interview 
schedule)   
Justice Wrongs       no post study access to proven intervention, inequitable 
standards of care usually with international research, no 
provision for compensation for research-related injuries. 
  
  
 
   
 
                             
